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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Cosmopolitan accounts of justice received a major impetus from Peter Singer’s 1972 
article Famine, Affluence, and Morality on the moral illegitimacy of famine, which argued 
for a radical rethinking of our moral duties to prevent deaths from famine wherever they 
occur. Since Singer’s article appeared, the process of globalization has only intensified. 
The concept of globalization, however, is contested, giving rise to different 
interpretations and definitions. We will here us the working definition offered by 
Manfred Steger: 
Globalization refers to a multidimensional set of social processes that create, 
multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and exchanges 
while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening 
connections between the local and the distant. (Steger 2003, 13) 
As a consequence of this complex phenomenon, the world we live in is characterized 
by an unprecedented level of global interconnectedness and interdependence. 
International trade increases ever faster and finance seems to know no borders. 
Information and communication technologies, as well as international travel, increase 
our knowledge of living conditions in other parts of the world. The resultant benefits are 
numerous and irrefutable, e.g. improvements in healthcare and information access. 
However, globalization of industry, massive population growth and ever-increasing 
energy demands have also brought severe burdens which are spread across the globe – 
e.g. climate change, a problem which has a clear dimension of (in)justice in view of the 
inverse relationship between historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions and 
vulnerability to the impacts of such emissions. Moreover, climate change is the risk with 
the greatest potential impact on our world, according to the recent Global Risks Report 
of the World Economic Forum (2016).  
Globalization also entails an erosion of national sovereignty. As a consequence inter 
alia of the establishment of organizations such as the European Union and the World 
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Trade Organization (WTO), decision-making increasingly occurs at the supranational 
level. As the influence of such bodies on domestic policy-making grows, the boundaries 
between the national and the international spheres are disappearing in various contexts. 
Thus, the background against which individuals play their role in the world has changed 
profoundly over the last decades. This raises fundamental questions regarding the ‘moral 
calibre’ of supranational institutions, practices and regulations, and our role in their 
creation and imposition. The globalized world we live in is characterized by a multitude 
of causal connections and these new modes of interaction seem to challenge our common 
sense conception of individual responsibility. 
In this dissertation, we will try to answer some of these important questions generated 
by the process of globalization and situated at the intersection of moral philosophy (in 
particular global ethics) and political philosophy (in particular theories of global justice). 
We will focus on both individual moral responsibility and the principles and institutional 
conditions for the effective realization of a just society. Special attention will be paid to 
feasibility objections related to the successful tackling of climate change. 
According to ‘cosmopolitan’ approaches to global justice, the scope of justice is global, 
thus principles of distributive justice should operate globally rather than merely at the 
level of the state. As noted by Thomas Pogge, one of the foremost writers on global justice 
and a proponent of cosmopolitanism: 
Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individualism: the 
ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons – rather than, say, family 
lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter 
may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or 
citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every 
living human being equally – not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, 
Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status has global force. 
Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, 
fellow religionists, or such like. (Pogge 1992, 48-49, footnotes omitted) 
With increased communication and information access, the inequality of the global 
distribution of benefits and burdens is well-known to most. Cosmopolitanism requires us 
to acknowledge our responsibility to promote global justice, to reduce those inequalities. 
Some ‘realist’ critics, however, argue that cosmopolitan global justice is infeasible; thus 
states should focus on advancing their national interest and should not seek to advance 
the standard of living of non-nationals. In this dissertation we will assess the most 
commonly invoked ‘infeasibility’ arguments relating to both the individual and the 
institutional levels. We will investigate the nature and effects of barriers of motivation at 
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the individual level (in particular conceptions of individual responsibility), the 
institutional conditions required for an effective promotion of global justice, and the 
interactions between these levels. 
The questions that are central to this dissertation are: 
How should we conceptualise global justice? 
How does globalization affect (i.e. increase or decrease or change the nature of) the 
moral responsibilities of individual agents? 
Is the lack of motivation at the individual level to tackle climate change really 
insurmountable? 
Should considerations of institutional feasibility affect the responsibilities of the 
individuals that shape these institutions? 
Can an institutional cosmopolitanism help to overcome the feasibility objections at 
the level of the individual moral agent? 
The main aim of this dissertation thus is to assess to what extent feasibility 
considerations should affect the responsibilities generated by the process of 
globalization, with climate change as our focal point.  
1.1 Globalization and global justice 
What is global justice? 
The first question we will address in this dissertation is what global justice exactly means. 
Traditionally, theories of global justice are classified under one of three general 
conceptions: political realism, the morality-(or society-)of-states, and cosmopolitanism 
(Beitz 1979). Political realism has a long tradition in the discipline of International 
Relations. It has been the standard view for many years. Realism can be considered to be 
the complete opposite of idealism and hostile to utopianism (Caney 2005, 7-8). Morality 
thus has no place in international relations, which inspired Darrel Moellendorf to equate 
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political realism to ‘politics without morals’ (2002, 143). In contrast to political realism, 
proponents of the so-called society-of-states approach, such as Terry Nardin (1983) and 
John Rawls (1999), believe that morality does have a place in the international realm. 
However, they consider the moral rules governing this realm to be different from those 
governing the domestic sphere. What we owe to our compatriots is fundamentally 
different from what we owe to distant strangers. In contrast, cosmopolitans claim that 
moral obligations and considerations of justice are global in scope. They attach little (or 
sometimes even no) ethical significance to national boundaries. This is significantly 
different from the position of political realists, who claim that morality has no place in 
the international realm, but only governs domestic affairs. It also differentiates 
cosmopolitans from society-of-states proponents and nationalists, for whom borders or 
national boundaries are very important in delineating moral obligations. 
In chapter 2 we will provide an overview of the key arguments in this debate between 
realists, society-of-states proponents (and nationalists), and cosmopolitans. We will 
dismiss political realism as a kind of scepticism, both on empirical and ethical grounds. 
Realism thus should not be considered to be a moral position. The society-of-states 
approach, in contrast, is a moral position. Proponents of this approach argue that our 
obligations towards our compatriots differ fundamentally from our obligations towards 
distant strangers. We will critically assess the most important arguments that are invoked 
to explain this difference. In other words, we will evaluate answers to the famous 
question: ‘What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my’ that should justify us in overturning 
the decisions of impartial truth?’ (Godwin 1971 [1793], book 2, chapter 2). Two kinds of 
reasons are commonly used to justify giving priority to one’s compatriots, namely 
efficiency or some intrinsic feature or independent moral force inherent to sharing a 
nation, state, or community. We will dismiss the efficiency argument as ethically 
unsound, given the huge inequalities that characterize our current world. The claim that 
some relationships have intrinsic value and that this implies that they generate special 
responsibilities cannot be so easily refuted. However, as the process of globalization 
intensifies, it seems to put further pressure on the priority thesis defended by the society-
of-states proponents. 
Cosmopolitanism seems better suited to these changing background conditions. 
Cosmopolitans like Pogge (1992; 2008) have shifted the focus from the level of the state to 
include international institutions. However, cosmopolitans have divergent views on what 
exactly constitutes ‘global justice’. More specifically, their disagreements concern the 
reason why moral duties should apply globally, what values or which goods need to be 
promoted, and to what extent. In the second section of chapter 2 we will discuss the 
similarities and differences between the most prominent variants of cosmopolitanism. 
Special attention will go to utilitarianism, a contractarian account, a needs-based 
account, the capabilities approach, a Kantian account, and a rights-based account of 
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cosmopolitanism. We will conclude this chapter by developing our own position in the 
debate.  
Our starting point will be the fact that there exists reasonable disagreement about 
what justice exactly entails. A complicating factor here is that judgments about 
reasonableness are (to some extent) normative in kind, and consequently potentially 
controversial (Valentini 2010a, 8). However, we believe that the idea of reasonable 
disagreement is not unintelligible. Laura Valentini summarizes it as follows: ‘when 
disagreement is reasonable, none of the parties involved can be accused of being 
irrational or obviously mistaken’. As a consequence, their views merit to be taken 
seriously (Valentini 2010a, 9). Christopher McMahon (2009, 19) expresses a similar point: 
‘Disagreement is reasonable when the relevant considerations are such that competent 
engagement with them is compatible with the reaching of different conclusions’. 
Characteristic for reasonable disagreement thus is that none of the contending positions 
can be reasonably rejected (Gutman and Thompson 2004, 28; Scanlon 1998, 153). 
Disagreements of this kind are omnipresent in the realm of politics. Citizens hold 
divergent views on policies regarding taxation or the welfare system, for example. When 
we turn our attention to the international level, the disagreement about justice appears 
no less pervasive: 
It is hard to deny that many reasonable and reflective people disagree about which 
principles of distributive justice, if any, should apply at the global level. Given this 
it seems unreasonable simply to state that political institutions should be designed 
to best realise the correct principles of distributive justice. (Caney 2009, 116) 
How should we deal with this situation? Faced with reasonable disagreement with 
regard to different conceptions of global justice, how should we proceed? Valentini claims 
that the principle of equal respect should play an important role in this context. This 
principle requires that the implemented institutional arrangements are justifiable to 
everyone affected by them. She illustrates this claim using the example of tax reform 
(Valentini 2010a, 17-18). Some citizens might defend a reform based on the difference 
principle, claiming that the distribution of income and wealth should always benefit the 
worst-off. However, other citizens might hold different, yet equally reasonable, views; 
[…] under circumstances of deep reasonable disagreement, we cannot 
unproblematically assume that this [the difference principle] is what equal respect 
for persons actually requires. Some may reasonably hold this view, but others may 
equally reasonably believe that respect for persons has different distributive 
implications. Under such circumstances, we cannot take ourselves to respect others 
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if we simply impose our views on them. To do so would be to fail to recognize their 
status as equal rational and autonomous agents. (Ibid.) 
We agree with Valentini (2013) that reasonable disagreement, together with the notion 
of equal respect, makes it very difficult to justify demanding conceptions of global justice. 
She concludes that the only moral imperative that can be defended is to protect a set of 
fundamental rights (2013, 100). This conclusion is not uncontested, yet gains significant 
strength when we accept that duties of justice generate ‘rightfully enforceable 
entitlements’ (Valentini 2013, 94). These entitlements may thus be enforced without 
wrongdoing, even if people are not sufficiently motivated to comply. As this is a defining 
feature of duties of justice, deciding which duties are to be considered duties of justice 
requires caution. Especially when we are faced with reasonable disagreement, the 
principle of equal respect implies not to impose your conception of the good on others. 
Juha Räikkä (1998) has discussed the moral costs that can be caused by the 
implementation (or imposition) of certain ideals. He argues that we should pay attention 
to the moral costs of changeover, since avoiding these costs might turn out to be more 
important than achieving the ideal suggested by the theory (1998, 35). In this context he 
refers to John Rawls (1987, 4), who argues that full agreement on the demands of justice 
can only be achieved under a totalitarian regime. 
The point is that certain ideals (and theories supporting them) should be rejected, 
not only if it is literally impossible to implement the ideals, but also if in practice it 
would necessarily be too costly to implement them. Implementing certain ideals 
would necessarily violate the value of pluralism, or would require “oppressive use 
of state power,” and this is why these ideals should be rejected as unjustified. 
(Räikkä 1998, 35) 
We need not endorse Rawls’ strong claim that full agreement on justice can only be 
achieved through oppressive use of state power to acknowledge that imposing a 
demanding conception of the good on people that reasonably disagree with this 
conception involves unjustifiable moral costs (such as contradicting the will of the 
people)1. Therefore, we agree with Valentini that only respect for a set of basic rights can 
 
                                                     
1 ‘Why do political theorists generally think that the ideals they defend should not be carried out, even if 
possible, if those ideals blatantly contradict the will of the people? Because they see that the moral costs of 
changeover - the rejection of democratic procedures - would be so serious that implementing the ideals is 
unjustified. So in that case there is a moral reason (a respect for democracy) to think that the morally justifiable 
ideals should not be implemented’ (Räikkä 1998, 39). We want to emphasize that this moral cost should only be 
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be justifiably imposed as a conception of justice. This comes very close to the minimal 
rights-based position defended by Pogge and Simon Caney, characterized by their 
prioritizing of negative human rights. This position thus can be ‘adopted from within a 
wide variety of different conceptions of the good and ethical worldviews’ (Caney 2010, 
169). Because this position is a moderate (allowing special obligations) and weak (not 
arguing for global equality) form of cosmopolitanism, it will not face as much opposition 
as extreme and strong accounts. Since the modest premises of this minimalist normative 
position cannot reasonably be refuted,2 whatever conclusions we can derive from them 
will be very difficult to reject. In a similar vein as Pogge we thus grant that there only are 
duties to respect basic human rights, not to promote them. In chapter 3 we will examine 
to what extent we are currently meeting our minimal obligations within the globalized 
world. 
It is important to note here that we do not ground this minimalist position on 
considerations of feasibility. The fact that this position is widely acceptable heightens its 
chance of being successfully implemented, but this is not the reason why we defend it. 
Even if people would not be motivated to fulfil their obligations under this minimal 
conception, these obligations would not lose any normative force. In determining the 
duties of justice, motivations should be disregarded, otherwise agents would be let off the 
moral hook too easily; ‘The fact that a person won’t do something isn’t enough for us to 
retract an imperative that she ought to’ (Lawford-Smith 2013, 254). However, we do 
believe that a valid theory of justice ‘should not contain requirements that are altogether 
beyond human reach’ (Valentini, 2010b). Since reasonable disagreement about justice 
seems to be a persistent feature of human existence, Valentini concludes that justice can 
only command respect for basic human rights.3 We will elaborate our position further in 
chapter 2. 
 
                                                     
taken into consideration if the disagreement is reasonable. The will of the people should evidently be overruled 
if the majority of a society wants to implement a racist policy, for example. We will discuss the possible tension 
between democracy and justice in depth in chapter 7. 
2 We believe that violating people’s basic human rights is irreconcilable with meeting the demands of the 
principle of equal respect. We will take the active violation of negative human rights as our baseline for 
determining harm and injustice. 
3 Through the use of the concept ‘beyond human reach’, feasibility seems to creep back in through the back 
door. However, we need to distinguish between principles and the question of their implementation (Barry and 
Valentini 2009; Cohen 2001); ‘It is ways of implementing principles in the world that are feasible or infeasible, 
not principles themselves’ (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012, 811). What is considered to be ‘beyond human 
reach’ thus is the full and free agreement on principles of justice, not the motivation to comply with the 
corresponding obligations of justice. 
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Has globalization changed our responsibilities regarding global justice, 
and if so, how? 
The second question we will address in this dissertation is whether the process of 
globalization has changed our responsibilities, and if so, how (chapter 3)? Our starting 
point here will be that since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, many of these human rights still 
remain unfulfilled. Using the framework of the ‘responsibilities approach’ to human 
rights, as developed by Kuper et al. (2005, ix-xxii), we will examine how this situation 
came about. The central question in this approach is ‘who must do what for whom’? If we 
fail to identify the agents that bear the counterpart obligations that arise from human 
rights, we are at risk of emptying the human rights discourse of any meaningful content. 
To avoid this risk, we need to allocate these responsibilities in an ethically justified way. 
The process of globalization has complicated this important task significantly. 
Traditionally, a distinction is made between negative rights (understood as rights to 
noninterference) and positive rights (conceived of as rights to assistance). A corresponding 
distinction is made between negative duties of noninterference and positive duties of 
assistance (Cruft 2005, 29-30). Although criticized (Shue 1980), we agree with Samuel 
Scheffler (2001, 39) that this distinction remains one of the important hallmarks of our 
common sense conception of individual responsibility. People do feel more responsible 
when they have contributed to the harmful situation that needs remedying, than when 
they have merely failed to prevent it. We will apply this distinction to the human rights 
approach, arguing that our first and foremost duty is to avoid the active violation of 
negative human rights. Following Pogge (2008, 25), we will take this conception as our 
baseline for determining harm and injustice. In other words, if one violates people’s 
human rights, one is clearly harming those people. 
Another common sense distinction is made between general and special obligations. 
General obligations are obligations we owe to everyone equally, on the basis of our common 
humanity. For example, we all bear the general obligation not to interfere negatively with 
another person. However, our general obligations do not seem to imply respect for 
positive human rights. We do not assume that it is our obligation to ensure that everyone’s 
human rights are actively fulfilled. Our general positive duties of assistance seem less 
stringent and more problematic, especially from a motivational perspective. Moreover, 
we face the difficulty of assessing who should bear those responsibilities, if we do not want 
to make the human rights discourse void of meaning. This difficulty is known as the 
‘allocation problem’.  
Special obligations, in contrast, are owed only to some specific subset of persons with 
whom we have a special relationship, i.e. we do not bear them for everyone equally. We 
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feel we owe more to our family, friends, or even compatriots, than to distant strangers. 
In addition to the negative duties of noninterference we owe to everyone equally, we also 
feel that we owe duties of assistance to the members of that subset. These special positive 
obligations are generally considered to be less controversial than general positive 
obligations. Few people would deny the existence of such special positive obligations and 
fulfilling them appears to be common practice.  
The allocation problem thus seems especially relevant with regard to general positive 
obligations, as grounding (enforceable) positive duties on our common humanity seems 
to be quite problematic. In chapter 3, we will examine whether harm should be used as 
the criterion to solve this allocation problem. As mentioned above, we take the active 
violation of negative human rights as our baseline for determining harm. We believe that 
if one violates someone’s human rights, one is, without any doubt, harming that person. 
This corresponds to the minimalist position we defend in chapter 2 as our conception of 
global justice. In chapter 3, we will examine how this conception affects the obligations 
we bear within our current globalized world. In other words, we will examine whether 
we are violating the human rights of distant others through our role in the process of 
globalization. 
We have already mentioned that our obligations seem to be more stringent when we 
stand in some causal relationship to some other(s), including distant others. Christian 
Barry elaborates on this intuition in his formulation of a ‘contribution principle’. This 
principle is based on the distinction between doing something and failing to prevent it. 
He considers the fact that we contributed to something to be ‘a normative factor of special 
significance for determining whether and to what extent [we are] responsible for 
addressing it’ (Barry 2005, 107). This means that our obligations become more binding if 
they are the result of our own previous conduct. If we are violating the human rights of 
distant others through our role in the process of globalization, we cannot dismiss the 
corresponding obligations as ‘charity’. Through the act of harming, we acquire a special 
relationship with the people whose human rights we violate and we bear responsibility 
towards them, regardless of whether or not we actually value this relation. Harming 
someone thus seems to be a very strong reason to value a relationship. 
After elaborating this theoretical framework in depth, we will apply it to two specific 
aspects of the process of globalization, namely climate change and the global economic 
order. In this way, we will examine whether or not we are harming people through our 
role in these aspects. We will argue that, concerning the economic order, the data are not 
entirely conclusive. Whether or not we are harming distant others through upholding the 
global economic order, seems to depend on the specific benchmark to which we compare 
the current situation. We will discuss three possible benchmarks, namely the past, a 
counterfactual reference, and a benchmark of fairness (Risse 2005). After establishing that 
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only the historical benchmark provides a meaningful point of comparison, we face 
another difficult question: should we use relative or absolute numbers to inform this 
historical benchmark? Our answer to this question seems to determine whether or not 
we are harming distant others through upholding the global economic order. So how 
should we proceed in this case?  
Concerning the second aspect of globalization we will discuss, climate change, the 
harmful relation is more difficult to deny. We will argue that climate change should be 
characterized as a violation of negative human rights, including the right to life, the right 
to health, and the right to subsistence (Caney 2010; Bell 2011, 100). In the climate case, 
doing nothing to improve the status quo seems to worsen the situation of distant others 
and to violate their human rights. Through our part in the process of climate change, we 
thus seem to violate the human rights of a specific and large subset of persons. 
Consequently, we bear a special responsibility towards them, irrespective of whether or 
not we actually value this relationship. 
We will end chapter 3 with a plea for caution. Since whether or not something is 
considered a harm determines the status of the corresponding positive duties and, 
consequently, their normative force, grounding our special responsibilities on such an all 
or nothing mechanism seems imprudent. The globalized context we live in is 
characterized by a multitude of causal connections and a diffusion of responsibilities, as 
Scheffler has pointed out (2001, 38-40). Therefore, in demanding indisputable evidence of 
harm, we might be attaching too much importance to the demonstrability of harm. The 
danger exists that people are left to fend for themselves because they are unable to prove 
beyond any doubt that they are being harmed. We believe Barry’s ‘vulnerability 
presumption principle’ can and should play an important role in this regard. This 
principle urges us to use standards of proof that express a willingness to err in favour of 
the most vulnerable when determining whether or not there is a relationship of harm. It 
strengthens our account of characterizing the positive duties of mitigating climate 
change as special obligations of justice. With respect to the global economic order, 
however, the vulnerability presumption principle could inspire us to interpret the 
historical benchmark in absolute numbers, thereby accepting the resulting special 
obligations of justice.  
Case study: The Health Impact Fund 
In chapter 4 we will conduct a case study, focusing on the global governance regime 
designed to regulate intellectual property rights and the Health Impact Fund. We believe 
this case study provides a clear illustration of the possible tension between globalization 
and the fulfilment of human rights. Whether or not poor people in developing countries 
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have access to essential medicines is to a large extent determined by the relevant global 
governance institution, namely the WTO. We will explain below how the policies 
implemented by this institution can have such a devastating effect on the health of 
millions of people. Important to note here is that this case is just one of countless 
examples of the way in which globalization erodes national sovereignty. It is just one 
specific aspect of the more general process of globalization. Decisionmaking increasingly 
occurs at the supranational level and the influence of global governance institutions such 
as the WTO on domestic policy-making should not be underestimated. This development 
gives rise to important ethical questions, e.g. regarding our role in the creation and 
imposition of global governance regimes. The global governance regime designed to 
regulate intellectual property rights results in the violation of basic human rights. To the 
extent that the policies of the WTO are controlled by democratic governments, the 
responsibility for this violation is shared among them. Consequently, the citizens of these 
democratic countries become complicit in the resulting violations of basic human rights. 
As citizens, they acquire an obligation of justice to reform the global governance regime 
in a way that would end or at least minimize these violations. 
The starting point for this chapter is the lack of access to essential medicines that more 
than a third of the world’s population experiences. More than half of this group of people 
lives in the poorest regions of Africa and Asia.4 A first explanatory factor is the concept of 
the so-called ‘10/90 gap’ – i.e. less than 10% of the total health-related R&D is devoted to 
the major health problems representing 90% of the global disease burden.5 This concept 
has become widely accepted in theoretical analyses of the problem, but those who suffer 
from the conditions in question see little change. 
The problem of inadequate innovation to tackle certain diseases (for example African 
trypanosomiasis, leishmaniasis, and Chagas disease) is the logical consequence of the law 
of supply and demand. While the US, the EU and Japan together represent only 15% of the 
world population, they make up 87% of the global pharmaceutical market. As a result, 
pharmaceutical companies tend to invest in R&D for medicines which are effective 
against diseases or ailments suffered by a large number of patients in industrialized 
countries who, directly or through health insurance or national health systems, can 
afford to pay prices far beyond the capacity of the average citizen of developing world 
 
                                                     
4  See www.who.int and data from Médecins Sans Frontières (website of the campaign for access to essential 
drugs: www.accessmed-msf.org).  
5 See http://www.globalforumhealth.org. For a critical discussion of the 10/90 gap, see 
http://who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/InternationalPolicyNetwork.pdf and 
http://www.bjmp.org/content/global-health-and-1090-gap.  
 12 
countries. Accordingly, R&D of medicines to treat diseases affecting predominantly or 
only the developing world is severely neglected. 
However, next to problems of innovation, problems of accessibility also play an 
important role. Here we will focus our attention on the operation of the patent system. 
As the risks and costs of drug development are indeed very significant, pharmaceutical 
companies need a reasonable chance of recouping their investment, generally through 
sales at a considerable profit facilitated by patent protection. In the past, however, the 
patent laws of many countries did not permit drug substances as such to be patentable, 
only processes for preparing them. In this way, it was possible to “design around” such 
process patents, i.e. to invent alternative, non-infringing processes. Consequently, 
pharmaceutical companies could still produce cheaper, generic, copies of new medicines. 
A large proportion of the medicines sold in Africa were produced in this way by Indian 
companies for example. 
This situation changed in 1994, when an Annex was introduced in the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, which required all countries which 
would be party to the World Trade Organization to permit patenting of drug substances 
as such. This Annex, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 
better known as the TRIPs Agreement (WTO 1994), means that in future the ability of 
generic pharmaceutical companies to sell affordable copies of new medicines will be 
severely restricted. With regard to essential medicines, this condition was not strictly 
enforced, as the example of India – the ‘pharmacy of the world’ – illustrated. However, in 
2005 India was forced to comply with the trade agreements and thus to allow and enforce 
patents, even for essential medicines. 
Several suggestions for addressing the lack of access to essential medicines have been 
made in the recent past and some are already in place. We will discuss earlier proposals 
that focus on different actors, namely the governments of the country whose citizens 
suffer from the disease in question, ‘big Pharma’, and academia and/or public research 
institutes. Next, we will assess the most important solutions proposed until now, 
including: (a) limiting patent protection; (b) compulsory licensing of patents; (c) 
voluntary licensing of patents (including patent pools); (d) parallel inducement; (e) 
orphan drug protection; (f) supranational funding of R&D; (g) advance market 
commitments; and (h) prizes. We will briefly comment on each of these schemes. 
In the remainder of chapter 4, we will discuss the Health Impact Fund (HIF). The HIF, 
as recently proposed by Thomas Pogge and Aidan Hollis, is essentially a supranationally-
funded prize system intended to address the problem of affordable access to new 
medicines for diseases primarily affecting developing countries (Hollis & Pogge 2008). As 
it is currently designed, the HIF involves a supranational body, majoritatively funded by 
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developed countries, paying an annual prize for up to ten years to a company bringing a 
new medicine to market. The size of the payment will be a reflection of the reduction in 
global health burden attributable to the use of that medicine and with the medicine being 
sold at a pre-agreed and hence affordable price.  
As the HIF is a potentially game-changing idea, it has been severely criticized from 
different sides. For example, its potential impact on the generic pharmaceutical industry 
has inspired considerable debate. Moreover, the HIF has been criticized for problems 
resulting from its linkage with patents and problems arising from the obligations HIF 
registrants must accept. On the one hand, the HIF thus faces criticism for not doing 
enough to bring down the price of essential medicines, whilst on the other hand, it is said 
to be infeasible for not being attractive enough for the pharmaceutical companies. Other 
hurdles that the HIF must overcome have to do with the calculation of the health impact 
of the registered medicines and with the security of its funding. 
Although the HIF faces some considerable difficulties, two original aspects seem to 
make this proposal more attractive than the competing proposals we will discuss. The 
first aspect is the expected motivational power of the reward with regard to innovation. 
The second aspect concerns the potential solution that the HIF might provide for the ‘last 
mile’ problem. Since the HIF reward depends on the measured health impact of the 
registered medicine on the global burden of disease, pharmaceutical companies have a 
strong incentive to make this impact as high as possible. Since their profit no longer solely 
depends on their sales figures, pharmaceutical companies might be persuaded to tackle 
some of the problems that undermine the full potential of their registered medicines.  
1.2 Feasibility objections  
In the first part of this dissertation, we will thus try to answer the questions of what global 
justice is and how the process of globalization has changed our responsibilities in 
attaining it. In the second part, we will turn our attention to feasibility objections 
suggesting that cosmopolitan justice should not be strived for because it cannot be 
attained. There are several aspects relating to the concept of (political) feasibility and it 
is consequently used in many different ways. We will here use the conceptual exploration 
of feasibility by Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith (2012) to explain how we 
understand this concept and exactly which feasibility objections we will examine. 
Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012, 812) distinguish two important functions of feasibility, 
namely (1) ruling out certain political proposals because they cannot be implemented in 
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practice and (2) enabling comparative assessments of different proposals. They argue that 
there is a spectrum of constraints that determine to what extent a certain proposal is 
feasible. At the one end, there are logical and nomological constraints, at the other end, 
they mention physical, economic, institutional and cultural constraints, next to 
psychological and motivational constraints (Ibid., 813). They call the first kind ‘hard 
constraints’, as these will always remain in place. They are crucial with regard to the first 
function of feasibility, namely ruling out certain proposals (binary feasibility). The second 
kind are ‘soft constraints’, as these do not rule out certain outcomes, but rather make 
them comparatively less feasible (scalar feasibility) (Ibid.). 
We believe hard constraints are less interesting from the perspective of moral and 
political philosophy, since they are by definition permanent. Our focus here will be on 
two soft constraints, namely motivational and institutional constraints, respectively at 
the individual and at the institutional level. At the level of the individual moral agent we 
will try to answer the questions as to what the potential barriers to feasibility are in this 
context, and whether we might be able to overcome them. More specifically, we will 
examine the feasibility objection that our moral judgment system is unable to identify 
climate change as an important moral problem and whether this explanation can 
exonerate us from individual responsibility. We thus want to answer the question 
whether our lack of motivation to tackle climate change really is insurmountable? If so, 
this feasibility objection might put significant pressure on our common-sense practice of 
treating the individual agent as the primary locus of responsibility in this context. 
At the institutional level, we will identify the relevant problems and examine how 
considerations of institutional feasibility should affect the responsibilities of the 
individuals that shape these institutions. In this context, we understand feasible to mean 
‘with a realistic chance of being implemented’. We will examine whether the current 
arrangement under the UNFCCC can be said to be the best feasible option and what this 
might imply for its legitimacy, and for our responsibilities in this context. Moreover, we 
will investigate specific soft constraints inherent to the democratic institutions involved 
in the tackling of climate change that jeopardize the implementation of a stronger 
climate policy. We will also discuss possible solutions to break the current deadlock. 
In this second part we will take the case of climate change as our focal point. As we will 
argue in chapter 3, we are in fact harming distant others through our role in the process 
of climate change. In this way, we acquire a special relationship with a very large subset 
of persons. Consequently, we bear a special responsibility towards them, irrespective of 
whether or not we actually value this relationship. As this aspect of globalization presents 
a more clear-cut illustration of harm than upholding the global economic order, we 
decided to examine the feasibility objections that are invoked in this context.  
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The level of the individual 
The most commonly invoked feasibility objection at the level of the individual moral 
agent is that cosmopolitan justice will necessarily remain unfeasible in view of the nature 
of human beings. Samuel Scheffler has done important work on the implications of 
globalization for the common sense conception of individual responsibility (Scheffler 
1995, Scheffler 2001). He claims that this common sense conception significantly limits 
our individual responsibility as it is ill equipped to deal with the new and complex modes 
of interaction that characterize our globalized world. Our moral judgment system is thus 
said to be inadequate to cope with so-called ‘New Harms’ (Lichtenberg 2014, 74):  
The model of harm underlying the classic formulation of the harm principle – 
discrete, individual actions with observable and measurable consequences for 
particular individuals – no longer suffices to explain the ways our behavior 
impinges on the interests of other people. 
In chapter 5 we will examine whether this claim can be invoked to explain the 
motivational gap regarding climate change. The starting point will be the fact that 
although climate change jeopardizes the fundamental human rights of current as well as 
future people, current actions and ambitions to tackle it are clearly inadequate, which 
indicates a lack of motivation. The predominant explanation for this motivational gap 
refers to the inability of the conventional moral judgment system to identify climate 
change as an important moral problem. Both in the literature and popular opinion, there 
are persistent doubts about the agency of individual emitters in tackling climate change – 
providing an important explanation for the fact that ethical and political analysis has 
mostly focused on the role of nation-states and international institutions. We will 
examine the legitimacy of these doubts and argue that emitters should acknowledge 
moral responsibility for the contribution of their avoidable emissions to the harmful 
effects of climate change (Caney 2009, 179; McKinnon 2012, 100; Vanderheiden 2008, 72). 
We will illustrate our claim using the examples of energy and meat consumption. 
After discussing the alleged lack of agency of individual emitters, we will tackle the 
motivational problem from another angle, namely moral psychology. We will argue that 
the ‘agency-argument’ is incomplete, since it disregards people’s ability to 
psychologically reconstruct a problem in order to reduce its urgency or minimize 
perceptions of their own contribution to it. In fact, the complexity of problems such as 
climate change precisely provides the necessary latitude for people to employ strategies 
of moral disengagement, enabling them to dissociate self-condemnation from harmful 
conduct.  
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We will examine the different mechanisms of moral disengagement that people deploy in 
the context of climate change. These processes enable people to engage in activities that 
serve their self-interest, but violate their moral standards by inflicting harm, without 
having to face the restraints of self-condemnation (Bandura et al. 2001, 126-7). A first set 
of strategies of moral disengagement is related to reprehensible conduct. We will discuss 
social and moral justification, advantageous comparison, and euphemistic labelling. A 
second set of mechanisms of moral disengagement focuses on injurious effects, namely 
denial and minimizing of consequences and discrediting evidence of harm. A third set 
operates at the intersection between reprehensible conduct and injurious effects. We will 
discuss diffusion and displacement of responsibility, two potent dissociative practices 
that operate by obscuring the relationship between actions and the effects they cause, 
minimizing an individual’s agentive role. We will examine the use of these mechanisms 
in the political context in chapter 6. The final mechanism of moral disengagement focuses 
on the victims of the harmful conduct. In an attempt to dismiss their suffering as 
irrelevant, they are divested of the qualities that make them human. 
We will not deny that climate change poses a serious challenge to our moral judgment 
system, due to its inherent complexity – including the perceived social acceptability of 
greenhouse gas emitting activities, the remaining scientific uncertainties, and the 
collective action involved. However, we argue that moral disengagement is also an 
important explanatory factor for the existing motivational gap. As moral disengagement 
reduces the dissonance or inconsistency between personal or societal moral standards 
and the pursuit of self-interested desires that would conflict with these standards (Stoll-
Kleemann et al. 2001, 111), it thus allows emitters to maintain a consumptive lifestyle and 
to emit greenhouse gases, without having to accept moral responsibility for the resulting 
climate-related harms.  
In the remainder of chapter 5 we will make some tentative suggestions for tackling 
moral disengagement and addressing the motivational gap.   
The institutional level 
After focusing on the level of the individual moral agent, we will then turn our attention 
to the institutional level. As mentioned, we will identify existing problems and examine 
how considerations of institutional feasibility affect the responsibilities of the individuals 
that shape these institutions. More specifically, we will discuss the institutions involved 
in the tackling of climate change, namely the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the states (and politicians) that constitute this institution (the 
Parties to the UNFCCC), and the citizens of these states. 
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In chapter 6 our starting point will again be the fact that although climate change 
represents one of the most serious and far-reaching challenges facing humankind in the 
twenty-first century, the response to it is nevertheless characterized by inadequate 
action at all levels. We will already have assessed some of the arguments that are invoked 
to explain this inaction, yet will here focus on one argument in particular, namely that 
addressing climate change is exclusively the job of others – primarily the government and 
supranational institutions. More specifically, we will assess the explanation for the 
ubiquitous inaction that refers to the delegated authority model (Gardiner 2011). This 
model underpins the legitimacy of political institutions and their leaders, depending on 
their ability to solve problems that are difficult to address at the individual level. Since 
the institutions created to tackle the significant threat climate change poses to basic 
human rights fail to do so, their legitimacy is seriously questionable.  
We will start this chapter by examining how climate change affects human rights. Our 
framework will be the normatively minimalist conception of justice we have outlined in 
chapter 2. We will demonstrate that even if we use this limited list of key rights (the right 
to life, the right to health, and the right to subsistence, understood as negative rights), 
anthropogenic climate change clearly fails to respect them (Caney 2009; 2010). 
Since the violation of basic human rights counts as a clear instance of injustice, this 
situation is in urgent need of remedying. However, as people often feel powerless when 
facing challenges of this proportion, they tend to turn to the institutional level for 
solutions. This idea is at the core of the delegated authority model, which underpins the 
legitimacy of political institutions and their leaders, depending on their ability to solve 
problems that are difficult to address at the individual level. But what if the delegation of 
responsibilities has failed to be successful, as in the case of climate change? What does 
this imply for the political leaders and current institutions that have assumed the mantle 
of responsibility and have acted as if they were capable of discharging this role (for 
example, by making speeches, promising progress, and organizing frequent meetings 
under the UNFCCC)? Does the failure to implement a robust policy to tackle climate 
change necessarily imply that the relevant institution loses its legitimacy? 
To assess the legitimacy of the UNFCCC, we will use the theoretical framework 
developed by Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane. They propose three ‘substantive 
criteria’ that institutions should meet in order to be legitimate: minimal moral 
acceptability, comparative benefit and institutional integrity (Buchanan & Keohane 2006, 
419). We will explain these criteria and assess to what extent the UNFCCC can be said to 
meet them. Given that the UNFCCC does not meet the criterion of minimal moral 
acceptability and the fact that its institutional integrity is questionable, we will argue that 
it can only remain legitimate if no better alternative is feasible. Consequently, the only 
way to save the legitimacy of the UNFCCC would be to prove that the current arrangement 
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really is the best feasible option. If the implemented policy turns out to be the best one 
available under the current circumstances, the UNFCCC would arguably be no longer 
blameworthy for the failure to provide a robust response to climate change. The question 
thus arises: how should we evaluate the options open to the UNFCCC? Is there no better 
arrangement with a realistic chance of being implemented under the current 
institutional circumstances?  
More specifically, we will examine whether the failure to design a policy that respects 
basic human rights is due to unwillingness on the part of the political representatives or 
due to genuine unfeasibility. The delegation of responsibilities to tackle climate change 
from the individual to the collective level has obviously not led to success. However, in 
contrast to the general perception, we will argue that this failure should not in the first 
place be ascribed to the elected delegates. To a certain extent, their claim that a stronger 
climate policy is not feasible is justified, since their electors fail to give them a strong 
mandate to strive for a robust climate policy. The failure of the electorate to discharge its 
shared political responsibility severely limits the availability of feasible options for their 
political representatives to defend a robust agreement to tackle climate change.  
We will end chapter 6 by discussing the implications of this failed delegation of 
responsibility. Our focus here will be on the implications of the current illegitimacy of the 
UNFCCC for us as individual citizens. In this context we will first argue that delegating 
responsibility to a collective level can only exonerate the individual if it is done in a 
consistent way; otherwise it is nothing more than blame-shifting or displacing 
responsibility. As responsibility is in fact not delegated to the collective level in a 
consistent way, most citizens of developed, high emitting countries can no longer invoke 
this model of political legitimacy as an excuse for the general inaction regarding climate 
change. Hiding behind the delegated authority model should then be characterized as a 
mechanism of moral disengagement (see Bandura 1999, 193-209; Bandura et al. 1996, 364; 
Tsang 2002, 25) through which people deny their individual responsibility in an 
unjustifiable way. We will argue that two strategies of moral disengagement are 
specifically deployed in the attempt to deny individual responsibility under a delegated 
authority model, namely displacement and diffusion of responsibility. Consequently, we 
should urgently recognize that the delegated authority model is being misused to 
facilitate moral disengagement and to evade responsibility for the violation of basic 
human rights entailed by climate change. 
The second implication of the current illegitimacy of the UNFCCC is that we need to 
take responsibility (both individually and politically) for the failed delegation of 
responsibility in the case of climate change. We will discuss what this might mean in the 
remainder of chapter 6.  
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In chapter 7 we will examine other ways to deal with the illegitimacy of institutions. 
We will here investigate how possible conflicts between democracy and justice should be 
solved. People hold divergent beliefs about what constitutes the good life. They disagree 
about the ideal structure of society and what exactly constitutes justice. Ideally, these 
differences are accommodated through democratic procedures. However, there are 
external limits to the political authority of democracy: ‘when decisions made in a 
democracy are felt to be too unjust then, in the name of justice, that democratic decision 
may be challenged undemocratically’ (Dowding et al. 2004, 24). However, deciding when 
a democratic decision should be overruled by considerations of justice is no easy task and 
should be handled with extreme caution.  
Our starting point here will be the minimalist position we developed in chapter 2, 
namely that justice demands respect for fundamental rights. We agree with Valentini that 
more demanding conceptions of global justice are difficult to justify, given the reasonable 
disagreement that exists about what justice exactly entails. Important to note is that the 
duty at issue is a duty to respect fundamental rights, not to promote them. The 
interpretation of fundamental rights as negative rights makes this a normatively 
minimalist position, which is widely acceptable. We will argue that the violation of such 
rights counts as an external limit to the political authority of democracy. The violation of 
basic human rights can never be justified by referring to the democratic nature of the 
underlying decision-making process. In cases like that, we would submit that it is 
perfectly justified to overrule democratic decisions by considerations of justice.  
We will apply this theoretical framework to the democratic arrangements that are 
designed to tackle climate change. We will first explain why we think the way in which 
climate change is currently handled is an excellent illustration of the tension that may 
exist between democracy and justice. As anthropogenic climate change violates basic 
human rights, the political authority of the relevant democratic institutions is under 
great pressure, even under a minimalist conception of justice. Moreover, there seems to 
be a second problem that aggravates this situation. The same group of people always 
seems to be at the losing end of the democratic decisions regarding climate change. We 
are thus faced with the problem of persistent minorities or persistent losers. 
The tension between democracy and justice is undeniable in this context. Yet how is it 
caused? Why do the democratic institutions designed to tackle climate change struggle 
so much to achieve their goal? We will discuss two problems of accountability that might 
shed some light on the matter. The first explanation is that politicians lack accountability 
for the future impacts of their policies, which explains their tendency for harmful short-
termism (Caney forthcoming, 3). Politicians indeed seem to focus too much on the next 
election and to neglect the long term impacts of their policies. This short-sighted bias can 
have disastrous results. We will also discuss a second, complementary, explanation and 
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problem of accountability. Politicians do not only lack accountability for the future 
adverse effects of their policies, but also for the adverse effects their policies have on 
current people who do not belong to their own constituencies. Both factors seem to 
contribute to the failure to agree on a strong policy to tackle climate change. The UNFCCC, 
designed to put a robust policy in place, even faces a further problem, due to its 
procedural rules. Its requirement of consensus decision making cripples its effective 
functioning and aggravates the problem of persistent losers. 
After clarifying how the tension between democracy and justice could be explained, 
we will then turn our attention to efforts to solve it. More specifically, we will propose 
three possible strategies for ‘making democracy just’ (Goodin 2004, 107), namely ‘role 
reminders’, institutional reform, and the role of litigation and courts. 
The first strategy, role reminders, is to motivate people to focus more on the common 
good and less on their self-interested preferences, when fulfilling a political role such as 
voting. In this way, role reminders could urge us to fulfil our political obligation as voters. 
We will further examine what this mechanism might imply for the obligations of our 
political representatives. More specifically, we will answer the question what they need 
to do when we, as citizens, fail to fulfil our task?  
If effective, the mechanism of ‘role reminders’ would provide an elegant solution for 
the conflict between justice and democracy. However, a second strategy might be 
necessary to break the current deadlock, namely institutional reforms. At the 
international level (the UNFCCC), we will advocate replacing consensus decision making 
by majority voting, since majority voting could prove both more efficient and more 
effective than the current procedure (Kemp 2014). However, the historical record of the 
UNFCCC and its path dependency do not give much cause for optimism. Therefore, we 
will also examine what could be done at the level of the individual states. 
Role reminders and the proposed institutional reforms might not succeed in the 
ending of the violation of basic human rights. In this non-ideal circumstance, another, 
more drastic instrument might be justified, or even obligatory. We will end this chapter 
by arguing for an obligation to sue underachieving governments as a ‘last resort’ type 
strategy. 
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1.3 How to overcome the feasibility objections at the level 
of the individual moral agent? 
In Part III we will focus on the question how the feasibility objections at the level of the 
individual moral agent might be overcome. More specifically, we will examine how the 
motivational gap to tackle climate change (as discussed in chapter 5) could be bridged. 
Our starting point in chapter 8 will be Scheffler’s concept of the ‘phenomenology of 
agency’ (Scheffler 2001, 38-39). According to Scheffler, this characteristic way of 
experiencing ourselves as causal agents consists of at least three features: acts having 
primacy over omissions, near effects having primacy over remote effects, and individual 
effects having primacy over group effects (Ibid., 39). These features roughly coincide with 
the dimensions along which climate change differs from a paradigm moral problem, since 
it is ‘not a matter of a clearly identifiable individual acting intentionally so as to inflict an 
identifiable harm on another identifiable individual, closely related in time and space’ 
(Jamieson 2010, 437). This is often invoked to explain why we fail to attach the moral 
severity of a paradigm moral problem to climate change and why it is not perceived as a 
problem of individual responsibility (Gardiner 2011, 41; Jamieson 2010, 436).  
In this chapter we will examine whether our phenomenology of agency really is too 
ill-suited to deliver a moral judgment of climate change that fully captures its urgency. 
We will claim that climate change does in fact correspond to a paradigm moral problem 
in certain important respects. We therefore would argue that the predominant or 
exclusive focus on the omissions involved in climate change, on the remoteness of its 
impacts, and on the fact that its effects are the aggregate result of the actions of a number 
of people is deceitful. Climate change can and should rather be assessed as a matter both 
of omissions and acts, remote effects and near effects, and group effects and individual 
effects (Peeters et al. 2015, chapter 3). 
We will examine whether stressing the ways in which climate change does in fact 
approximate the characteristics of a paradigm moral problem, might provide a first 
strategy to overcome the motivational gap. We would argue that the lack of motivation 
at the individual level should be tackled by enhancing people’s moral judgment based on 
conventional moral ideas. By emphasizing that they are in fact harming others and acting 
wrongly, even measured by their own standards, we might expect to heighten their guilt 
and, under the right conditions, their motivation to end the harmful situation. Using 
arguments from justice, rather than arguments from humanity, could increase the 
feasibility of our minimal conception of global justice. 
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Although this strategy appears promising, there are some good reasons to explore 
possible solutions at the institutional level (Lichtenberg 2014, 67-70). Faced with a 
(perceived) problem of demandingness and the allocation problem, Lichtenberg argues 
that collectivizing and thereby institutionalizing our duties might provide a valuable way 
to mitigate these problems. As we will discuss in chapter 6, the greater efficacy of 
institutions is often invoked as justification for their existence (Gardiner 2011). The 
delegated authority model accordingly makes the legitimacy of political institutions and 
their leaders dependent on their ability to solve problems that are difficult to address at 
the individual level. We will examine whether the delegation of responsibilities to 
institutions could solve the motivational problems we experience at the individual level 
(partly) due to our phenomenology of agency. 
Special attention will be devoted to the role politicians should play in this regard. In 
chapter 7 we will argue that when basic human rights are being violated, politicians can 
be permitted to overrule democratic concerns in order to end this situation. Moreover, 
politicians thus not only have permission to give priority to justice instead of democracy, 
they can be obliged to do so. However, the current political situation makes it very 
unlikely that politicians will enforce duties of justice. Given the economic and financial 
crisis, voters tend to emphasize the importance of their national economic interests even 
more, and politicians are likely to follow their lead. Moreover, we acknowledge that not 
everyone (e.g. libertarians) will accept that duties of justice should sometimes overrule 
democratic demands. In the remainder of chapter 8, we will therefore argue for an 
obligation that can accommodate both concerns and offers a way out of the current 
gridlock; the moral obligation to nudge.  
In the final chapter (chapter 9) we will summarise the most important findings of this 
dissertation and discuss some overarching conclusions. We will also comment on the 
extent to which the different chapters have answered the research questions mentioned 
in this introductory chapter. 
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Globalization and global justice 
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Chapter 2  
Variants of cosmopolitanism: A realistic 
cosmopolitan utopia1 
2.1 What cosmopolitanism is not 
Traditionally, theories of global justice are classified under one of three general 
conceptions: political realism, the morality-(or society-)of-states and cosmopolitanism 
(Beitz 1979).2 Before focusing our attention on the last conception, we need to outline the 
former two and explain why we believe they are inadequate. 
2.1.1 Political Realism 
Political realism has a long tradition in the discipline of international relations. It has 
been the standard view for many years. Realism can be considered to be the complete 
opposite of idealism and hostile to utopianism (Caney 2005, 7-8). Thus, it is the approach 
furthest removed from cosmopolitanism.  
Realists, such as Hans Morgenthau (1948) believe that the international realm is best 
characterized as a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’. Hobbes developed this concept to describe 
the hypothetical situation in which men lived before they agreed to a social contract that 
organized society and established some kind of government. He famously described life 
 
                                                     
1 This chapter is based on the following article: De Smet, Andries, and Sigrid Sterckx. (2015) “Varianten van 
cosmopolitanisme: een realistische cosmopolitanistische utopie.” Ethiek en Maatschappij, 16(1-2), 69-114. 
2 In the new afterword of the 1999 edition of Political Theory and International Relations, Beitz sketches a more 
nuanced distinction. We will discuss this later and explain why we think the conceptualization mentioned here 
remains justifiable. 
 28 
in this situation as being ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ (1994 [1651], 76). This 
state of nature is defined by ‘the absence of a political authority sufficiently powerful to 
assure people security and the means to live a felicitous life’ (Beitz 1979, 28). Given this 
absence, it is not rational for people to comply with moral rules, as they have no 
guarantee that others will do the same. Analogously, as there is no strong global 
government, it is not rational for states to comply with moral requirements in the 
international sphere. Morality thus has no place in international relations. This implies 
that states have no moral obligations with regard to distant strangers. A state can never 
be morally blameworthy with regard to its foreign policy. Darrel Moellendorf even 
equates political realism to ‘politics without morals’ (2002, 143). States are the principal 
actors and there are no universal principles guiding their relations. States are not only 
permitted to pursue power and their national interest3; this is what they should do, 
according to political realism.  
Simon Caney (2005, 7) rightly notes that this argumentation entails two claims; an 
ethical one and a more empirical or explanatory one. Moreover, the empirical claim that 
states tend to pursue their national interest is often used as part of the justification for 
the ethical claim that this is their moral duty: 
[…] realists sometimes argue that it would be wrong for a state not to pursue its own 
interests (an ethical claim) on the grounds that other states will pursue their own 
interests (an empirical claim) and hence that pursuing a non-self-interested policy 
would be likely to achieve nothing (an empirical claim) and leave the citizens of the 
non-self-interested state highly vulnerable (an empirical claim), a state of affairs 
assumed to be morally bad (an ethical claim). (Caney 2005, 7) 
Caney emphasizes that these claims remain logically independent of each other; 
affirming one does not necessarily entail affirming the other (Caney 2005, 10). However, 
to the extent that realists use the empirical claim to buttress the ethical claim, they 
become vulnerable to criticism attacking the empirical claim. Charles Beitz tries to refute 
the realist position in this way by arguing that states are in fact not in a state of nature 
towards each other. He starts from the observation that ‘a wide variety of areas of 
international relations are characterized by high degrees of voluntary compliance with 
customary norms and institutionalized rules established by agreement’ (1979, 47). As 
states have some common interests, it is not unreasonable to expect some reciprocal 
compliance, even if no global authority is available to ensure this (Beitz 1979, 49). 
 
                                                     
3 This concept can be understood in both a subjective and an objective way. See Wendt (1999). 
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Moreover, even if the realist empirical claim were correct, arguing for an ethical stance 
based on an empirical fact is a clear case of the is-ought fallacy. However, realists might 
avoid this flaw by only endorsing the ethical claim, so we also need to address the realist 
position in a normative way. Beitz again leads the way by arguing that states can be 
justified in forgoing self-interest because that is what morality may require, even in a 
state of nature (Moellendorf 2002, 147). 
[…] the invocation of the national interest does not necessarily justify disregard of 
other moral standards. What is required is a balancing of the rights and interests 
presumably protected by acting to further the national interest and those involved 
in acting on the competing principle that gives rise to moral disapprobation. While 
it cannot be maintained a priori that the individual rights presumably protected by 
the national interest would never win out in such cases, the opposite cannot be 
maintained either. Yet this is exactly what an uncritical acceptance of 
Morgenthau’s view invites. (Beitz 1979, 55) 
The problem here is that realists make a strong distinction between the domestic and 
the international sphere. States may act morally in the domestic case, but internationally 
their only duty is to advance their national interest, however conceived. As this 
distinction cannot be grounded on their empirical claim, it remains unclear how this 
position can be justified. Other approaches also differentiate between both spheres, so we 
will examine the justifying reasons below. We should emphasize here, though, that 
realists need to appeal to a very strong reason, as their conclusion is equally strong. 
Stating that there is a difference between the domestic and the international sphere, and 
that different moral frameworks apply to each, is one thing. Stating that morality has no 
place in international relations or that advancing national interest is the only moral duty 
of states, is something else completely. 
Relying on these arguments, Beitz (2005, 16) dismisses political realism as a kind of 
scepticism. We agree with him that this implies that only cosmopolitanism and less 
extreme forms of statism are to be considered moral positions. 
2.1.2 The society-of-states approach and its descendants 
In contrast to political realism, proponents of the society-of-states approach, such as 
Terry Nardin (1983) and John Rawls (1999), believe that morality does have a place in the 
international realm. However, the moral rules governing this realm are different from 
those governing the domestic sphere. As its name suggests, the society-of-states 
approach takes the international society to be a ‘practical association of states’ (Nardin 
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1983, 14-15). Consequently, states (or peoples in Rawls’ account4) are the units of ethical 
consideration rather than individuals, as in the domestic sphere. States, rather than 
persons, are the principal bearers of rights and duties (Beitz 2005, 16). The idea of state 
autonomy (or sovereignty) is crucial in this approach, hence the principles of non-
intervention and self-determination take priority. States need to respect some principles 
in the international realm, for example respect for a minimal set of human rights, but 
they also have a duty of non-intervention and should respect the independence of other 
states. This position thus acknowledges that national borders are morally significant and 
that they limit the scope of our obligations. What we owe to our compatriots is 
fundamentally different from what we owe to distant strangers. In fact, we do not owe 
them anything as individuals. The only moral principles that apply in the international 
realm hold between states, peoples or societies, not between persons.  
At a certain point in history, this account may have been defensible. As long as states 
were independent of each other, it may have been justified to give priority to the 
aforementioned principles. However, the process of globalization has eroded the 
sovereignty of states. As a consequence of inter alia the establishment of organizations 
such as the European Union and the World Trade Organization, decision-making 
increasingly occurs at the supranational level. As the influence of such bodies on domestic 
policy-making grows, the boundaries between the national and the international spheres 
are disappearing in various contexts. Climate change provides another illustration of the 
permeability of state boundaries. As with the approach of political realism, the empirical 
presupposition underlying the society-of-states approach is not fulfilled. 
Even if this condition was met, we could still (normatively) question the priority this 
approach gives to those near and dear to us. In the famous words of William Godwin: 
‘What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my’ that should justify us in overturning the 
decisions of impartial truth?’ (Godwin 1971 [1793], book 2, chapter 2). This questioning 
also targets forms of nationalism (Tamir 1993; Miller 2007), communitarianism (Walzer 
1994) or any other theory that takes a particular group, and not individuals per se, as the 
unit of ethical consideration.5 As a consequence, the moral rules guiding our conduct 
 
                                                     
4 For an explanation of the difference between states and peoples, see Rawls 1999, 23-30. Caney (2005, 11-12) 
criticizes this distinction and argues that Rawls’ position is similar to the society-of-states approach. 
5 We discuss these theories here, because the argument is basically the same regardless of whether we target 
the prioritizing of states, nations or communities. These theories make a ‘division of moral labor between the 
domestic and international levels’ and that is why Beitz considers them ‘descendent[s] of the morality of states’ 
(Afterword 1999, 215). They are all ‘interpretations of the morality of states’ (Beitz 2005, 16). 
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towards compatriots are different from the rules with regard to distant strangers6. Why 
should this be justified? 
In general, two kinds of reasons are commonly used to justify this focus on states (or 
other collective entities) and the implied priority thesis (Beitz 1979/Afterword 1999, 208-
214). First, the priority thesis might be defended in an indirect way. This means that the 
priority we give to our compatriots would be justified by ‘considerations at a deeper level 
of reasoning, where everyone is treated equally in the morally relevant respect’ (Ibid., 
208). According to this view, the fact that we give priority to our compatriots (and friends, 
families, …) in no way contradicts our equal concern for all. What is more, giving priority 
might even be the best way to promote the greater good; ‘Special responsibilities are [...] 
assigned merely as an administrative device for discharging our general duties more 
efficiently’ (Goodin 1988, 685). Goodin thus uses reasons of efficiency to defend the 
priority thesis. Special relations, and the corresponding responsibilities, do not have 
intrinsic value. Goodin (1988, 678) even denies that they possess an independent 
existence or moral force. As they receive their moral force from the general duties, their 
special status has been dealt a sharp blow: ‘In this way, it turns out that “our fellow 
countrymen” are not so very special after all. The same thing that makes us worry mainly 
about them should also make us worry, at least a little, about the rest of the world, too’ 
(Ibid., 679). Giving priority to compatriots can thus only be defended indirectly, if it 
proves to be the most efficient way of promoting an intrinsic end.  
Regardless of how we define the intrinsic end to be achieved, this condition will most 
likely not be met. Given the huge inequalities that characterize our current world, it is 
difficult to see how prioritizing our compatriots can be the best way to promote – for 
example – the greatest happiness for the greatest number: 
[…] given familiar assumptions about the diminishing value of increasing income, 
there is no reason to think that overall value could not be increased if the wealthy 
were to act on a more egalitarian principle than priority for compatriots. […] So the 
simple consequentialist defense is not likely to justify anything very much like the 
priority thesis found in conventional morality. (Beitz 1979/Afterword 1999, 210) 
 
                                                     
6 This discussion is a specific instance of the more general debate on general and special obligations. The former 
are owed to everyone equally on the basis of our common humanity. Special obligations, in contrast, are owed 
only to some specific subset of persons with whom we have a special relationship. We do not bear them for 
everyone equally. We feel we owe more to our brother, a friend, or perhaps even a fellow countryman, than to 
a distant stranger. We will discuss this further in chapter 3. 
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Beitz argues that this problem jeopardizes every theoretical defence of the priority 
thesis that builds on a proclaimed commitment to treat every human being equally in the 
morally relevant way. To maintain that giving priority to our compatriots is best for 
everyone, a theory would need an eccentric standard of value or implausible premises, 
for example an equal background distribution of natural resources and talents. Therefore, 
defending the priority thesis at the intermediate level is very unlikely to be successful 
(Ibid., 209-211).  
The second way the priority thesis might be defended is at the foundational level. Here, 
giving priority to compatriots is justified because it has some intrinsic value per se, rather 
than because it yields the best overall result. Our special obligations are not just instances 
of our general ones; they possess an independent moral force. This implies that our 
special and general obligations might conflict. Samuel Scheffler (2001, 115) rightly notes 
that we are faced with a dilemma: ‘Either we must argue, as Nussbaum does, that devoting 
special attention to the people we are attached to is an effective way of doing good for 
humanity at large, or else we must suppose that the people we are attached to are simply 
worth more than others’.  
We have just attempted to explain why the first – indirect – horn of this dilemma is 
unable to justify the priority thesis, and will now look at the second one. Which feature 
of our relationship with our compatriots could possibly justify treating them as if they 
are worth more than distant strangers? Yael Tamir (1993) has sketched a first 
foundational answer to this question. She considers ‘connectedness’ to be the basis for 
our relationships and defines this as ‘the belief that we all belong to a group whose 
existence we consider valuable’ (1993, 98). As a member of a group, our self-esteem and 
well-being are affected by the failures and successes that occur in the context of that 
group. We develop a sense of mutual care and mutual responsibilities towards fellow 
group members and abide by a sense of justice towards them. In this way, nationality plays 
a constituting role with regard to our identity and a feeling of relatedness, which give rise 
to ‘deep and important obligations’ (1993, 99). If a relationship is constitutive of our 
identity, it – in itself – creates special obligations. Andrew Mason (1997, 438) emphasizes 
the foundational nature of this argumentation: ‘these obligations are not contingent upon 
the role they might play in, say, promoting general well-being, or securing equal freedom, 
but derive immediately from the nature of the relationships involved’. Tamir takes this 
even further by claiming that these obligations are independent of the normative nature of 
the association (1993, 101). This means that even membership in the Mafia or a racist group 
gives rise to special obligations. Tamir acknowledges that these obligations can be 
overridden by moral obligations, but this gives rise to the question as to whether this is 
not an instance of Bernard William’s ‘one thought too many’? Do we really want to 
maintain that membership in an immoral group gives rise to genuine special obligations? 
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David Miller (2005; 2007) denies that all valued relationships can ground genuine 
special obligations. He argues that three conditions need to be met in order for special 
obligations to arise. Firstly, the relationship needs to be intrinsically valuable, as opposed 
to instrumentally valuable (2005, 65). This means that the relationship should not be 
valued exclusively for the mutual instrumental benefits it involves. Secondly, the special 
obligations under consideration need to be integral to the relationship, which means that 
the relationship would cease to exist in its relevant form if the corresponding obligations 
were not generally acknowledged; the special obligations need to be central to how the 
participants understand the relationship (Miller 2005, 65-66). Miller gives the example of 
friendship to illustrate this condition: ‘You can’t be somebody’s friend unless you 
understand that this entails giving them certain kinds of priority in your life – being ready 
to drop what you are doing and go to them when they need you’ (Miller 2005, 66). As third 
and final condition, Miller mentions that the grounding relationships must not involve any 
injustices. For example, being a member of a racist group does not entail special 
obligations towards your fellow-members. The injustice that is inherent to the group 
deprives it of any intrinsic value it might otherwise have had. On this point, Miller and 
Tamir hold divergent opinions. 
We agree with Miller that not all valued relationships give rise to special obligations. 
We will use his three conditions to examine whether any of the proclaimed relationships 
can ground the priority thesis central to the society-of-states approach. Although there 
is considerable common ground, we need to distinguish between different views. 
Proponents of the priority thesis vary in which relationship they value and why.  
As a first view, we already mentioned Tamir and Miller’s emphasis on the importance 
of nationality: 
Thus nationality is essentially a subjective phenomenon, constituted by the shared 
beliefs of a set of people: a belief that each belongs together with the rest; that this 
association is neither transitory nor merely instrumental but stems from a long 
history of living together which (it is hoped and expected) will continue into the 
future; that the community is marked off from other communities by its members' 
distinctive characteristics; and that each member recognizes a loyalty to the 
community, expressed in a willingness to sacrifice personal gain to advance its 
interests. We should add, as a final element, that the nation should enjoy some 
degree of political autonomy. (Miller 1988, 648) 
We share a history, traditions, a culture and often a language with our co-nationals and 
this is constitutive of our identity. Therefore, according to this view, we are permitted to 
give them priority. 
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Proponents of the second view7, like Mason (1997), focus on the level of the state and 
our co-citizens. This difference is relevant because a state can consist of different 
nationalities and a co-national can live in another state. Mason argues that citizenship, 
rather than nationality, is an intrinsically valuable relationship that justifies special 
obligations towards fellow citizens (1997, 442). He emphasizes the importance of political 
equality and recognition and the opportunity to participate in the formation of the laws 
and policies of a state as factors that strongly influence the lives of its citizens. This 
account of citizenship is said to have intrinsic value: 
Part of what it is to be a citizen is to incur special obligations: these obligations give 
content to what it is to be committed or loyal to fellow citizens and are justified by 
the good of the wider relationship to which they contribute. In particular, citizens 
have an obligation to each other to participate fully in public life and an obligation 
to give priority to the needs of fellow citizens. A good citizen is, in part, someone 
who complies with these various obligations and responsibilities, and in doing so 
realizes the good of citizenship. (Mason 1997, 442) 
A third related, but more general, view is known as communitarianism. Among its 
proponents are political philosophers like Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael 
Walzer, and Charles Taylor. They argue that the rules of morality are only justifiable in 
relation to a particular community and the social roles that constitute it (MacIntyre 1984). 
MacIntyre departs from the impersonal moral standpoint and makes the case for the 
morality of patriotism, based on the importance that communal ties, broadly conceived,8 
have for our sense of identity and well-being. Giving priority to fellow members of our 
community is thus integral to this relationship: 
A central contention of the morality of patriotism is that I will obliterate and lose a 
central dimension of the moral life if I do not understand the enacted narrative of 
my own individual life as embedded in the history of my country. For if I do not so 
understand it I will not understand what I owe to others or what others owe to me, 
for what crimes of my nation I am bound to make reparation, for what benefits to 
my nation I am bound to feel gratitude. Understanding what is owed to and by me 
 
                                                     
7 Different aspects of shared citizenship can be emphasized to justify the priority thesis, for example the fact 
that citizens are subject to the same coercion by the state (Blake 2001), the reciprocity they owe towards each 
other (Sangiovanni 2007), or the profundity of the state for their lives (Risse 2006). 
8 Daniel Bell (2013) distinguishes between communities of place, communities of memory, and psychological 
communities.  
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and understanding the history of the communities of which I am a part is on this 
view one and the same thing. 
Whether the focus is on nations, states, or communities in general, the core 
argumentation remains largely the same. Proponents of the priority thesis all believe that 
the relationship under consideration is intrinsically valuable, that the corresponding 
obligations are integral to the relationship, and that no injustice is involved in giving 
priority to the relevant group. We will start by assessing Miller’s defence with regard to 
these three conditions (2005, 67-71), and then examine whether this account can justify 
the priority thesis endorsed by all. 
Regarding condition 1, Miller believes nationality has intrinsic value, besides (and 
above) instrumental benefits such as giving rise to a stable democracy. In brief, he argues 
that the burden of proof lies with the people who want to deny the significance of – 
actually valued – national attachments. We will not try to refute this first claim and grant 
Miller that his first condition is met. In the same vein, we also accept that citizenship and 
communal ties can have a non-instrumental, intrinsic value. 
Miller also thinks that the special obligations we have towards our co-nationals are 
integral to our relationships with them (condition 2). Nations play an important role in 
organizing social justice and deliberative democracy, for example, and this would be 
impossible if co-nationals did not recognize special obligations towards each other. We 
agree that the idea of a shared nationality or citizenship would lose much of its 
significance if special obligations between co-members would be denied. 
This only leaves the third condition (injustice) to potentially refute the priority thesis. 
Miller acknowledges that a world of nations will in practice be an unequal world. 
However, he wants to challenge the view that the fact of inequality by itself undermines 
the value of national attachments and the corresponding special obligations. Indeed, the 
priority thesis is often attacked precisely on this ground. Critics argue that special 
obligations towards compatriots are unfair with regard to the outsiders of the relevant 
relationships. If citizens of wealthier states are permitted or required to give priority to 
each other’s interests at the expense of poorer people living in another state, then special 
obligations towards compatriots aggravate the inequality in an unjustifiable way. 
Scheffler (2001, 56-60) labels this counter-argument the distributive objection.  
Whether this objection proves the priority thesis to be unjust, seems to depend on the 
extent to which we should give priority to our compatriots. In principle, there is nothing 
inherently wrong with special obligations to compatriots. We can even concede that the 
grounding relation has an intrinsic value and that these obligations are integral to this 
relationship. However, this in no way implies that giving priority is always justifiable. 
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This would only be the case if our relationship with our compatriots would be the only 
relationship with intrinsic value. However, our relationship with our fellow human 
beings also counts for something. We need not go as far as Goodin to derive our special 
obligations from our general ones, yet we cannot dismiss the latter as irrelevant either. 
How both kinds of obligations should be balanced, will be discussed below. For now, we 
can conclude that giving absolute priority to those with whom we share a nation, state, or 
community is unjust because it does not give our general obligations their due weight.  
2.2 Cosmopolitanism 
Now that we have discussed political realism and the society-of-states approach and its 
descendants, we can focus our attention on cosmopolitanism. We will start by explaining 
which features are shared by all variants of cosmopolitanism and then discuss the 
differences that exist between them. 
2.2.1 What all variants of cosmopolitanism have in common 
The first feature that all forms of cosmopolitanism share is the claim that moral obligations 
and considerations of justice are global in scope. Cosmopolitans thus attach less (or sometimes 
even no) ethical significance to national boundaries. This is a major difference with 
regard to political realism, which claims that morality has no place in the international 
realm, only in domestic affairs. It also differentiates cosmopolitans from society-of-states 
proponents and nationalists, for whom borders or national boundaries are very 
important in delineating moral obligations. The second feature that all cosmopolitans 
share is their focus on the individual as ultimate unit of moral concern. The competing 
approaches tend to focus on states, nations or other collective entities, as mentioned 
above. Third, cosmopolitans all emphasize the equal moral worth of individuals, irrespective 
of which groups or collectives they belong to or where they live.  
Thomas Pogge has summarized these features in what has become the default 
definition of cosmopolitanism: 
Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individualism: the 
ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons – rather than, say, family 
lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter 
may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or 
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citizens. Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every 
living human being equally – not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, 
Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status has global force. 
Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, 
fellow religionists, or such like. (Pogge 1992, 48-49, footnotes omitted) 
These features thus bind all forms of cosmopolitanism together and distinguish them 
from the competing approaches discussed above. Unfortunately, the agreement seems to 
end there. 
2.2.2 Different conceptions of cosmopolitanism 
Cosmopolitanism is a very broad umbrella term. That is why we will start by 
distinguishing between some major views that can all be called cosmopolitan, and then 
refine our focal point. The term ‘cosmopolitanism’ dates back as far as Diogenes the Cynic 
(fourth century BC) and the Stoics (third century BC). Here, we find its etymological roots: 
in ancient Greek, ‘cosmos’ means ‘world’ and ‘polis’ denotes ‘city’ or ‘state’. The Stoics 
thus considered themselves to be ‘citizens of the world’, without any special attachment 
or obligation to their particular city-state, community, or culture (Kleingeld & Brown 
2014). 
This idea is reflected in the cultural interpretation of cosmopolitanism. Here, a 
cosmopolitan is an open-minded globetrotter, with an aversion of parochialism and 
strong forms of nationalism. As this view is not concerned with normative questions 
regarding our global responsibilities, it falls beyond the scope of this chapter.  
Another important distinction is that between moral and institutional (or political) 
cosmopolitanism. The idea of moral cosmopolitanism is captured in Pogge’s explanation 
above, namely that every person has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern 
(Pogge 1992, 49). Institutional cosmopolitanism is focused more on the way in which this 
goal might be achieved. More specifically, institutional cosmopolitans examine which 
institutional changes are needed to the global order and whether a world state is a 
necessary pre-condition (Cabrera 2004). Although moral cosmopolitanism can imply 
institutional cosmopolitanism, this is not self-evident. 
With regard to moral cosmopolitanism, Scheffler further differentiates between 
extreme and moderate forms of cosmopolitanism (2001, 111-130). This distinction is based 
on the status that one ascribes to special relationships and the corresponding obligations. 
For extreme cosmopolitans, our particular relationships and group affiliations can never 
provide an independent reason for action or generate special responsibilities. Moderate 
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cosmopolitans, in contrast, do not need to deny the intrinsic value of people’s 
relationships. They only need to insist that the special responsibilities generated on the 
basis of those relationships must be balanced and constrained by consideration of the 
interests of other people (Scheffler 2001, 115). Moderate cosmopolitans can accept that 
there are special responsibilities that we owe to our compatriots but not to distant 
strangers (Scheffler 2001, 116).9 
In this way, moderate cosmopolitanism seems to come close to certain forms of 
nationalism or the society-of-states approach. Indeed, Miller acknowledges that we are 
all cosmopolitans in this weak sense (Miller 2007, 28). However, the question arises 
whether it is conceptually sound to be genuinely committed to both moral equality and 
special responsibilities. Arash Abizadeh and Pablo Gilabert (2008, 359) do not think this is 
problematic: 
Cosmopolitan egalitarianism has room for claims about the non-instrumental value 
of special responsibilities. What it does not have room for is the claim that special 
relationships provide fundamental, independent, or ultimate—that is, 
unconditional—moral reasons that do not need to be couched by appeal to the 
satisfaction of universal principles elaborating the ideal of equal treatment of all 
persons. […] This does not mean that Scheffler is not on to something quite 
important with his critique of extreme communitarianism and extreme 
cosmopolitanism. Scheffler indeed uncovers genuine tensions, but these tensions 
exist not between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special duties, but between 
various duties (both general and special) that arise from the recognition, demanded 
by cosmopolitan egalitarianism, of diverse basic goods (including special 
relationships, a basic constituent of human well-being). These are tensions within 
cosmopolitan egalitarianism itself. 
Abizadeh and Gilabert attempt to resolve these tensions by arguing that relationships 
can only give rise to special responsibilities if they do not undermine or neglect the fair 
access of others to the basic goods that constitute their well-being (2008, 358). However, 
this seems to merely shift the tension to discussions about what constitutes this fair access 
and what goods should be considered basic. 
According to Kok-Chor Tan, liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan global justice are 
mutually compatible ideals, if properly understood (2002, 431; 2005). He argues for a 
moral cosmopolitanism with respect for the nationalist ideals of self-determination and 
 
                                                     
9 Caney (2001a) makes a similar distinction between ‘radical’ and ‘mild’ forms of cosmopolitanism. David Held 
uses the terms ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ cosmopolitanism (2010, 78).  
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cultural belonging. Correspondingly, the features of nationalism need to remain within 
the bounds of liberal nationalism (2002, 445, 447). This implies that co-national partiality, 
or the priority thesis, can only be permissible within the boundaries of justice: ‘So, liberal 
nationalism can be truly liberal only if the nationalist goals that it pursues are pursued in 
a world in which the duties of global distributive justice are met. […] Committed liberal 
nationalists must thus also be committed cosmopolitans’ (Tan 2002, 458). 
Whether nationalism and cosmopolitanism really are compatible thus seems to 
depend on how demandingly global justice is defined. In this respect, Gillian Brock (2009, 
13) distinguishes between weak and strong forms of cosmopolitanism. Weak 
cosmopolitanism specifies as a requirement of justice that the conditions necessary for 
living minimally decent lives should be met universally. Strong cosmopolitanism is more 
demanding and aims to eliminate inequalities even when these conditions are met. 
Strong cosmopolitans are thus committed to a more egalitarian world than their weak 
cosmopolitan colleagues.  
These different conceptions of cosmopolitanism (cultural/moral/institutional, 
extreme/moderate, strong/weak) can entail quite distinct positions. Depending on how 
these features are combined, these positions are either more or less compatible with the 
society-(or morality-)of-states approach. How compatible these competing approaches 
are obviously also depends on which specific conception of the society-of-states is 
advocated. Not all proponents of the society-of-states approach adhere to the non-
intervention principle or the priority thesis to the same degree. In this context Beitz 
considers social liberalism to be the offspring of the morality-of-states with the greatest 
interest (Beitz 1979/Afterword 1999, 214). This conception differentiates between the 
domestic and the international level and allows for a certain amount of priority for 
compatriots. At the same time, the international community has the task of establishing 
and maintaining background conditions that enable domestic communities to develop 
and flourish (Ibid., 215). He then contrasts this social liberalism with cosmopolitan 
liberalism, which takes the prospects of persons (rather than states or societies) as 
fundamental. Cosmopolitan liberalists thus question the special moral status social 
liberalists accord to national community. Although these positions differ in this respect, 
Beitz (Ibid., 216) acknowledges that they are likely to converge on many important 
matters of policy in the nonideal world. We believe that they can converge on many points 
in the ideal world also, depending on which specific conceptions of cosmopolitanism and 
society-of-states (or nationalism) are considered. This possible convergence will prove to 
be very important when we will turn our attention to feasibility objections. 
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2.2.3 Different accounts of moral cosmopolitanism 
In the two previous sections we discussed the features that all forms of cosmopolitanism 
share and provided an overview of different views that can all be called cosmopolitan. In 
this section we will focus on moral cosmopolitanism in more detail. After all, recognizing 
that every person has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern can mean 
many different things. Moral cosmopolitans have divergent views on what exactly 
constitutes ‘global justice’. More specifically, they can disagree on the reason why moral 
duties should apply globally,10 what value or which goods need to be promoted, and to 
what extent. In the following six sections, we will give an overview of the most prominent 
variants of moral cosmopolitanism: utilitarianism, a contractarian account, a needs-based 
account, the capabilities approach, a Kantian account, and a rights-based account of 
cosmopolitanism.  
2.2.3.1 Utilitarianism 
The first cosmopolitan position we will discuss is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is a 
consequentialist moral theory, which means that it judges an act to be right or wrong 
solely on the basis of its consequences. More specifically, utilitarians assess an act on the 
basis of the consequences it has for the happiness11 of all those involved. According to 
Jeremy Bentham (1780), we should always promote the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number. In promoting this goal, everyone is to be treated equally and impartially. John 
Stuart Mill calls this ‘Bentham’s dictum’: each counts as one and no more than one (1987 
[1863]). This emphasis on equality and impartiality remains pivotal in the work of more 
contemporary utilitarians like Peter Unger (1996) and Peter Singer (2002).  
Utilitarianism has an intuitive appeal which explains its popularity. Most people value 
well-being and happiness and it seems natural to assess acts in the light of their 
consequences. Moreover, utilitarian reasoning seems to provide a practical tool that can 
 
                                                     
10 Brock (2013, 5) distinguishes between a humanist and an associativist / relational account. On the humanist 
account, moral duties should apply globally due to our shared humanity. On the relational account, something 
more is needed. Duties only apply between people that share a certain relationship, e.g. a global economic 
association. We will come back to this in chapter 3. 
11 Happiness can be conceived in different ways. Bentham advocated a quantitative, hedonistic utilitarianism, 
focusing on the amount of pleasure. Mill, in contrast, introduced a qualitative criterion and distinguished 
between lower and higher sensations. George Edward Moore takes this even further and advocates an ideal 
utilitarianism, mindful of values like beauty and love. More recently, preference utilitarianism focused on 
satisfying our desires. However, as what we desire is not always what is best for us, some utilitarians have 
advocated objective list theories. Their goal is the satisfaction of the desires that we would have, given that we 
would be fully informed and rational. Going further into these different conceptions of happiness unfortunately 
falls beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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help our decision-making, both at the personal and at the policy-making level. 
Nevertheless, few (if any) have ever lived their life according to utilitarian principles. 
Three important features of utilitarianism seem to account for this discrepancy.  
The first feature has to do with the way utilitarianism resolves possible conflicts 
between our self-interest and the demands of morality. In that situation, moral 
requirements are always considered to be overriding. Utilitarianism demands that every 
action we do maximizes the total amount of happiness. As reading a book or watching a 
movie will not meet this requirement, these actions are wrong and should be condemned. 
To live one’s life according to utilitarianism thus means to devote one’s life to the 
maximization of happiness, regardless of the personal costs involved. Non-moral 
considerations or interests will never be more than secondary issues. This feature on its 
own makes utilitarianism an extreme position: ‘[the claim of overridingness] is such a 
strong claim that it is unlikely to be true, even if morality is thought of as moderate rather 
than stringent, and despite the difficulty in providing conclusive arguments against the 
claim’ (Scheffler 1992, 60).  
The second feature that contributes to the demandingness of utilitarianism is its 
emphasis on impartiality. More specifically, utilitarians deny that there is any magic in the 
pronoun ‘my’. This means that we should treat everyone equally, independent of our 
relationship with them. Whether someone is our friend, family, or compatriot is utterly 
irrelevant in deciding how to treat them, which differs greatly from our common moral 
practice. To illustrate the impact of this feature, imagine a burning building with two 
persons inside. One is your wife, the other is a complete stranger. You can only save one. 
Who should you save? According to utilitarianism, you should save the person who will 
bring about the largest amount of happiness throughout her life. If this turns out to be 
the other person, this means tough luck for you and your wife. A utilitarian may respond 
that it is better, all things considered, to allow people to give priority to their special 
relationships, but does choosing to save your wife rather than a stranger really require a 
justification? As noted by Bernard Williams: 
It depends on how much weight is carried by ‘justification’: the consideration that 
it was his wife is certainly, for instance, an explanation which should silence 
comment. But something more ambitious than this is usually intended, essentially 
involving the idea that moral principle can legitimate his preferences, yielding the 
conclusion that in situations of this kind it is at least all right (morally permissible) 
to save one’s wife. […] But this construction provides the agent with one thought 
too many: it might have been hoped by some (for instance, by his wife) that his 
motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not 
that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s 
wife. (Williams 1981, 18) 
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Utilitarianism thus denies that our special relationships have intrinsic value and that 
they can ground special obligations. In deciding what to do we should take everyone into 
account equally, whether they are our mother, wife, child or a distant stranger. This 
requirement seems to be unattainable in real life. 
The third feature that characterizes utilitarianism has to do with its stance on 
supererogatory acts. These are acts that are commonly considered to be good, but not 
obligatory. You are praiseworthy if you perform them, but you will not be condemned if 
you omit them. To illustrate this category, Urmson (1958) uses the example of a soldier 
who jumps on a grenade to save the lives of the buddies of his combat unit. We tend to 
characterize this behaviour as saintly or heroic, not as morally obligatory. However, this 
is exactly what a utilitarian would be expected to do. According to utilitarianism, if an act 
is good, as a matter of principle it also is obligatory. ‘Whatever is good, ought to be done’ 
(Heyd 2002, 7). There is no such thing as a supererogatory act, which nullifies the 
distinction between duty and charity (Singer 1972; 2002, 151). If a wealthy person donates 
money to a charity, she is merely fulfilling her duty, not acting charitably. Moreover, if 
she could give more, she is no longer praiseworthy, but instead blameworthy. This seems 
to be completely at odds with our intuitions about such practices. 
Given these three features, utilitarianism needs to be characterized as an extreme and 
strong form of cosmopolitanism. Our special relationships have no intrinsic value and 
count for nothing in grounding obligations. Moreover, we need to treat everyone equally 
and impartially, which implies reducing inequality as far as possible. Utilitarianism 
therefore is a very demanding moral theory, even more so because its requirements 
should always be regarded as overriding. The question then arises why we should accept 
this extreme position? This seems to be a consequence of our shared humanity12 (, as 
opposed to the ‘associativist’ or ‘relational’ position which bases our obligations on our 
special relationships (Brock 2013, 5)). We are inclined to feel sympathy for our fellow 
human beings: ‘The idea of the pain of another is naturally painful; the idea of the 
pleasure of another is naturally pleasurable’ (Mill 1835, 60). This sympathy can lead to 
generalized benevolence, which means we are no longer focused on our own happiness, 
but strive for the happiness of humanity at large. 
Given the current state of the world, this conception might seem somewhat naïve. Mill 
admits that sympathy in itself will often fail to motivate people to act morally. To 
successfully motivate a utilitarian lifestyle, this feeling needs to be cultivated. Even if we 
grant that this is possible, we can still question whether it is desirable. As we have seen, 
 
                                                     
12 Some utilitarians argue that we should include all sentient beings into our moral framework, not only humans. 
See, for example, Singer’s Animal Liberation (1975).  
  43 
living a utilitarian life seems to involve very high personal costs. Again, Williams aptly 
describes the problem: 
It is absurd to demand of such a man, when the sums come in from the utility 
network which the projects of others have in part determined, that he should just 
step aside from his own project and decision and acknowledge the decision which 
utilitarian calculation requires. It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions 
and the source of his action in his own convictions. It is to make him into a channel 
between the input of everyone's projects, including his own, and an output of 
optimific decision; but this is to neglect the extent to which his projects and his 
decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions which flow from the projects 
and attitudes with which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal 
sense, an attack on his integrity. (Williams 1973, 116-117) 
Shelly Kagan has tried to refute this argument from integrity in The Limits of Morality 
(1989). He argues that our common, restrictive conception of morality cannot be justified. 
Moreover, only people who comply with the genuine demands of morality, however 
excessive, can be said to live a life of integrity. We will return to such considerations of 
feasibility below. For now we will conclude that utilitarianism, which is an extreme and 
strong form of cosmopolitanism, turns out to be a very demanding position. 
2.2.3.2 Contractarian accounts of cosmopolitanism 
Whereas utilitarianism derives our responsibilities from our shared humanity, 
contractarians argue that something more is needed. They believe that moral norms 
derive their normative force from the idea of a contract or mutual agreement (Cudd 2013). 
Yet how can we decide which principles of justice are fair and should be adopted?  
 
John Rawls 
In A Theory of Justice (1971) John Rawls tried to answer this question for the domestic sphere. 
He considers society to be a system of social co-operation which produces both benefits 
and burdens. The principles of justice are needed to distribute these benefits and burdens 
in a fair way and to outline the basic structure of society. Central here is the idea of an 
‘original position’, i.e. a hypothetical situation designed to arrive at a fair agreement as 
to how society should be arranged. A defining feature of this position is that none of the 
participants knows his or her exact position within the society: 
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… no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any 
one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence, strength and the like. I will even assume that the parties do not know 
their conceptions of good or their special psychological propensities. The principles 
of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is 
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural 
chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated 
and no one is able to design principles to favour his particular condition, the 
principles of justice are the result of fair agreement or bargain. (Rawls 1971, 12) 
Rawls argues that we would opt for the liberal values of equality and freedom to 
structure our political and social institutions.13 More specifically, the first principle of justice 
is to assure equality regarding basic freedoms: ‘Each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for others’ (Rawls 1971, 60). This principle thus focuses more on the political 
constitution and the equal status as citizens, by emphasizing freedom of speech, 
assembly, conscience, and the like. The second principle of justice has to do more with the 
distribution of wealth and socially valued positions: ‘Social and economic inequalities are 
to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least 
advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity’ (Rawls 1971, 302; 2nd Edition 1999, 72). We would not opt for a 
fully equal society from behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls argues, but rather grant 
inequalities if and only if they are to the advantage of the worst off. The moral idea behind 
this hypothetical choice is that the distribution of wealth and opportunities should not 
depend on morally arbitrary grounds, such as the social class one is born into, one’s sex, 
one’s level of intelligence, and so on.  
Rawls’ contractarian conception of justice remains very influential to this day. What is 
remarkable, however, is that he limited the application of these principles to the domestic 
realm. As mentioned earlier in section 1.1.2, Rawls is a proponent of the morality-of-states 
approach, which means that he advocates different principles for the governance of the 
domestic versus the international realm. He developed his international account in The Law 
of Peoples (1999) and it is striking how much this differs from his ‘justice as fairness’ at the 
domestic level. The question thus arises to what extent this discrepancy is justified. In 
our exploration of this issue, we will focus on two key figures in the contractarian 
tradition, namely Charles Beitz and Darrel Moellendorf. 
 
                                                     
13 These institutions regulate, for example, our freedom of speech, the market, property, family, and political 
liberty. They thus influence our lives to a large extent. 
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Charles Beitz 
We already mentioned Beitz in section 1.1.2, where we discussed his attempts to refute 
political realism and the society-of-states approach. In contrast to these positions (and 
especially Rawls), Beitz argues that there is such a thing as international distributive 
justice. More specifically, he agrees with Rawls that justice only applies in contexts of 
social cooperation, yet claims that our current world meets this condition. Consequently, 
the principles of justice that apply to the domestic sphere should also apply 
internationally. As trade, communication, financial transfers and the property rights 
regime all have become increasingly globalized, the relevant difference between the 
domestic and the international context has dissolved:  
Economic interdependence, then, involves a pattern of relationships which are 
largely nonvoluntary from the point of view of the worse-off participants, and 
which produce benefits for some while imposing burdens on others. These facts, by 
now part of the conventional wisdom of international relations, describe a world in 
which national boundaries can no longer be regarded as the outer limits of social 
cooperation. (Beitz 1975, 374) 
As states no longer meet the condition of self-sufficiency, we should abandon the state-
centred perspective and apply the relevant principles of distributive justice globally 
(Beitz 1975, 383). More specifically, Beitz argues for a global ‘original position’ in which 
the representatives would be unaware not only of their position in society, but even of 
which specific society they will inhabit. Beitz believes that enlarging the scope of the 
original position in this way is unlikely to change the content of the principles that would 
be chosen (1975, 376). He uses Rawls’ contractarian argumentation, yet reaches a 
cosmopolitan conclusion. With regard to distributive justice, this would imply a global 
difference principle, justifying only those social and economic inequalities that are of the 
greatest benefit to the least advantaged members of the world. The way things currently 
are, is clearly at odds with this criterion. 
 
Darrel Moellendorf 
Darrel Moellendorf explores this line of reasoning further in his book Cosmopolitan Justice 
(2002). He starts by distinguishing between general moral duties and duties of justice, and 
proceeds to develop an institutional account of cosmopolitanism. Much like Rawls, he 
focuses on the duties we have regarding the institutions that structure our social and 
political lives to a large extent. He considers these duties of justice to be a subset of our 
more general moral duties. They are generated by associational relations and can be 
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discharged indirectly, namely through obeying or advocating just institutions and 
principles to govern these associational relations (Moellendorf 2002, 31). 
This conceptualization of duties of justice implies that they are not owed to everyone, 
as they require a relevant association; they are membership dependent. Moellendorf (2010, 
3-4) demarcates those associations that generate duties of justice using ‘the principle of 
associational justice’: 
The idea is that duties of social justice exist between persons who have a moral duty 
of equal respect to one another if those persons are co-members in an association 
that is (1) relatively strong, (2) largely (individually) non-voluntary, (3) constitutive 
of a significant part of the background rules for the various relationships of their 
public lives, and (4) governed by norms that can be subject to (collective) human 
control.  
How strong an association is, depends on how enduring it is, how comprehensively 
governed by institutional norms, and how regularly it affects the highest order moral 
interests of its members. Its (non-)voluntariness has to do with the availability of a 
reasonable alternative to participating in the association. Moellendorf admits that 
determining whether these conditions are met is not always straightforward; it requires 
casuistry (Moellendorf 2010, 4).  
A first, rather obvious, association that might generate duties of justice, is the state. Its 
rules clearly structure our public lives and affect persons’ highest order moral interests. 
Moreover, given the costs of emigration, for most people no reasonable alternative is 
available. Therefore, Moellendorf (2010, 9) concludes that states are indeed associations 
that generate duties of justice among compatriots. In this way, his account of 
cosmopolitanism can accommodate special duties to compatriots. As a moderate 
cosmopolitan, he does not deny the intrinsic value special relationships like this can have, 
nor the corresponding special obligations. Moreover, his principle of associational justice 
can explain the raison d’être of special obligations as duties of justice. Therefore, we may 
reasonably expect that his account of cosmopolitanism can more easily be accepted by 
nationalists and society-of-states proponents. 
The question remains however as to whether Moellendorf could convince nationalists 
and society-of-states proponents of the existence of global duties of justice. Given his own 
rationale, he would need to demonstrate the existence of a global association, strong 
enough to meet the conditions of his principle of associational justice. In line with Beitz’s 
reasoning, Moellendorf argues that the global economic order falls within this 
framework. He first considers the condition of strength (Moellendorf 2010, 12-13). He 
traces the origin of our globalized economy back to the early colonial area, to pinpoint 
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how enduring it is. Moreover, he focuses on the norms of governance that are provided 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
World Bank, and the implicit recognition of exclusionary property regimes in all 
international commerce. He further argues that the globalization of trade, investment 
and finance is seriously affecting the highest order moral interests of persons. By way of 
illustration, he looks at the position of some of the poorest and most vulnerable people 
worldwide, viz. children in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1990, they were 19 times more likely to 
die than children in the richest countries. By 2003, however, this number had already 
grown to 26 times (UNDP 2003, 39). This situation is the result of a complex combination 
of factors, so it would be misleading to attribute it solely to the process of economic 
globalization. However, Moellendorf’s claim that international trade, foreign direct 
investment, and the globalization of finance profoundly affect people’s local economies, 
cannot be easily dismissed (2010, 13). 
The second condition that needs to be met in order for an association to generate 
duties of justice is non-voluntariness. Moellendorf admits that political leaders are formally 
free to decide whether or not to join the WTO, yet he interprets the fact that nearly every 
country is a member as implying that no feasible alternative exists. Moreover, he points 
out that many countries are not in fact democratic, which clearly undermines the 
possibility of a voluntary consent of their citizens.  
The third condition has to do with the extent to which an association determines the 
background rules for the relationships people have in their public lives (Moellendorf 2010, 
13-14). We already mentioned the impact of the rules of the WTO on the domestic policies 
of its members. Moellendorf explicitly mentions patent protection, established by the 
WTO Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property rights (TRIPS 1994), 
which critically undermines the ability of states to provide their citizens with life-saving 
medicines.14 This is a clear illustration of the way background rules seriously affect 
people’s lives.15 
Before an association can give rise to duties of justice, its norms also need to be subject 
to human control. According to Moellendorf (2010, 14) this is a foregone conclusion: 
‘Market competition can be limited, directed, or counterbalanced by deliberate public 
policy; WTO rules can be amended; and property regimes can be altered. So, there is no 
doubt that the global economic association satisfies this condition’. 
 
                                                     
14 For a proposal to tackle this problem, see Hollis & Pogge (2008).  
15 As this regulation clearly affects the highest order moral interests of persons, the actual difference between this 
condition of associational justice (significant link with background rules that affect the relationships of people’s 
public lives) and condition 1 (strength of the association) seems to be open to interpretation. 
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Moellendorf thus concludes that the global economic association meets the four 
conditions of the principle of associational justice, which implies that it generates duties of 
justice. However, as he himself notes, the emergent and partial nature of the global 
economic association might cast doubt on this account (Moellendorf 2010, 17). The scope 
of the duties of justice seems to depend on the threshold we use to determine who exactly 
counts as a member of the global economic association.16 We agree with Moellendorf that 
for almost everyone the conditions of associational justice are met: the global economic 
association affects most people’s highest order moral interests; membership is non-
voluntary; the association largely determines the background rules that regulate people’s 
public lives; and the governing norms are subject to human control. To the extent that 
the economic association is global, it thus generates duties of justice with a global scope. 
What makes Moellendorf’s account of associational justice so appealing is that it 
provides the basis for a theoretical reconciliation of duties to compatriots and 
cosmopolitan duties to non-compatriots (Moellendorf 2010, 22). He does not deny that we 
have duties of justice to compatriots and even provides nationalists and society-of-states 
proponents with a theoretical framework that can ground these special duties. However, 
the possibility of conflict between both kinds of duties remains. To resolve such conflicts, 
we need to weigh both duties against each other, taking into account the relevant 
circumstances. Giving general priority to either of the two is merely question-begging: 
When claims of justice made by compatriots and noncompatriots conflict, 
resolution is often possible by appealing to more fundamental or background 
considerations of justice. This assertion does not, however, entail that the claims of 
compatriots invariably trump the claims of noncompatriots or vice versa. It is an 
assertion about the manner of resolution, not its outcome. (Moellendorf 2002, 41) 
More specifically, Moellendorf (2002, 43) urges us to look at ‘the basic consideration of 
justice at stake in particular disputes’. What this means, seems to depend on the specific 
interpretation of global justice that is being advocated, and how demandingly it is 
conceived. In other words, how does Moellendorf conceptualize a just world and should 
we characterize his theory as an example of weak or strong cosmopolitanism?  
 
                                                     
16 Do we, for example, owe duties of justice to the indigenous people of the Amazon rainforest, as they arguably 
are no active participants in the global economic order? Moellendorf argues that climate change – a process 
linked to economic globalization – could also generate global duties of justice: ‘Global warming seems to pose a 
threat to most everyone. […] the distribution of pollutants in the atmosphere has also brought people into an unavoidable 
association affecting their highest order moral interests’ (Moellendorf 2002, 37). 
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Much like Beitz, Moellendorf argues that duties of global egalitarian distributive 
justice do exist (2002, 68). Moreover, he wants to extend Rawls’ conception of domestic 
justice to the global realm and he advocates a global difference principle. This means that 
inequalities are only justified insofar as they benefit those people who are worst off on 
the global scale. Furthermore, Moellendorf argues for global equality of opportunity. In 
A Theory of Justice Rawls defines what ‘fair equality of opportunity’ means in the domestic 
realm:  
 […] those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same 
willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of 
their initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the income class into 
which they are born. In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal 
prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and 
endowed. (Rawls 1971, 73) 
Moellendorf wants to generalize this principle and apply it to the global realm as well. 
He argues that our initial place in the social system is not only determined by the income 
class into which we are born, our sex, race, and ethnicity, but should also entail our country 
of birth. As Branko Milanovic has convincingly demonstrated in his studies for the World 
Bank, our country of birth has a massive influence on our opportunity for income. As this 
feature is as morally arbitrary as those corrected for in the domestic context, it seems 
puzzling why a principle of fair equality of opportunity should be restricted to the 
domestic sphere. 
A possible explanation could be that global equality of opportunity is simply an overly 
demanding conception of global justice. This becomes clear when we look at 
Moellendorf’s understanding of the principle (2002, 49): ‘If equality of opportunity were 
realized, a child growing up in rural Mozambique would be statistically as likely as the 
child of a senior executive at a Swiss bank to reach the position of the latter’s parent’. He 
concedes that this would require substantial wealth transfers from the developed to the 
developing countries, to support their education, health, food and security programs. A 
possible rebuttal of this demandingness objection focuses on equivalent, rather than 
identical, opportunity sets (Miller 2007, 63).17 We will return to this issue when we discuss 
the needs-based account of cosmopolitanism advocated by Gillian Brock.  
 
                                                     
17 Miller denies that this adaptation can save the global application of the principle of equality of opportunity. 
He argues that we still face a metric problem, namely that there is no global common set of cultural 
understandings to enable cross-national opportunity comparisons. We have no way of establishing what 
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Here we will conclude that Moellendorf advocates a rather nuanced, somewhat hybrid, 
position. On the one hand, he accepts the legitimacy of special obligations towards 
compatriots, which makes him a moderate cosmopolitan. On the other hand, he defends a 
global difference principle and global equality of opportunity, which characterizes him 
as a strong cosmopolitan.  
2.2.3.3 A needs-based account of cosmopolitanism 
Gillian Brock (2009, 47) agrees with Moellendorf (and Beitz) that the Rawlsian framework 
can also be useful in the global context, as it succeeds quite well in modelling impartiality. 
The conclusion she reaches, however, is different. More specifically, she questions 
whether the representatives in the global original position would indeed choose a global 
difference principle. She designs an alternative Rawlsian-style normative thought 
experiment and argues that it would be reasonable to choose a more minimally 
egalitarian principle, characterized by a needs-based minimum floor (Brock 2005, 4). 
In her thought experiment, delegates are asked to reflect on which basic structure for 
governing the world’s inhabitants would reasonably be accepted as fair. She agrees with 
Moellendorf that the veil of ignorance would yield special attention to the interests of the 
worst off, because the delegates might themselves turn out to be worst off. However, she 
argues that this would urge the representatives to ensure a certain threshold, instead of a 
global difference principle. More specifically, the representatives would want to avoid 
policies that would have unbearable effects on people (2005, 6): 
So my claim is that the minimum package it would be reasonable to agree to in the 
ideal choosing situation I have identified is that we should all be adequately 
positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life, as fleshed out by what is 
necessary to be enabled to meet our basic needs and those of our dependents (but 
with provisions firmly in place for the permanently or temporarily disabled to be 
adequately cared for) and certain guarantees about basic freedom. We would use 
this as a baseline and endorse social and political arrangements that can ensure and 
underwrite these important goods. (Brock 2005, 8) 
Brock then strengthens her account by providing empirical data indicating that people 
would actually choose some kind of minimum floor principle instead of the – more 
demanding – global difference principle. In this context she (Brock 2005, 10) refers to the 
 
                                                     
equality of opportunity means in a culturally plural world (2007, 64-68). However, he does concede that ‘we might 
be able to identify the most egregious forms of inequality’ (Ibid., 67). Given the current state of the world, this could 
definitely start us in the right direction. 
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work of Norman and Joe Oppenheimer, who have designed several experiments in a way 
that is said to show which principles of distributive justice people would choose under 
conditions of impartiality. One could say that Frohlich and Oppenheimer, to a certain 
extent, have tried to put Rawls’ hypothetical original position into practice. In contrast 
to what Rawls might have expected, the difference principle turned out to be the least 
popular; it was chosen in only 1 % of cases. Frohlich and Oppenheimer experimented in 
different countries, and the floor constraint principle was by far the most popular. Almost 
80 % of people wanted to maximize the floor income in society. The rationale underlying 
this choice was that this principle would act as a safety net for all individuals. Important 
here is that they chose this floor constraint principle out of a concern for people being 
able to meet their basic needs. Once this threshold was met, people did not want any 
further redistribution. They wanted to make full use of the existing incentives and in this 
way maximize production and thus average income (Frohlich & Oppenheimer 1992, 59). 
When thinking about justice, people thus seem to balance needs, entitlements and 
incentives (Brock 2005, 13). This sounds very reasonable when we consider the debate 
about the appropriate height of unemployment benefits. Based on the data of the 
abovementioned experiments, Brock argues that a fair balance can be found between 
these three central ideas (needs, entitlements and incentives) in designing the basic 
structure of society. However, it is not the balance Rawls (domestically) and Moellendorf 
(globally) had in mind: 
We could arrive at a reasoned view of the weight to give a commitment to meeting 
basic needs which does not thwart entitlement or dampen incentives. It is not the 
case that we care only about the worst off, nor is it the case that considerations of 
entitlements and incentives drown out our appropriate concern with needs. As the 
empirical evidence shows, concern for the needy is strong and robust, all things 
considered. But importantly, it is strikingly not the case that under conditions of 
impartiality we want to arrange things so that we concern ourselves only with 
maximizing the position of the worst off. This tells rather dramatically against the 
Difference Principle. (Brock 2005, 13-14) 
The fact that people would actually choose a minimum floor principle under 
conditions that model impartiality, goes some way towards proving it to be a fair 
principle. Based on Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992, 118), Brock also claims that the 
preference for this principle remains stable over time; people’s confidence grows when 
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they have to live with the result of their choices (Brock 2005, 14).18 These features both 
seem to be in the interest of the worst off, and therefore, Brock (Ibid., 15) argues, the 
needs-based minimum floor principle she suggests, need not differ fundamentally from 
the global difference principle. 
Whether and to what extent both principles would differ, seems to depend on the 
current state of affairs. As things stand, making sure that everyone can meet his basic 
needs is very likely in the interests of the worst off. Once this threshold has been met, 
however, both principles would require different courses of action. Whereas Brock’s 
principle would in principle allow for large inequalities, Moellendorf would argue that 
these are only justified if they are beneficial for the worst off. His global difference 
principle would thus require more redistribution. Hence we would submit that Brock’s 
needs-based minimum floor principle characterizes her theory as a weak account of 
cosmopolitanism, which increases its acceptability for her opponents. 
Brock (2005, 16) also challenges Moellendorf’s call for global equality of opportunity, 
not for being too demanding but because it is too culturally specific or culturally 
insensitive (Brock 2009, 59). As different cultures value different ends or goods, it seems 
impossible to compare the desirability of positions between cultures. As noted earlier, 
Miller (2007, 64-68) calls this the metric problem. Caney (2001b, 120) has tried to refute 
this objection by developing a more culturally neutral account: ‘Global Equality of 
Opportunity requires that persons (of equal ability and motivation) have equal 
opportunities to attain an equal number of positions of a commensurate standard of 
living’. In his attempt to describe ‘positions of equal worth’ he builds on Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach, which we will discuss in the next section. Brock (2005, 19) however 
argues that this account is unable to block disadvantage and discrimination on morally 
arbitrary grounds. By focusing on the enjoyment of an equal standard of living, 
differences in power or genuine opportunities might pass unnoticed. We believe, 
however, that these criticisms call for a refinement of the concept, rather than refuting 
the possibility of a principle of global equality of opportunity in general. 
Be that as it may, designing a positive version of a principle of global equality of 
opportunity is likely to remain controversial. Brock’s plea to return to the negative 
version of the principle therefore has some appeal to it. Enabling people to meet their 
basic needs seems a very promising strategy to enhance their opportunities. Without 
 
                                                     
18 Brock (2005, 20) links these features to Rawls’ concept of a ‘realistic utopia’ (1999, 11-12). The focus on 
impartiality ensures the utopian component, whereas the stability over time provides the realistic component.  
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secure access to clean water, food, sanitation, education, and health care, talk of equal 
opportunities becomes just another empty word (Brock 2005, 19).  
Brock (2009, 62) also points out that our focus on equalizing opportunities might be 
misguided, as the underlying thought seems to be the concern to provide everyone with 
a decent set of opportunities: ‘The decent, not the equal, set of opportunities is surely the 
primary goal, because consider how we could easily equalize downwards, so that 
everyone has the same opportunities, yet these are hopelessly inadequate’. Indeed, it is 
important that people can meet their basic needs, so they can function as human agents.19 
What is required to attain this goal, can be summarized in five categories: (1) physical and 
psychological health; (2) security; (3) an understanding of the options one is choosing 
between; (4) autonomy; and (5) decent social relations. A further advantage of this 
account, according to Brock (2009, 65-68), is that it is sufficiently specific to assess the 
state of affairs and track progress. 
To sum up, Brock’s needs-based minimum floor principle seems quite promising. As a 
weak cosmopolitan, she is not overly focused on equality, so possible opponents will be 
less easily scared off than with a global difference principle. Moreover, her focus on needs 
as the basis for a decent set of opportunities seems uncontroversial. However, before we 
can jump to any conclusions, we still have three alternative accounts of cosmopolitanism 
to consider.  
2.2.3.4 The capability approach 
The next account of cosmopolitanism we will discuss, bears resemblance to Brock’s 
needs-based account, as they are both focused on the conditions needed for human 
flourishing. In Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (2006, 226-7) 
Martha Nussbaum examines ‘what all human beings require to live a richly human life – 
a set of basic entitlements for all people’. What do we need to live a life with dignity? Her 
focus on human flourishing reveals her Aristotelian inspiration.20 Nussbaum’s answer 
consists of a list of ten capabilities, requirements for living a good life, namely: life; bodily 
health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reasons; 
affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s environment (Nussbaum 2006, 76-
78). In this way, the capability approach focuses on what people are actually able to do 
 
                                                     
19 Brock links needs to human agency, but other underpinnings are also possible. David Braybrooke (1987), for 
example, explains the importance of needs in relation to social functioning. 
20 According to Nussbaum, Aristotle conceived of the task of political planning as ‘to make available to each and 
every citizen the material, institutional and educational circumstances in which good human functioning may 
be chosen; to move each and every one of them across a threshold of capability into circumstances in which 
they may choose to live and function well’ (1998, 135). 
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and to be, rather than on utility/happiness or the amount of resources they have (Sen 
1992, 48). Important here is the difference between functionings and capabilities. 
Functionings are the ‘beings and doings’ a person can undertake, like ‘being’ well-
nourished or educated, and travelling or voting in an election (doings). Capabilities, on 
the other hand, entail the freedom to achieve well-being or the real opportunities one 
has to achieve functionings (Robeyns 2011):  
Thus, while travelling is a functioning, the real opportunity to travel is the 
corresponding capability. The distinction between functionings and capabilities is 
between the realized and the effectively possible, in other words, between 
achievements, on the one hand, and freedoms or valuable opportunities from which 
one can choose, on the other. 
Consider in this context the difference between fasting and starving (Sen 1992, 52). 
Whereas the functioning is the same in both situations, there is a fundamental difference 
with regard to the capability to be adequately nourished. In a just world, then, everyone 
would have the opportunity to achieve all the relevant functionings. Yet how should this 
goal be operationalized? How should the relevant list of capabilities be determined, for 
example? And is there not a risk of paternalism in proclaiming which capabilities should 
be valued universally (Stewart 2001, 1192; Clark 2002)? Sen (2004, 77) acknowledges this 
danger and argues for a more participatory approach:  
The problem is not with listing important capabilities, but with insisting on one 
predetermined canonical list of capabilities, chosen by theorists without any 
general social discussion or public reasoning. To have such a fixed list, emanating 
entirely from pure theory, is to deny the possibility of fruitful public participation 
on what should be included and why [...] Public discussion and reasoning can lead 
to a better understanding of the role, reach and significance of particular 
capabilities [...] 
Even if we agree with Nussbaum that her list is sufficiently abstract or cultural-
neutral,21 the question still remains how different capabilities should be weighted. In an 
ideal theory, Nussbaum is right to argue that they are all equally important and 
incommensurable conditions for living a life with dignity. In this way, the capability 
 
                                                     
21 We agree that the focus on capabilities rather than on specific functionings lowers the risk of paternalism by 
accommodating local differences. Moreover, Nussbaum herself stresses that her list is open-ended and always 
open for revision (Nussbaum 2000, 77). 
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approach has broadened the ‘informational basis’ for assessment (from a narrow focus on 
income to multiple social indicators). Designing and assessing policy, however, is 
dependent on empirical data which are not always easily accessible. Paul Anand (2005) 
and Martin van Hees (2006) have attempted to tackle this challenge by setting up the 
Capabilities Measurement Project.22 Through this research, they want to develop a 
multidimensional tool for measuring capabilities. The importance of capabilities for 
living a life with dignity is also reflected in the work of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and its annual publication of the Human Development Report. In this 
report, countries are evaluated and ranked using a Human Development Index (HDI) 
consisting of both economic and social indicators.23 This broader informational basis 
includes life expectancy, education, standard of living and political participation. 
Knowing what capability theorists advocate, we now want to focus on the extent to 
which they say this should be attained. The concept of basic capability is very insightful in 
this context, as it refers to ‘the ability to satisfy certain elementary and crucially 
important functionings up to certain levels’ (Sen 1992, 45 n. 19). Basic capabilities thus 
refer to having real opportunities for survival and being free from poverty. As such, they 
constitute a threshold that everyone should be able to meet. Rather than aiming for 
equality as such, the focus of the capability approach seems to be on providing everyone 
with a sufficient level to enable a life with dignity (sufficientarianism).24 
Brock rightly points out that this weak cosmopolitan account comes close to her needs-
based minimum floor principle, as a pre-condition for living a decent life. However, 
fulfilling this task is no walk in the park and it remains unclear to whom this duty would 
be allocated if states (the primary bearers of this responsibility, according to Nussbaum) 
would fail. 
2.2.3.5 The Kantian account of cosmopolitanism 
Before we can discuss the Kantian account into detail, we should briefly look at the moral 
foundations of Kant’s cosmopolitanism (Brown 2010, 46-49). Pivotal here is Kant’s 
categorical imperative, which demands to ‘act only according to the maxim whereby you 
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ (Kant 1993 [1785], 30). 
From this Kant derives two important principles of cosmopolitan universality, namely: 
(1) that we should act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in our own person 
 
                                                     
22 http://www.open.ac.uk/ikd/projects_capabilitiesmeasurement.shtml.  
23 http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi. 
24 Robeyns (2011) rightly points out that not all capability theories necessarily entail a sufficiency rule like 
Nussbaum. If they do not, however, we should characterize them as strong cosmopolitan accounts, which would 
reduce their chance of ever being accepted by their opponents.  
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or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end, and never merely as a 
means; and (2) that legislative maxims can only be valid if they can at the same time have 
for their object themselves as universal laws of nature (Brown 2010, 47). From this Brown 
concludes that it is because of our universal capacity to be moral lawgivers, that we 
should treat everyone with a sense of universal human dignity. This implies that everyone 
has the right to as much freedom as is compatible with that of others, simply by virtue of 
the fact that they are human.  
The emphasis on universality in Kant’s moral theory clearly indicates that he is a moral 
cosmopolitan. He believes that – as rational beings – we are all members of a single moral 
community and that our obligations are not restricted by nationality, language, religion, 
or customs (Kleingeld 2003, 301). Pauline Kleingeld distinguishes two political aspects in 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism, namely the concept of a ‘league of states’ and that of a 
‘cosmopolitan law’ (Kleingeld 2003, 301-302).25 In Toward Perpetual Peace (1795) Kant 
argued that states should join this league of nations and thereby promote peace, an idea 
that is reflected in the United Nations. His cosmopolitan law (Weltbürgerrecht) is an 
addition to constitutional and international law, and grants individuals certain rights as 
citizens of the earth, regardless of their nationality. The right to hospitality, for example, 
falls under this cosmopolitan law. 
Kant’s moral theory is thus cosmopolitan in nature. What could a Kantian account 
contribute to the debate between cosmopolitans? Onora O’Neill has tried to answer this 
question in A Kantian Approach to Transnational Justice (2010). She begins by pointing out 
the flaws in alternative competing theories. She blames communitarians (and others who 
grant compatriots legitimate priority and deny that international distributive justice is 
an issue) for their ‘self-serving nostalgia’. Much like Beitz, O’Neill (2010, 64) believes the 
necessary pre-condition for this view can no longer be met: ‘It is not a world of closed 
communities with mutually impenetrable ways of thought, self-sufficient economies and 
ideally sovereign states’. Against consequentialist accounts such as utilitarianism, she 
argues that these cannot fully grasp the importance that non-consequentialists attach to 
some aspects of justice, for example individual rights; ‘in taking the production of benefit 
as the criterion for right action it permits some lives to be used and used up in order to 
produce benefit (happiness or well-being) in other lives’ (O’Neill 2010, 65). Rights-based 
accounts can solve this problem, but only to face a different problem, and this is where a 
Kantian account brings added value, according to O’Neill. 
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When we consider rights, we normally assume that there are corresponding 
obligations that can be claimed. If those obligations cannot be allocated to a specific duty-
bearer, the rights under consideration will only be ‘manifesto rights’ (Feinberg 1980). 
Traditionally, however, a distinction is made between perfect and imperfect duties, with 
the former applying to everyone in a strict way, whereas the latter allow for a great deal 
of latitude on the part of agents as to time, place, manner, and extent of fulfilling the 
duties (Lichtenberg 2014, 49). Negative duties, like the duty not to harm, are perfect. 
Positive duties, like duties of beneficence, are imperfect. This poses a problem, since: ‘for 
[positive duties] to be real and meaningful, we must be able to say who has the duty to 
fulfil them or not to violate them and exactly what and how such agents must do’ 
(Lichtenberg 2014, 50). 
Under this conception, a theory can either limit itself to negative duties (e.g. 
libertarianism) and thus neglect certain needs, or argue for welfare rights, and thus leave 
certain obligations unallocated. O’Neill (2010, 73) has tried to combine an account of the 
allocation of obligations with an acknowledgement of the claims of need and poverty, by 
sketching an account of obligations among finite, needy beings. A first way in which her 
Kantian account might do better than theories of rights is by offering an account of virtue 
as well as justice. The underlying rationale is that rational beings whose desires 
standardly outrun their own resources will discover that they cannot universally act on 
principles of neglecting needs. Neglecting positive duties completely would thus not 
comply with Kant’s categorical imperative. This account does not make imperfect duties 
into perfect ones, but endows them with some extra normative force: 
The advantage of an account of imperfect obligations is that it neither insists that 
what have traditionally been thought of as imperfect duties have corresponding 
rights nor treats them as in no way obligatory. In short, the approach leaves room, 
as rights-based approaches do not, for a non-trivializing account of the social and 
institutional virtues. (O’Neill 2010, 75) 
O’Neill thus argues for a universal imperfect duty to meet needs, but without positing 
a positive right on the side of the needy. According to her, rights to subsistence can be 
nothing more than ‘empty manifesto rights’, and recognizing this implies that we should 
rather use the discourse of obligations (O’Neill 1998, 12). We agree with O’Neill that a 
Kantian account and an emphasis on obligations can add normative force to meeting 
people’s needs. We do not, however, think that this solves the problem of allocation in a 
compelling way.  
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2.2.3.6 Rights-based accounts  
The final account of cosmopolitanism we will discuss takes rights as its focal point. 
Important advocates of this account are Henry Shue, Charles Jones, Simon Caney, and 
Thomas Pogge. Before we will discuss their views into more detail, we will examine what 
gives rights their special appeal.  
David Copp (1998) has tried to answer this question and argues (in direct contrast to 
O’Neill) for a right to be enabled to meet one’s basic needs.26 In line with Brock, he takes 
this to be an important means to living a decent life. He considers our ability to satisfy 
basic needs to be ‘a nonarbitrary and theoretically defensible criterion of the minimal 
adequacy of a standard of living’ (1998, 122). So far, the views of Copp and Brock are quite 
similar. Copp however goes on to emphasize that having our basic needs met is a right, 
which endows it with a special status (1998, 127): 
The special status of rights has been thought to have three aspects. First, rights have 
priority over the ordinary goals and duties of the state and over the goal of 
promoting the general welfare. Rights can be overridden only in the interest of a 
goal or duty of special urgency. Second, rights can be claimed as their due by the 
people who possess them. Right holders are wronged if their rights are abridged. 
Third, a person who claims something to which she has a right does not thereby 
demean herself or undermine her grounds for self-respect or self-esteem. On the 
contrary, a person with proper self-respect and self-esteem would claim the things 
to which she had a right, unless she had a good reason not to do so. 
The fact that rights have this special status is what convinced Copp that being able to 
meet one’s basic needs is best characterized as a right (Copp 1998, 127). Stan Van Hooft 
(2009, 57-58) expresses a similar idea when he differentiates between the moral quality of 
claiming assistance as a matter of right and the moral quality of begging for it. He makes 
the same distinction on the part of the donors. Donors are said to act generously or 
charitably when giving in the absence of a corresponding right to receive assistance. 
However, when the recipients are exercising their right, fulfilling it is nothing more than 
just. In this context, Van Hooft refers to Onora O’Neill and the formal complementarity 
between rights and duties; ‘Once we start talking about rights, we assume a framework in 
which performance of obligations can be claimed. Rights have to be allocated to specified 
bearers of obligations: otherwise, claimants of rights cannot know to which obligation 
bearer their claims should be addressed’ (1998, 96). We argue that characterizing the 
 
                                                     
26 Copp conceptualizes this as a right against the state, more specifically against a state in favorable 
circumstances. 
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fulfilment of our basic needs as a right can bring added value, but only if this task can be 
adequately allocated. 
Within this rights-based approach, different positions are advocated. A first divisive 
issue is the question whether or not humans are entitled to social and economic rights, 
in addition to basic civil and political rights. Civil and political rights include the right to 
freedom of expression, conscience, and association, the right to security of the person, 
the right to due process and the rule of law, and the right to political participation. Socio-
economic and cultural rights include the right to a fair share of basic resources and the 
right to basic education (Jones 2013, 60). Traditionally, socio-economic rights are 
considered more controversial, among other things because of their assumed high cost 
(Cranston 1962). However, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966a, Article 11) explicitly endorses a subsistence right as ‘the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions’ and ‘the 
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger’. The question however remains 
who should ensure that this right is met? 
Generally, this is considered to be the task of the state, but what if it fails to do so? 
According to Henry Shue (1996, 51-60) the responsibility then becomes more generalized. 
He argues that the complete fulfilment of every right (including the right to subsistence) 
gives rise to different kinds of duties, namely duties to avoid depriving; duties to protect 
from deprivation; and duties to aid the deprived. These duties are interrelated; if 
everyone could be relied on to fulfil the first duty, then the second one would be 
superfluous. The third duty (to aid the deprived) can be the result of a failure to fulfil both 
other duties, but it can also be attached to a special role or relationship, or it may result 
from natural disasters. Irrespective of the specific origin of the duty to aid the deprived, 
Shue firmly argues for a basic right to subsistence to which everyone is entitled. As a moral 
right, this provides ‘(1) the rational basis for a justified demand (2) that the actual 
enjoyment of a substance be (3) socially guaranteed against standard threats’ (1996, 13). 
Charles Jones (2011, 117) defends a similar position. He argues that human rights are 
claims linked to the dignity and equal moral status of individual human beings and 
conceives of them as the normative link between interests and duties (2013, 58). He agrees 
with Shue that human rights protect important individual interests against standard 
threats, and he links the duties generated by these rights to institutions, rather than 
individuals. As surviving is one of the most basic interests people have, Jones 
conceptualizes the right to subsistence as a human right. He acknowledges the danger of 
inflating human rights by allowing too many demands to count as rights, but argues that 
this risk is not at issue in the case of subsistence: 
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While worries about inflation should lead to denial for certain candidate-rights, it 
is difficult to see how an interest as fundamental as access to clean water, clean air, 
and adequate nutrition could be less important than any other interest one might 
identify. Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that even the most 
trimmed-down set of human rights must contain a right to subsistence. (Jones 2013, 
67) 
Apart from subsistence, his minimal list also includes the rights to life, physical 
security, and basic freedoms (Jones 2013, 68). 
Fulfilling a universal subsistence right might be demanding, yet Shue and Jones can 
still be characterized as weak cosmopolitans, due to the sufficientarian nature of their 
account. Nonetheless, their position remains controversial, even if we disregard the 
implied demandingness. This has to do with the way they conceptualize the duties 
corresponding with the right to subsistence and challenge the distinction between 
positive and negative rights. Traditionally, negative rights are conceptualized as rights of 
noninterference and positive rights as rights of assistance. In the same way, a distinction is 
made between negative duties of noninterference and positive duties of assistance (Cruft 
2005, 29-30). Shue is especially critical about this distinction, but we agree with Scheffler 
(2001, 39) that it remains one of the important hallmarks of our common sense 
conception of individual responsibility. People believe it does matter whether or not they 
had anything to do with the situation of deprivation they are expected to remedy; 
‘individuals have a special responsibility for what they themselves do, as opposed to what 
they merely fail to prevent’ (Scheffler 1995, 223). Disregarding this will minimalize the 
chance of being accepted as a viable theory. 
Thomas Pogge fully acknowledges this fact and builds his cosmopolitan theory on the 
primacy of negative rights and duties. He takes up an ecumenical strategy in an attempt 
to convince proponents of all important schools of thought, including libertarianism 
(Pogge 2005a, 95). By avoiding claims about positive duties, he seems to want to make 
clear that his argument does not depend on positive duties (Ibid., 93). His minimal 
conception only states that respecting negative human rights is a necessary condition for 
justice (Pogge 2005b, 76), which corresponds to Shue’s duty to avoid depriving. Any 
institutional order we impose upon others must meet this condition as far as reasonable 
possible. If an institutional order violates human rights, we have the obligation to reform 
it and compensate those who have been harmed. 
In his book World Poverty and Human Rights Pogge evaluates the current state of affairs 
by applying this minimal criterion. He argues that we, the global rich, are harming the 
global poor through the global economic order we uphold. Rather than failing to fulfil a 
positive duty of charity or assistance, we are actively violating our negative duty not to 
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harm other people. Our economic order foreseeably and avoidably causes human rights 
deficits and everyone who participates in its creation or imposition consequently harms 
those affected negatively (Pogge 2008, 25-26). We want to emphasize the strength of this 
minimalist normative position in comparison with more demanding theories, such as 
Shue’s. 
Setting aside any open-ended positive duty to help the badly off, my appeal to a 
negative duty generates then compensatory obligations that are tightly limited in 
range (to persons subject to an institutional order one cooperates in imposing), in 
subject matter (to the avoidance of human rights deficits), and in demandingness 
(to compensation for one’s share of that part of the human rights deficit that 
foreseeably is reasonably avoidable through a feasible alternative institutional 
design). (Pogge 2008, 26) 
Like Shue and Jones, Pogge advocates a global sufficientarian theory, and thus a weak 
cosmopolitan account. However, since he has slimmed down his theoretical framework 
by avoiding more controversial positive duties, his account cannot easily be dismissed. 
By limiting his framework to negative rights and perfect duties, he is not vulnerable to 
the allocation problem O’Neill addressed. 
Caney has also elaborated a minimal conception of human rights, and examined what 
this would entail when applied to climate change. He defines human rights as ‘minimum 
moral thresholds to which all individuals are entitled, simply by virtue of their humanity, 
and which override all other moral values’ (2010, 165). Within this context, everyone is 
entitled to three key rights: the right to life, the right to health, and the right to 
subsistence. Caney (2010, 166) explicitly mentions that he uses the least contentious and 
most modest formulation of each of these rights, to strengthen his argument in the same 
way Pogge does.27  
Caney (2010, 166-167) first discusses the right to life, the human right not to be 
‘arbitrarily deprived of his life’ (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966b, 
Article 6.1). He employs a minimal conception of this right as a merely negative right, not 
making the more contentious claim that persons have a positive right to have their life 
protected against all kinds of threats. Especially in this minimal formulation, the right to 
life should be interpreted as ‘the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted 
 
                                                     
27 Caney convincingly argues that climate change jeopardizes these human rights, even under this minimal, 
negative account.  
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even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation’ (Human Rights 
Committee 1982, paragraph 1).  
Second, Caney (2010, 167-168) endorses the right to health, again negatively 
interpreted. Whereas the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN 
1966a, article 12.1) recognizes ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health’, which implies extensive positive 
measures, Caney proposes a less ambitious conception of this right. He merely asserts 
that everyone has the right ‘that other people do not act so as to create serious threats to 
their health’. In this way, he wants to avoid the objections that can be raised against more 
maximalist conceptions of the right to health. 
The third right included in Caney’s (2010, 168-169) minimal conception proclaims that 
‘all persons have a human right that other people do not act so as to deprive them of the 
means of subsistence’. Under the traditional account mentioned above (‘the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living […]’), this right is conceived as demanding 
positive actions, and thus more controversial. That conception insists that everyone has 
a positive right to aid to avoid hunger, irrespective of how that hunger came about. 
Characterizing this as a requirement of justice, instead of charity, would require a 
theoretical framework that many would refuse to adopt. 
The minimal conception advocated by Pogge and Caney seems able to gain wide 
support. As long as one does not actively violate the human rights of others, one enjoys 
quite some leeway in one’s actions. Promoting equality beyond this threshold is not 
obligatory (weak cosmopolitanism) and giving priority to compatriots is not wrong by 
definition (moderate cosmopolitanism). By avoiding positive right-claims, this 
conception becomes more acceptable for other cosmopolitans, nationalists and society-
of-states proponents alike. 
2.3 Our position  
In this chapter we have discussed many different accounts of global justice. We looked at 
political realism and the society-of-states approach (and its descendants) and argued that 
these are flawed. We then shifted our focus on the vast variety of cosmopolitan accounts 
and assessed their merits. As our main concern is with the feasibility of global justice, we 
are drawn to the more moderate, minimalist conceptions. We should be careful, however, 
not to neglect the utopian side of Rawls’ ‘realistic utopia’. Moreover, the fact that a theory 
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can enjoy widespread support is – although not entirely irrelevant – not a strong 
argument.  
In this context, Laura Valentini develops an argument based on the notions of equal 
respect and reasonable disagreement. She starts by claiming that duties of justice, unlike 
duties of friendship or duties of charity, generate ‘rightfully enforceable entitlements’ 
(Valentini 2013, 94). This means that these entitlements may be enforced without 
wrongdoing, even if people are not sufficiently motivated to comply. As this is a defining 
feature of duties of justice, we should not decide lightly which duties are to be considered 
duties of justice. More specifically, Valentini examines whether equal respect and justice 
demand global equality. As there is reasonable disagreement about this claim, even 
amongst people who are genuinely committed to equal respect, global equality should 
not be enforced: 
In other words, the demands of justice must be determined through “public 
reason,” corresponding to the area of overlap between different reasonable 
interpretations of equal respect. When it comes to establishing enforceable 
entitlements, we can therefore only assume the moral imperative to protect a set 
of fundamental rights. Beyond this threshold, equal respect itself prevents us from 
unilaterally establishing the conditions under which our social arrangements count 
as just or unjust. (Valentini 2013, 100) 
Important here is the way Valentini understands public reason. She distinguishes 
between public reason positively understood, or what is de facto endorsed by the world 
at large, and public reason normatively understood, or what anyone committed to equal 
respect ought to endorse (Valentini 2013, 102). She is thus not arguing against global 
equality because there is no factual agreement on the desirability of this goal, but rather 
because equal respect implies not to impose your conception of the good on others when 
there is reasonable disagreement. 
Valentini (2013, 100) concludes that justice does not demand global equality, but global 
sufficiency, in the form of respect for fundamental rights.28 This comes very close to the 
minimal rights-based position defended by Pogge and Caney, characterized by their 
prioritizing of negative human rights. We agree with Valentini that more demanding 
conceptions of global justice are difficult to justify, given the reasonable disagreement 
that exists. We also agree with Pogge and Caney that this position can be ‘adopted from 
within a wide variety of different conceptions of the good and ethical worldviews’ (Caney 
 
                                                     
28 Next to this outcome component, Valentini also argues for a procedural component, establishing a set of fair 
procedures to determine what justice might demand beyond these fundamental rights (2013, 103). 
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2010, 169). Because this position is a moderate (allowing special obligations) and weak (not 
arguing for global equality) form of cosmopolitanism, it will not face as much opposition 
as extreme and strong accounts. 
We believe it is important to conceptualize this account as rights-based rather than 
needs-based, because of the special status that attaches to rights.29 The formal 
complementarity between rights and duties adds an important dimension. However, we 
fully acknowledge O’Neill’s concern with the allocation of imperfect obligations, which is 
why we limit our account to negative human rights. As these give rise to perfect duties 
(applying to everyone), the allocation problem can be avoided.30 The fact that this 
normatively minimalist position can enjoy ecumenical support, is also an important point 
in its favour. 
In this chapter we have outlined our own position regarding global justice. In the next 
chapter we will apply this minimalist conception to two specific ‘results’ of the process of 
globalization, namely climate change and the current global economic order. In this way, 
we will examine whether or not we are harming people through our role in these 
developments. After addressing the question as to what global justice might mean, we 
will now examine whether (and how) globalization has changed our responsibilities. 
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Chapter 3 Globalization and responsibility for 
human rights1 
3.1 Introduction 
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly.2 Despite important progress made over the last 66 years, many 
of these human rights still remain unfulfilled.3 In 2010, 2.4 billion people were living 
under the $2 poverty line, 1.2 billion of whom had to live with even less than $1.25 per 
day (World Bank 2013a).4 In 2010-2012, about 870 million people (or 1 in 8) were 
undernourished and an estimated 11 percent had no access to adequate drinking-water 
(FAO 2013, 67, 80). The human right to basic education5 is still not met for 57 million 
children and child mortality (6.9 million in 2011) remains high (UN 2013, 4-5). Moreover, 
diarrhoea kills around 760,000 children under five each year, although this figure could 
be significantly reduced through the provision of safe drinking-water and adequate 
sanitation and hygiene (WHO 2013). While future people are likely to suffer most of its 
adverse effects, anthropogenic climate change already impacts human life and worsens 
this situation, since it results in an increased frequency and intensity of heatwaves, 
floods, storms, fires and droughts (Confalonieri et al. 2007, 373). Indeed, anthropogenic 
climate change ‘violates the human rights to life, physical security, subsistence and 
 
                                                     
1 This chapter is based on the following article: De Smet et al. (2015) “Globalization and responsibility for human 
rights.” Journal of Human Rights, 14(3), 419-438.  
2 In art. 25(1) the UDHR explicitly formulates a right to an adequate standard of living, including food, clothing, 
housing, medical care and necessary social services (UNGA 1948). 
3 In Resolution 67/164, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) reaffirms that extreme poverty is a violation of human 
dignity and inhibits the observance of human rights (UNGA 2012). 
4 On the characterization of poverty as a human rights violation, see Pogge (2008). 
5 Art. 26(1) of the UDHR (UNGA 1948). 
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health’ (Caney 2010; Bell 2011, 100). The fact that developing countries are likely to bear 
75% of the costs of damages resulting from climate change (Hoornweg et al. 2010, 4) makes 
this situation even more problematic.  
Our framework for this chapter is the ‘responsibilities approach’ to human rights, as 
developed by Kuper et al. (2005, ix-xxii). Proponents of this approach focus on the 
counterpart obligations6 that arise from human rights. They stress that if we fail to 
identify the agents that bear those obligations, we are at risk of emptying the human 
rights discourse of any meaningful content. To avoid this risk, we need a sound account 
for the allocation of responsibilities within our globalized world. The responsibilities 
approach to human rights is devoted to this major task: 
 […] the responsibilities approach to human rights – where we demand, in every 
context, to know “who must do what for whom?” – provides the conceptual 
resources to move beyond conventional pieties and statist strictures. It provides a 
much-needed bridge that at once strengthens the discourses of rights and 
accountability and links them to one another: Responsibility becomes the middle 
term that allows us to delineate justifiable and feasible rights-claims and to identify 
and hold to account agents who can and should deliver on those rights. (Kuper et 
al. 2005, xxii) 
Taking this approach as a starting point, we wish to examine which rights-claims are 
justified and who then bears the responsibility to fulfil these claims. Before we can answer 
this question, we need to make some observations on the nature of human rights. 
Traditionally, a distinction is made between negative rights (understood as rights to 
noninterference) and positive rights (conceived of as rights to assistance).7 In the same way, 
a distinction is made between negative duties of noninterference and positive duties of 
assistance (Cruft 2005, 29-30). 
Although the relevance of this distinction has been criticized (Shue 1980), we agree 
with Samuel Scheffler (2001, 39) that it remains one of the important hallmarks of our 
common sense conception of individual responsibility. Indeed, if we do not want to 
jeopardize the feasibility of our effort to ground human rights and allocate the 
corresponding obligations, we should not neglect the common sense view of 
responsibility. As explained by David Miller: 
 
                                                     
6 We use the terms ‘obligation’ and ‘duty’ interchangeably. 
7 We already discussed this distinction briefly in the previous chapter. 
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From the agent’s perspective there may be a difference between the stringency of 
the duty to refrain from causing harm and the duty to act beneficially, 
corresponding to the familiar (though much debated) distinction in moral 
philosophy between acts and omissions. Furthermore, whereas negative duties 
clearly fall on all agents, whether individual or collective, in the case of positive 
duties there is a substantive question about whose responsibility it is to provide the 
resources needed to secure basic rights, whenever there are many agents each of 
whom could potentially discharge the duty in question. (Miller 2005, 47) 
In this chapter we therefore give priority to negative duties, precisely because this is a 
minimalist normative position which is widely acceptable. For example, the distinction 
between causing poverty and merely failing to reduce it, is morally significant in the 
common sense view of responsibility: ‘individuals have a special responsibility for what 
they themselves do, as opposed to what they merely fail to prevent’ (Scheffler 1995, 223). 
When we apply this distinction to the human rights approach, it becomes clear that our 
first and foremost duty is to avoid the active violation of negative human rights. 
Following Thomas Pogge (2008, 25), we will take this conception as our baseline for 
determining harm and injustice. We take the claim that if one violates people’s human 
rights, one is harming those people, to be uncontroversial. 
In the next section, we will examine how negative and positive rights fit in with the 
common sense distinction between general and special obligations. Our focus in section 
2.3 will be on exactly what constitutes a reason to value relationships. In section 2.4, we 
will argue for the need to consider harm when developing an account of responsibility 
for human rights in a globalized world. We will focus on the global economic order and 
on climate change and examine whether these aspects of globalization provide us with 
new reasons to value our relationships with distant others. In the final section, we will 
consider whether Christian Barry’s ‘vulnerability presumption principle’ (Barry 2005a, 
221) can help us in answering these questions. 
3.2 General and special obligations 
How is the distinction between negative and positive duties reflected in our moral 
outlook? To begin with, in common sense morality we distinguish between general and 
special obligations. The former are owed to everyone equally, on the basis of our common 
humanity. Human rights seem to provide the most evident basis for these general 
obligations. As for the negative duties entailed by human rights, i.e. the rights to 
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noninterference, there seems to be no problem. For example, it seems inconceivable to 
deny someone the right not to be killed, except in very extraordinary circumstances such 
as self-defence.  
Positive duties (i.e. duties of assistance), however, are much more controversial. Some 
commentators, for example Shue (1980), argue that we have a general obligation to fulfil 
the subsistence rights of distant others, even if this implies positive duties.8 According to 
libertarians, however, we bear no general positive obligations, as long as we did not 
previously make any promises or violate any negative duties (Narveson 1988, 59-60). 
Pogge is said to side with libertarians on the question of normative principle, for he does 
not argue that we have positive duties yet he tries to challenge the libertarians’ factual 
claim that the affluent do not harm the world’s poor by causing their poverty (Patten 2005, 
20). Rather than explicitly endorsing a libertarian view, he takes up an ecumenical 
strategy in an attempt to convince proponents of all important schools of thought (Pogge 
2005a, 95). By avoiding claims about positive duties, he seems to want to make clear that 
his argument does not depend on positive duties (Ibid., 93). We will return to this issue 
later. 
As noted earlier, our general obligations are owed to everyone equally, on the basis of 
our common humanity, yet they do not seem to imply respect for positive human rights. 
We all bear the general obligation not to interfere negatively with another person. 
However, our general positive duties of assistance are less stringent and more 
problematic, from a motivational, and also – and more importantly – from certain 
theoretical points of view. Moreover, we face the difficulty of assessing who should bear 
those responsibilities, if we do not want to make the human rights discourse void of 
meaning. This difficulty is known as the ‘allocation problem’. We shall come back to it 
later. 
In contrast to general obligations, special obligations are owed only to some specific 
subset of persons with whom we have a special relationship, i.e. we do not bear them for 
everyone equally. We feel we owe more to our brother, a friend, or perhaps a fellow 
countryman, than to a distant stranger. In addition to negative duties of noninterference 
towards them, we also feel that we owe them duties of assistance. In other words, special 
positive obligations are less controversial than general positive obligations. No mother 
would refuse to share her food with her child, claiming that this would impose an 
unjustified infringement of her freedom, for example. Few people would deny the 
existence of such special positive obligations. 
 
                                                     
8 As discussed in the previous chapter. 
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Admittedly, general and special obligations often coexist without problem, but 
sometimes they do conflict. When this happens, should we be allowed to give priority to 
our special positive obligations and neglect our general ones? For example, should we be 
allowed to buy a birthday present for our son while other people are living in severe 
poverty? What exactly constitutes a special relationship and bestows compelling force to 
giving preference to it? Two types of answers have been given to this question: 
‘reductionist’ and ‘non-reductionist’ answers (Scheffler 2001, 98). 
Reductionists suppose that special obligations arise out of specific interactions that occur 
in the context of our relationships, such as promises, mutual interdependences or a 
notion of reciprocity. For example, we have a duty to take care of our elderly parents 
because they nurtured us when we were young. Non-reductionists, in contrast, believe this 
is ‘one thought too many’ (Williams 1981, 18). For them, the mere fact that we value a 
relationship with someone gives rise to a special obligation towards this person. The 
relationship itself, not some preceding interaction, is the source of the special 
responsibility we bear (Scheffler 2001, 100-104). 
Does non-reductionism imply that every relationship that we value is equally morally 
significant? According to Wellman (2000, 552-554), the non-reductionist approach is 
vulnerable to objections when it tries to answer this question. If non-reductionists want 
to maintain that our intuitions about relations are what really matters, they cannot 
denounce racism or sexism. Some people place great value on their relationships with 
people belonging to the same group, which would establish special responsibilities 
towards that subset of persons. Yet Van der Vossen (2011, 489) rightly raises the following 
question: 
Can we really accept that members of morally reprehensible communities may 
bring into being moral obligations to support and maintain those communities and 
practices simply by having certain attitudes? Surely it is not that easy to ordain 
unjust practices with moral quality. 
Non-reductionists can try to avoid this conclusion by showing why the relationship 
with our compatriots may imply a special responsibility and our relationship with people 
of the same race or sex may not. Yet, in doing so they would have to point to other 
grounds than the relationship itself to explain this difference. Consequently, they would 
cease to defend a non-reductionist account. In sum, special responsibilities based on 
special relationships that one should not value cannot be refuted on purely non-
reductionist grounds. 
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Non-reductionism also seems to face another problem. People do not only value 
relations they should not value (e.g. racism), but also do not value relations they should 
value. Some liberals reject every responsibility that one has not voluntary accepted (the 
voluntarist objection), but can consent really be that important? If a mother does not 
think she has a special relationship with her child, does this imply that she bears no 
special responsibility for the child? Do we only have responsibilities for those we already 
have accepted responsibility for? Alternatively put, simply because we do not believe that 
our relation with distant strangers is special, does this mean that our failure to alleviate 
their severe poverty is acceptable?  
3.3 A relationship one has reason to value 
In his book Boundaries and Allegiances, Scheffler focuses on the responsibilities we bear as 
individuals in a globalized world. He believes that the changing circumstances of the 
modern world have resulted in a growing uncertainty about exactly what those 
responsibilities are. He holds that the restrictions imposed on individual responsibility, 
on the basis of a conception of human social relations as ‘consisting primarily in small-
scale interactions, with clearly demarcated lines of causation, among independent 
individual agents’, have become questionable (Scheffler 2001, 39-40). He therefore claims 
that the restrictive conception of individual responsibility, embodied in common sense 
moral thought, is outdated.  
Indeed, our special obligations do increasingly seem to conflict with our general 
obligations. As explained in the previous section, our negative duties regarding human 
rights are equally stringent on both accounts. However, our positive special obligations 
towards our friends and families seem to take precedence over our positive general 
obligations to satisfy the human rights of distant others. We feel ourselves torn between 
the values of loyalty and equality, while most of us cherish both (Scheffler 2001, 79). 
Scheffler tries to reduce this tension without giving dominance to either one of these 
values. Essential in this attempt is his non-reductionist defence of special responsibilities: 
Among the things that we value are our relations with each other. But to value one’s 
relationship with another person is to see it as a source of reasons for action of a 
distinctive kind. It is, in effect, to see oneself as having special responsibilities to 
the person with whom one has the relationship. Thus, in so far as we have good 
reasons to value our interpersonal relations, we have good reasons to see ourselves 
as having special responsibilities. (Scheffler 2001, 103) 
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Important here is that Scheffler considers these relationships to generate 
responsibilities irrespective of whether or not these relationships are actually valued. He 
does not deny the importance of choice or consent in determining which relationships 
matter, but refuses to ground all responsibility in our own decisions, ‘for the relationships 
that generate responsibilities for an individual are those relationships that the individual 
has reason to value’ (Scheffler 2001, 107). An important fact of moral duties thus seems to 
be that we are bound by them, ‘regardless of whether we happen to believe that we are 
or want to be’ (Moellendorf 2002, 35). Nagel (2005, 121) describes a similar idea in his 
characterization of the political conception of justice:  
 […] though the obligations of justice arise as a result of a special relation, there is 
no obligation to enter into that relation with those to whom we do not yet have it, 
thereby acquiring those obligations toward them. If we find ourselves in such a 
relation, then we must accept the obligations, […] 
In this way, Scheffler tries to refute the voluntarist objection, raised by some liberals, 
in a non-reductionist way. The question as to whether he succeeds in this effort is difficult 
to answer, since Scheffler does not specify the exact meaning of ‘having a reason to value’ 
a relationship. His account appears to resemble Hardimon’s principle of reflective 
acceptability (1994, 348):  
To say that a social role is reflectively acceptable is to say that one would accept it 
upon reflection. Determining whether a given social role is reflectively acceptable 
involves stepping back from that role in thought and asking whether it is a role 
people ought to occupy and play. Determining that a given social role is reflectively 
acceptable involves judging that it is (in some sense) meaningful, rational, or good. 
Scheffler’s account resembles Hardimon’s, since both seem to imply that special 
responsibilities can be generated – upon reflection – even without an actual consent. 
However, their accounts diverge in that Hardimon specifies which properties establish a 
role (or relationship) as reflectively acceptable, viz. meaningful, rational, or good, 
whereas Scheffler does not aim to develop a detailed account of the responsibilities one 
might have. 
Christian Barry and Holly Lawford-Smith (2012) outline a number of reasons that may 
generate special obligations and responsibilities, apart from the special relationships that 
we voluntarily enter into through contracts or promises. They mention special 
obligations we might have towards citizens of our (ex-) colonies (Ypi et al. 2009) and 
responsibilities we bear for people who are vulnerable to our actions (Goodin 1985). They 
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also ask whether we should be held responsible if we benefit from certain injustices 
distant others experience and in which we have thus become morally complicit (Barry 
and Lawford-Smith 2012, xiii). 
As far as general obligations are concerned, we have already mentioned our common 
humanity as a good reason to value our relationship with the rest of mankind. We bear 
general obligations towards everyone, but, as we have seen, these are commonly held to 
be limited to negative duties that are derived from human rights, i.e. duties of non-
interference. Grounding (enforceable) positive duties on our common humanity seems to 
be more problematic. Hinsch and Stepanians (2005, 303) explain why: 
A human right [for example] not to suffer severe poverty seems to be a special right. 
In this type of right, all of us are candidates for the corresponding duties, but only 
some of us are actually bound. Because of the referential opaqueness of the term 
“some,” however, human rights of this kind give rise to what we call “the allocation 
problem,” i.e., the task of identifying the relevant duty-bearers and of specifying 
their concrete obligations. […] universal complex rights to abstract values against 
anonymous “somebodies” have at best weak regulative force unless they are 
supplemented by a determination of their concrete addressees with their specific 
active duties.  
In the following section, we will argue that harm should be used as the criterion when 
looking for a solution for this allocation problem.  
3.4 Harm as a good reason to value a relationship 
As mentioned in the introduction, we take the active violation of negative human rights 
as our baseline for determining harm. We believe that if one violates somebody’s human 
rights, one is, without any doubt, harming that person. In this section, we will examine 
how this conception affects the obligations we bear. Our obligations seem to be more 
stringent when we stand in some causal relationship to some other(s), including distant 
others. When we are, in some way, responsible for the situation of others, we are more 
likely to feel obliged to assist them (Dobson 2003, 171). Barry elaborates on this intuition 
in his formulation of a ‘contribution principle’. This principle is based on the 
aforementioned distinction between doing something and failing to prevent it. He 
considers the fact that we contributed to something to be ‘a normative factor of special 
significance for determining whether and to what extent [we are] responsible for 
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addressing it’ (Barry 2005b, 107). In the context of acute deprivations, he characterizes 
our responsibilities as especially weighty:  
there are strong moral reasons to refrain from contributing to others’ acute 
deprivation regardless of any further connections that we may have to them, so 
that we cannot easily appeal to considerations of cost to ourselves to excuse our 
failure to act on them. (Barry 2005a, 212) 
Referring to Linklater, Dobson (2003, 28) also emphasizes the importance of relations 
of actual harm. He describes harm as a source of political obligation and considers 
avoiding harm, or compensating for it, to be an obligation of justice rather than charity. 
He also argues that these obligations of justice are especially binding. Harming someone 
thus seems to be a very strong reason to value a relationship.9 We are in a special 
relationship with the people whose human rights we violate and we bear responsibility 
towards them, regardless of whether or not we actually value this relation. Even though 
many will fail to adopt this responsibility voluntarily, this does not exonerate us from it. 
As Nagel has put it: ‘to treat someone else horribly puts you in a special relation to him’ 
(Nagel 1972, 137). We cannot simply dismiss our obligations merely because we do not 
feel (sufficiently) motivated to accept them. 
The distinction between ‘obligations of charity’ and ‘obligations of justice’ is important 
here. Pogge illustrates this distinction as follows: 
Suppose we discovered people on Venus who are very badly off, and suppose we 
could help them at little cost to ourselves. If we did nothing, we would surely violate 
a positive duty of beneficence. But we would not be violating a negative duty of 
justice, because we would not be contributing to the perpetuation of their misery. 
(Pogge 2008, 204) 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, we hold that a failure to meet our negative 
duty not to harm generates obligations of justice. This is not to say that avoiding harm 
constitutes the alpha and omega of justice, but we agree with Pogge that respecting 
negative human rights is a necessary condition for justice (Pogge 2005b, 76). When we 
neglect a duty of charity to, say, feed a hungry child, we may be blameworthy for failing 
this duty, but we are arguably not failing to fulfil a duty of justice. When we are causally 
responsible for the malnutrition of that child and still fail to feed it, however, we are 
 
                                                     
9 We are not here presenting an exhaustive account of possible relationships, yet arguing that harm is a sufficient 
reason to value a relationship and generate responsibility. 
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acting unjustly. Through the process of harming, the general positive duty of charity of 
feeding the child becomes a special positive duty of justice. This is not merely a question 
of semantics; it endows the human right to food with more stringency and, thus, 
hopefully, more motivational power.10 
Through the process of globalization we have become causally interconnected with 
virtually everyone. As such, this does not constitute a reason to value our relationship 
with every distant other. However, if we would turn out to be systematically harming 
others, this would generate a strong reason to value the relationship, namely a reason of 
justice. Accordingly, the harm we inflict gives rise to a special obligation to a very large subset of 
persons, with a potentially universal scope.  
3.4.1 Does our economic interdependence constitute a reason to value 
relationships? 
Darrel Moellendorf (2002, 30-8) uses the concept of ‘global association’ as the starting 
point for his theory of global justice. He argues that duties of justice are special, generated 
by associational reasons, for example when people are connected through politics or 
commerce. If the institutions that govern those practices have a substantial impact on 
the highest order moral interests of people, they give rise to duties of justice on a global 
scale. To assess this impact, he focuses on people’s life prospects and concludes that these 
differ immensely based on the location of one’s birth. We largely agree with Moellendorf’s 
account,11 but, as noted in the introduction, the benchmark that we propose, following 
Pogge, is harm through violating human rights. 
In World Poverty and Human Rights Pogge argues that we, the global rich, are harming 
the global poor through the global economic order we uphold. We are not merely failing 
to fulfil a positive duty of charity or assistance; we actively violate our negative duty not to 
harm other people. Our economic order foreseeably and avoidably causes human rights 
deficits and everyone who participates in its creation or imposition consequently harms 
those affected negatively (Pogge 2008, 25-26). If this is the case, we would have a strong 
reason to value our relationship with the global poor and to shoulder the special 
responsibilities resulting from that relationship. 
Pogge supports his claim by pointing to two privileges that appear to play an important 
role in the active violation of our negative duty, namely the international borrowing 
 
                                                     
10 On the relation between moral judgment and motivation, see Rosati (2006). 
11 See our discussion in the previous chapter. 
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privilege and the international resource privilege. Both rely on the fact that our 
representatives in international negotiations, our governments and most corporations 
tend to regard leaders of other countries as legitimate representatives of their people – 
irrespective of how they came to power, how they exert it, or the extent to which they 
are supported by their domestic population (Pogge 2008, 118). Let us look at each of these 
privileges in turn. 
The international borrowing privilege focuses on the right that the international 
community grants to rulers to borrow money. Pogge mentions three important adverse 
effects of this privilege (Pogge 2008, 120-121). First, it enables rulers to remain in power, 
since it allows them to borrow much more and more cheaply. They can use this money as 
they please, which sometimes boils down to paying militias to oppress popular 
opposition. Second, coup attempts and civil wars become more attractive. Whoever 
succeeds in a coup gets the borrowing privilege as an important bonus. The third effect 
regards the situation after a dictatorship has been overthrown. The succeeding 
government is very likely to be crippled by the huge debts made by the ousted despot and 
to be incapable of implementing the necessary reforms. As such, the international 
borrowing privilege continues to harm the people, even after the oppressive regime has 
been overturned. 
The international resource privilege, in turn, not only recognizes the effective control that 
those in power have over the resources of their country, but also seems to legitimize this 
control (Pogge 2008, 119-120). When a company buys resources from a corrupt despot, it 
becomes the legitimate owner of those goods, regardless of how the despot came to power 
or what he does with the money acquired through the sale. As history has repeatedly 
shown, the resource privilege provides a strong incentive for coup attempts and civil wars 
in resource-rich countries, which is an aspect of the ‘resource curse’ (Auty 1993). Similar 
to the borrowing privilege, the resource privilege financially rewards whoever 
successfully comes to power and provides them with the means to maintain their 
position. Therefore, Pogge (2001, 22) concludes that:  
the underfulfillment of human rights in the developing countries is not a 
homegrown problem, but one we greatly contribute to through the policies we 
pursue and the international order we impose. We have then not merely a positive 
responsibility with regard to global poverty, like Rawls’s ‘duty of assistance,’ but a 
negative responsibility to stop imposing the existing global order and to prevent 
and mitigate the harms it continually causes for the world’s poorest populations. 
Because our responsibility is negative and because so much harm can be prevented 
at so little cost to ourselves, the reduction of severe global poverty should be our 
foremost moral priority. 
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The question arises, however, as to whether we are indeed failing to fulfil a negative 
duty, or whether, as argued by Patten (2006, 27), Pogge ‘[stretches] the concept of harm 
awkwardly to make space for duties of assistance i.e. positive duties?’ Is the fact that a 
different economic order, which would cause less suffering, is possible, sufficient to 
support the claim that, in the current economic order, the affluent are indeed harming 
the poor? According to some commentators, this conclusion is too strong. 
According to Mathias Risse, we should be reluctant to accept this conclusion in view of 
the meaning of ‘feasible alternatives’ (Pogge 2008, 26). Risse (2005a, 371) considers that 
Pogge mistakenly thinks that feasibility primarily concerns allocating money to 
developing countries. Risse argues that, in addition to money, institutional improvements 
are necessary and he points out that there is no consensus or ‘royal road’ (Kuper 2002, 
117) in the social sciences on how to eradicate poverty (Risse 2005a, 373-375). We agree 
with Risse that the mere allocation of money will not be enough and that institutional 
improvements are necessary to ensure that the intended changes are sustainable. Paul 
Collier elaborates this point in The Bottom Billion. Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and 
What Can Be Done About It. He examines which role aid can play and concludes that aid 
alone will not solve the problems of the bottom billion, as some thinkers on the left seem 
to believe. However, against the right, he argues that aid is part of the solution, rather 
than the problem (2007, 123, 191). To reach this solution, complementary institutional 
changes are needed. Focusing on money alone is no longer a viable option; we need to 
take the ‘institutional turn’ (Evans 2005). Collier mentions new trade policies, security 
strategies, international charters, and changes in the domestic law of rich countries as 
necessary conditions for effectively benefiting the poor. More specifically, Collier 
mentions, among other things, the importance of restoring order, maintaining peace and 
fighting corruption. Furthermore, democracy, budget transparency, and African trade 
liberalization seem to be crucial instruments for the intended poverty reduction.  
Bearing this in mind, we do not agree that Pogge holds that allocating money will in 
itself eradicate world poverty. Risse unfairly criticizes Pogge for not focusing on specific 
mechanisms through which the global order inflicts poverty on developing countries. At 
the same time, we would submit that a related question needs to be addressed, namely, 
which conditions must be met before a measure counts as an institutional change? For 
example, why is the Global Resource Dividend (GRD) that Pogge proposes regarded as 
‘allocating money’ rather than as an institutional reform? Under this scheme, states 
would be required to share a small part of the value of any resources they decide to use 
or sell. This payment would be used for the benefit of those who otherwise would be 
excluded from their proportional share of the world’s resources, e.g. the global poor 
(Pogge 2008, 202). Risse might reply that this proposal is not sufficiently elaborated and 
that its chance of being successfully implemented is rather slim, because the necessary 
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institutions (e.g. a functioning democracy) are not in place worldwide. This seems to 
imply that the GRD is indeed best characterized as an institutional reform. Would the 
Health Impact Fund (HIF), a mechanism designed by Pogge and Hollis (2008) to optimize 
the development and worldwide distribution of (essential) medicines, count as an 
institutional change? Pogge and Hollis explicitly acknowledge that this proposal needs to 
overcome some difficulties of implementation, as we will discuss in the next chapter. Does 
this problem of implementation really exonerate the current order (and the people that 
impose it) of all charges of harm regarding access to medicines? As a third example, 
Pogge’s plea for a world order without the international borrowing privilege and 
international resource privilege clearly illustrates that he does focus on institutional 
mechanisms and does not think allocating money is the final solution. Thus Risse’s 
criticism seems undeserved.  
For Pogge, the measures required for institutional reform constitute duties of justice, 
whereas Risse believes them to be duties of assistance in institution building. Risse 
emphasizes that we do not have a well-understood blueprint for eradicating poverty or 
successful development, which he believes to be necessary. This seems to imply that, for 
Pogge’s claim that upholding the global order is harming the poor to be true, we would 
need to have an agreed and implementable plan of action at our disposal. However, it 
might be questioned whether such a fixed action plan is really necessary to make the 
concept of a ‘feasible alternative’ intelligible. Given the complexity of our modern world, 
we believe this condition might be too stringent. It seems that every course of action will 
always have both advocates and opponents. Correspondingly, it seems overly demanding 
to expect a full-blown plan of implementation for every proposal. We do not deny the 
importance of a broad consensus or viable implementation measures, yet we consider 
that Risse’s use of the concept ‘feasible alternative’ is too stringent. John Rawls (1999, 12) 
has discussed this tension in connection with his concept of a ‘realistic utopia’: 
I recognize that there are questions about how the limits of the practically possible 
are discerned and what the conditions of our social world in fact are. The problem 
here is that the limits of the possible are not given by the actual, for we can to a 
greater or lesser extent change political and social institutions and much else. 
Hence we have to rely on conjecture and speculation, arguing as best we can that 
the social world we envision is feasible and might actually exist, if not now then at 
some future time under happier circumstances.  
However, in this respect Pogge and Risse again do not differ as much as one might 
expect. Risse (2005a, 376) admits that Pogge’s claim is not entirely implausible. He 
concedes that the absence of a blueprint does not give us the right to rest on our laurels: 
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To be sure, this understanding of feasibility still does lead to an indictment of the 
global order if a case can indeed be made that not enough effort goes into exploring 
possibilities for and, if appropriate, implementing institutional change. 
Yet how do we determine exactly when an alternative has enough support and when 
the probability of being implemented is high enough for it to count as ‘feasible’? How 
much agreement and information is needed before a relationship of harm can be said to 
be present? This is indeed a difficult question to answer. Risse correctly argues that we 
need a case-specific empirical analysis to discover how we can bring about institutional 
improvement (2005a, 373). When we take the individual as our ultimate unit of concern 
(Pogge 1992, 48), the urgency of the task of exploring avenues towards institutional 
improvement becomes clear. Even in the absence of an easily feasible alternative, it is 
clear, for example, that the current institutional framework regarding medicines is 
harming hundreds of thousands of people, as they cannot afford essential medicines 
because these are patent protected in accordance with the WTO TRIPS agreement (UN 
2012). Alternatives, such as the Health Impact Fund, face opposition and will not be 
implemented without considerable difficulties. However, can this really serve as an 
excuse for the suffering of so many people under the current regime? 
Our responsibility to implement the ultimate blueprint is somewhat meaningless, as 
such a blueprint clearly does not exist. Our duty to search for institutional improvements, 
however, remains solidly in place, although substantiating this duty is a difficult task. 
Which possibilities deserve to be further explored and to what extent? Secondly, which 
explored proposals are promising enough to be implemented and to what extent? There 
is no easy answer to these questions. For example, at the moment, the Health Impact Fund 
arguably does not yet enjoy widespread support and cannot yet be easily implemented. 
However, a pilot field test12 might refine the scheme before it is implemented on a wider 
scale, and hence might improve the feasibility of the original, more comprehensive 
proposal. Recently, Janssen Pharmaceutica, part of Johnson & Johnson, has made a 
commitment toward a joint HIF pilot involving their new drug against multi-drug-
resistant tuberculosis, bedaquiline. Janssen will contribute this drug at zero cost, with the 
intention of refining the measurement of health gains and the preservation of drug’s 
efficacy.13 This initiative does not in itself establish that HIF is a feasible alternative for 
the status quo. It does, however, show that the possibilities for institutional change have 
hitherto not been adequately explored. 
 
                                                     
12 http://healthimpactfund.org/next-steps.  
13 Personal communication from Prof. Thomas Pogge. 
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Risse is right to point out that there are numerous possible ways of improving the 
situation of the poor through institutional changes (2005a, 375). From this fact he infers 
that exploring possible institutional changes is a positive duty of assistance. However, 
since the current regime fails to meet even a minimal standard of human rights (e.g. 
access to essential medicines), it cannot be just (Pogge 2005b, 56). Searching for feasible 
alternatives for this unjust situation can no longer be characterized as a duty of 
assistance: the fact that we impose an institutional order that violates human rights gives 
rise to a relationship of harm and therefore a negative duty of justice. Only if no human 
rights were violated, would the duty to search for even better alternatives be a duty of 
assistance. Since Risse agrees that not enough has been done to explore and, if 
appropriate, implement institutional changes, and that the global economic order does 
harm the poor in this sense (2005a, 376), it is puzzling why he insists on calling the 
rectification of this situation a duty of assistance. We conclude that Risse’s argument for 
doubting Pogge’s claim that the global economic order is harming the poor, is 
unconvincing. 
Robert van der Veen (2005) provides us with a second reason to question Pogge’s 
conclusion. He attempts to rebut the claim that the affluent are harming the poor by 
pointing out three options we have regarding the current global economic order: we can 
sustain the status quo; we can improve it to alleviate suffering; or we can worsen it. If we 
worsen the situation, we are definitely violating our negative duty not to harm others. If 
we merely sustain the status quo, we are failing our positive duty to improve the situation 
of the global poor and are thus blameworthy, but not in the same sense as we would be if 
we had aggravated the situation. The longer we fail to fulfil our positive obligation to 
improve matters, the stronger its claim on us becomes, but it cannot suddenly switch 
from a positive to a negative obligation. Our obligation of assistance or charity then 
admittedly becomes more urgent, but it does not evolve into an obligation of justice. 
Thus, although a morally superior global economic order is possible, not improving the 
status quo does not amount to violating our negative duty not to harm, according to van der 
Veen. Therefore, he believes that merely sustaining the status quo without reforming 
global economic institutions is not sufficient to constitute a harm-based reason to value 
our relationship with the global poor and to bear special responsibilities for them. This 
argumentation needs to be elaborated further. After all, it is not self-evident why we 
should take the current global economic order as the significant benchmark for harm, i.e. 
the harm-neutral position. 
Risse (2005b) distinguishes three different possibilities. The first alternative benchmark 
is to compare the current situation to the past. Risse does not deny the World Bank’s grim 
figures on current poverty levels. However, he refuses to conclude that this in itself 
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proves the global order to be unjust. Looking back in time, he reaches a more positive 
conclusion (Risse 2005b, 11-12): 
what is remarkable is not that so many now live in poverty, but that so many do 
not; not that so many die young, but that so many do not; not that so many are 
illiterate, but that so many are not. By and large, if one looks at the last 200, 100, or 
50 years, things have improved dramatically for the poor. 
Risse (2005b, 12-15) acknowledges that this benchmark is not flawless. As Pogge rightly 
argues, we could after all be harming others although their situation has improved 
throughout history.14 A ‘system’ under which men beat the members of their family less 
than before cannot therefore be called just (Pogge 2008, 23). van der Veen faces the same 
objection, although his account is historical only in a weak sense. For example, if a certain, 
already existing, WTO-rule or treaty harms distant others and we fail to change it, are we 
really exonerated of harming those people because we are merely sustaining the status 
quo? Let us now consider whether the other two possible benchmarks could provide a 
way out. 
As a second alternative, Risse mentions a counterfactual reference, namely comparing 
the current situation with a situation in which the global order did not develop as it did. 
How would the global poor fare if Africa had never been colonized? If they would be better 
off, the global economic order as we know it would in fact be harming them, according to 
this benchmark. This question, however, seems impossible to answer, as Risse correctly 
points out. Since there is only one world with one history, we have no meaningful point 
of comparison. Consequently, this benchmark cannot be invoked to challenge Pogge’s 
claim (Pogge 2005b, 56). 
Risse’s third alternative is a benchmark of fairness. Here the current order is compared 
to a ‘state of nature’ characterized by a fair distribution of resources. As the status quo is 
characterized by an uneven distribution and radical inequality, from the perspective of 
fairness the global economic order seems to harm the developing countries. However, 
according to Risse, this comparison can only show that the current distribution is not 
even, but not who is to blame for this. For example, it is not inconceivable that the 
 
                                                     
14 We in no way deny that the global economic order, based on free trade, has improved the situation of the poor 
significantly. However, many human rights are being violated under the current regime and we believe a less 
harming alternative is feasible. To get a sense of what this alternative order might look like, see for example 
Collier (2007). 
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unequal distribution is the result of a sequence of entirely voluntary transfers.15 Risse 
(2005b, 14) concludes: 
the historical benchmark is the only benchmark among the three considered that 
we can make sense of, and in relation to that benchmark the global order has 
brought tremendous advances. Moreover, advances in medicine and food 
production are largely due to countries that have shaped that order. So, as far as we 
can tell, the global order has benefited the poor. 
Even if we grant Risse that only the historical benchmark is workable, we need not 
embrace his optimistic outlook. Once we look past ‘aggregates and averages’ and focus on 
‘individual lives lived near the bottom’ his account loses much of its force (Pogge 2005b, 
56-57). China and India have gone through a period of significant economic growth and 
the world’s population has also increased. As a consequence, the percentage of global 
poor has indeed diminished. The fact however remains that, in absolute terms, the 
number of extremely poor people has increased since the beginning of the 19th century 
(Chen & Ravallion 2001, 290). Their suffering continues. Whether or not we are violating 
our negative duty not to harm distant others through upholding the global economic 
order thus seems to depend on the interpretation of the historical benchmark that we 
use. In relative terms, Risse may well be right to argue that the global poor have benefited 
from the global economic order. However, when we look at the absolute numbers, Pogge’s 
claim is strengthened (Pogge 2008, 24). In Section 3.5 we will elaborate on a way to decide 
which interpretation of the historical benchmark we should favour. For now, we will 
conclude that upholding the global economic order can worsen the situation of distant 
others and can give rise to a special obligation of justice, depending on the benchmark 
one selects. 
3.4.2  Does climate change constitute a good reason to value 
relationships? 
Key to the argument sketched above is the condition of not actually worsening the situation 
of distant others when we sustain the status quo. In absolute terms, we have reason to 
believe that upholding the global economic order is harming distant others. When we 
focus on relative numbers, however, this conclusion is not self-evident. The question 
which we wish to raise now is which conclusion should be drawn when sustaining the status quo 
 
                                                     
15 If one favors historical principles over end-result principles, as Nozick (1974) does in his entitlement theory, 
an unequal distribution need not be unjust.  
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does worsen the situation of distant others beyond any reasonable doubt. We will address this 
question with reference to the case of climate change.  
The adverse effects of climate change on human life include, inter alia, increased 
mortality (related to, for example, the increased frequency and magnitude of heatwaves), 
food and water insecurity, the spread and exacerbation of diseases, conflicts resulting 
from resource scarcity, and increased migration (Confalonieri et al. 2007, McMichael et 
al. 2008; Costello et al. 2009; McMichael & Lindgren 2011). In this way, anthropogenic 
climate change jeopardizes the human rights to life, physical security, subsistence and 
health (Bell 2011, 100) for current and future people alike. In the climate case, doing 
nothing to improve the status quo thus indeed seems to worsen the situation of distant 
others and to violate their human rights. 
Through our part in the process of climate change, we are violating the human rights 
of a specific and large subset of persons, hence we bear a special responsibility towards 
them. We are violating our negative obligation not to harm those distant others and we 
are under a binding obligation to transcend the increasingly harmful status quo. At the 
least, we bear the stringent obligation of justice to recompense those harmed and to 
implement the required reforms. Our responsibility in causing the harmful effects of 
climate change is beyond any reasonable doubt (IPCC 2013). 
3.5 The burden of proof 
Up to this point we have tried to establish whether or not we are harming people through 
the global economic order and climate change. We found that, concerning the economic 
order, the data are not entirely conclusive. On purely empirical grounds, the data used by 
Risse to defend his cause are as sound as those used by Pogge, given the complexity of the 
global economic system. So how should we proceed in this case? Concerning climate 
change, the harmful relation is more difficult to deny. However, grounding our special 
responsibilities on such an all or nothing mechanism seems incautious. The globalized 
context we live in is characterized by a multitude of causal connections and a diffusion of 
responsibilities, as Scheffler has pointed out (2001, 38-40). Demanding indisputable 
evidence of harm thus becomes a risky strategy, as these situations are seldom clear cut. 
In this way, we might be attaching too much importance to the demonstrability of harm. 
The danger exists that people are left to fend for themselves because they are unable to 
prove beyond any doubt that they are being harmed.  
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Barry (2005a, 213-221) has attempted to address this problem by establishing fair 
standards of application for the so-called contribution principle, i.e. the principle that the 
obligations we bear are more weighty if we have contributed to a harmful situation. He 
distinguishes between three different standards of application. The first is the burden of 
proof, i.e. the question who has to provide the proof. The second is the standard of proof, 
i.e. the question how much proof is considered decisive. The third standard refers to the 
constraints on admissible evidence, i.e. the question what kinds of evidence will count as 
proof. The way these questions are answered can have a huge impact on the parties 
involved. Yet, as Barry concedes, there is no clear way of establishing whether these 
standards are fair. What counts as an appropriate standard depends on the context. In 
the context of a criminal trial, for example, the standards of application should be quite 
stringent to avoid punishing the innocent. Nonetheless, Barry (2005a, 216) rightly doubts 
whether we should extend such stringent standards to other areas of practical 
deliberation. 
The degree of stringency of the standards, in Barry’s view, may result in one of two 
errors. Either the accused is falsely believed to have contributed to the deprivations or harm 
(Type 1 error), or he is falsely believed not to have contributed (Type 2 error). The stringency 
we adopt depends on the importance we attach to avoiding either type of error (Barry 
2005a, 216-217). If we use extremely weak standards of application, some accused can be 
wrongfully convicted. If we use extremely strong standards, some accused can be 
wrongfully exculpated, and consequently some victims will remain uncompensated. So 
how can we determine the appropriate degree of stringency? Barry has formulated a 
special principle to help us make this choice in an ethical context, the ‘vulnerability 
presumption principle’ (2005a, 221): 
Given the relative costs to [party A] and [party B] of Type 1 and Type 2 errors, I 
conclude that there is a strong prima facie case for specifying standards of 
application for applying the principle of contribution that expresses a willingness to 
err in favour of the acutely deprived subjects, whether they are the party alleging that 
they have been harmed or the party against which such claims have been made. I 
shall call this norm the ‘‘vulnerability presumption principle.’’ While implausible as a 
principle for specifying standards of application in a criminal (and most likely in 
most civil) legal contexts, or as a principle for assessing ethical responsibilities 
more generally, the vulnerability presumption principle seems clearly superior to 
stringent standards of proof and evidence with respect to the determination of 
ethical responsibilities to address acute deprivations. 
If we apply this principle to our argumentation so far, the need to be cautious becomes 
obvious. Regarding Pogge’s claim that we are actively violating our negative duty not to 
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harm distant others, we concluded that the validity of his claim will depend on which 
interpretation of the historical benchmark is used. Therefore, one could claim that we 
only bear duties of charity in delivering the positive human rights of distant others. We 
could say that we bear no special positive duties of justice16 towards them, as we (arguably) 
did not harm them, given the stringent standards of application that are normally used 
to establish harm. 
However, given the current situation, we would submit that Barry is right to argue for 
less stringent standards. Admittedly, his ‘vulnerability presumption principle’ quoted 
above cannot refute the libertarian argument that, relying on relative numbers, we owe 
the poor no positive duty of justice. Libertarians can choose to maintain stringent 
standards and so deny the legitimacy of special positive duties of justice, claiming that 
they do not harm anyone. However, in doing so, they would have to explain why they 
continue to use stringent standards for establishing harm. It seems reasonable to expect 
that their growing awareness of the demandingness of their own standards of application 
would pave the way for their accepting stronger positive duties of charity. A libertarian 
can maintain very high standards of application and thus deny that we are harming the 
global poor in upholding the global economic order. He can deny that we bear a positive 
obligation of justice to deliver on their human rights, since we did not violate their 
negative rights. However, in absolute terms, we are indeed harming distant others and 
there is no reason why we should prefer the relative numbers. To the contrary: ‘The 
killing of a given number of people does not become morally less troubling the more the 
world population increases. What matters morally is the number of people in extreme 
poverty’ (Pogge 2005a, 92). Barry’s vulnerability presumption principle raises further 
doubts about the legitimacy of focusing on relative numbers and, at least, makes a case 
for accepting stronger positive obligations of charity or assistance to deliver on human 
rights. 
When we turn our attention to the second case discussed above, i.e., global climate 
change, Barry’s principle seems to support a positive special obligation of justice. The 
evidence supporting the claim that we are harming distant others through climate 
change is stronger than it is for a similar claim regarding the global economic order. The 
former claim can thus withstand higher standards of application. Moreover, as climate 
change especially harms the global poor and thus the most vulnerable (World Bank 
2013b), even a lower standard of evidence would suffice to establish a relationship of 
harm. For both these reasons, Barry’s vulnerability presumption principle strengthens 
 
                                                     
16 On the issue of remedial responsibilities, see Miller (2001; 2007). This issue falls outside the scope of this chapter. 
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our argumentation: we do bear a positive special obligation of justice to remedy the 
situation of everyone affected by climate change. 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
Our framework for this chapter was the responsibilities approach to human rights, 
focusing on the question ‘who must do what for whom’? We distinguished between 
negative and positive human rights and the corresponding duties of noninterference and 
assistance. We then examined how these fit in with the common sense distinction 
between general and special obligations. We found that duties of noninterference seem 
to be valid for both general and special obligations, whereas duties of assistance are more 
controversial.  
We examined whether this common sense view can be ethically justified and started 
our analysis with Scheffler’s non-reductionist claim that positive special obligations are 
based upon relationships that one has reason to value, irrespective of whether or not 
these relationships are actually valued. The process of globalization has given rise to new 
reasons to value certain relationships and to bear new special responsibilities. We 
distinguished between obligations of charity and obligations of justice and we invoked 
the criterion of harm as the decisive benchmark. 
Subsequently, we applied this framework to two cases: the global economic order and 
climate change. We argued that sustaining the global economic order can violate our 
negative duty not to harm others, but that this conclusion depends on the particular 
interpretation of the historical benchmark. Failing to mitigate climate change, in 
contrast, does entail a violation of our negative duties, for it actively causes harm and 
worsens the situation of distant others. Therefore, we have a reason to value our 
relationship with those who are adversely affected by climate change and we bear 
responsibility for them, even if we do not feel (sufficiently) motivated to assume such 
responsibility. The harm we cause through climate change thus grounds positive special 
obligations of justice to remedy this situation. Taking into account the harm we actually 
cause, gives rise to a special obligation to everyone who suffers because of that harm.  
By using harm as the criterion to solve the allocation problem (i.e. the question of who 
should deliver on human rights), we switched from a weak to a strong sense of human 
rights. If a relationship of harm is established, fulfilling positive duties is no longer a 
matter of general charity, but has become a special obligation of justice. Accordingly, 
human rights and corresponding obligations gain important normative weight. 
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Finally, we should like to note that using harm as the decisive benchmark requires 
caution, since whether or not something is considered a harm determines the status of 
the corresponding positive duties and, consequently, their normative force. Barry’s 
‘vulnerability presumption principle’ can play an important role in this regard. It 
strengthens our account of characterizing the positive duties of mitigating climate 
change as special obligations of justice. With respect to the global economic order, 
however, the vulnerability presumption principle could act as a tiebreaker. If we are 
considering whether to interpret the historical benchmark in relative or absolute 
numbers, Barry’s principle could convince us to favour the most vulnerable. It urges us 
to concede that we are indeed violating our negative duties and that we therefore bear 
special obligations of justice. For those who still want to continue using the relative 
interpretation of the historical benchmark, Barry’s vulnerability presumption principle 
should make them aware of the strict standards of application they use and the fact that 
this indicates their willingness to err at the expense of the global poor and the most vulnerable. 
At the least, Barry’s principle seems to provide all of us with a strong reason to accept 
stronger positive obligations of charity or assistance to deliver on human rights. 
We have now discussed in a quite general way how two particular ‘outcomes’ of 
globalization have changed our responsibilities, even under a minimalist conception of 
global justice. In the next chapter, we will illustrate the possible tension between 
globalization and the fulfilment of human rights in a more specific way, by conducting a 
case study. We will focus on the global governance regime designed to regulate 
intellectual property rights (especially patents) and the effects this regime has for the 
global fulfilment of the human right to health (especially access to medicines). 
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Chapter 4 The lack of access to medicines and 
the Health Impact Fund scheme1 
The task is huge. Take Africa. It has 34 of the 50 poorest 
countries in the world and suffers 24% of the global 
disease burden. It has just 3% of the world’s health 
workers. […] Two thirds of all people living with HIV live 
in Africa. In Africa, a child dies of malaria every 30 
seconds. (Witty 2009, 1) 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will conduct a case study on the global governance regime designed to 
regulate intellectual property rights to illustrate the possible tension between 
globalization and the fulfilment of basic human rights. Whereas the previous chapter 
assessed our responsibilities regarding globalization in a rather general way, we want to 
end Part I by examining one specific aspect of globalization in more detail.  
In August 2008, Thomas Pogge and Aidan Hollis launched a proposal for a Health 
Impact Fund (HIF), a scheme to facilitate the introduction of new medicines aimed 
primarily at diseases of the developing world (Hollis & Pogge 2008). 
 
                                                     
1 This chapter is based on the following book chapter: De Smet, Andries, Sigrid Sterckx, and Julian Cockbain. 
(2013) “The lack of access to medicines and the Health Impact Fund scheme.” In Genomics and democracy: towards 
a 'lingua democratica' for the public debate on genomics. Edited by Peter Derkx and Harry Kunneman, 151-170. 
Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi. 
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This chapter aims to provide some background to the access to medicines crisis, to give 
a brief overview of some suggestions for promoting access to medicines in poor countries, 
to explain the HIF mechanism and to discuss some of its perceived advantages and 
shortcomings vis-à-vis alternatives. 
Although we conclude that many hurdles have to be overcome and that the HIF scheme 
needs improvement, we strongly support any attempt to improve healthcare in the 
developing, and indeed the developed, world. The HIF scheme contains several important 
elements towards a solution. 
4.2 The access to medicines crisis 
The developing world faces several problems in relation to disease (Pécoul et al. 1999): 
there may be no medicines effective against the disease because of a lack of R&D; many 
of the existing medicines are toxic and/or out of date and/or not adapted to the 
circumstances on the ground; problems of resistance are widespread; the available 
medicines may be too expensive for the patients or the country to afford; there may be 
no efficient system for ensuring that the appropriate medicines reach the patients; and 
lack of education, prejudice, hunger or insanitary conditions may cause disease to be 
more serious or prevalent than would be the case in an industrialised country. Of these 
different problems, perhaps only the last is beyond the ability of pharmaceutical 
companies (hereinafter ‘Pharma’) to address. None are beyond the ability of national 
governments, perhaps with the assistance of supranational governmental institutions, to 
address. 
More than a third of the world’s population has no access to essential drugs. More than 
half of this group of people lives in the poorest regions of Africa and Asia.2 
Poor countries are smitten with infectious and parasitic diseases, while in rich 
countries these diseases represent but a small fraction of the disease burden (measured 
in so-called Disability-Adjusted Life Years or DALYs). Meanwhile, the concept of the so-
called ‘10/90 gap’ – i.e. less than 10% of the total health-related R&D is devoted to the 
 
                                                     
2  See www.who.int and data from Médecins Sans Frontières (website of the campaign for access to essential 
drugs: www.accessmed-msf.org).  
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major health problems representing 90% of the global disease burden –3 has become 
widely accepted in theoretical analyses of the problem, but those who suffer from the 
conditions in question see little change. 
Between 1975 and 2004, 1,556 new chemical entities were introduced to the market 
globally. Only 20 of these – i.e. a mere 1.3 per cent – were for tropical diseases and 
tuberculosis, even though these represent 12 per cent of the total disease burden. This 1% 
ratio has remained unchanged over the last three decades (Chirac & Torreele 2006). 
Even though the admirable and highly professional policy advocacy work of Non-
Governmental Organisations like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and others has resulted in 
important advances, radical changes are required to the current approach to 
incentivising pharmaceutical R&D, or this outrageous and absolutely unjustifiable 
situation will only deteriorate. 
4.3 Pharmaceutical industry R&D and patenting  
By Pharma's reckoning, to find and bring to market a new medicine costs in the region of 
$1 billion. From the start of research until market launch may take ten years or so. Thus 
for example, in a policy statement of November 2007, GlaxoSmithKline, one of the world’s 
most important pharmaceutical companies, commented: 
The cost, time and risk in bringing a product to market is huge. For every 10,000 
compounds that are tested for pharmaceutical activity, only 3 reach the market and 
then only one in every 3 drugs which reach the market is profitable. It costs on 
average around $1.2 billion to bring a drug to market and typically takes 10-12 
years. (GSK 2007, 2) 
Even though these figures are heavily criticised for being highly exaggerated (Public 
Citizen 2003; Relman & Angell 2002), the risks and costs of drug development are indeed 
very significant. To make huge investments over a long period of time requires 
government financing (think of Kennedy and the first moon landing), a Bill Gates, or a 
 
                                                     
3 See http://www.globalforumhealth.org. For a critical discussion of the 10/90 gap, see 
http://who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/InternationalPolicyNetwork.pdf and 
http://www.bjmp.org/content/global-health-and-1090-gap. 
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company which can see a reasonable chance of recouping the investment, generally 
through sales at a considerable profit facilitated by patent protection.  
While the US, the EU and Japan together represent only 15% of the world population, 
they make up 87% of the global pharmaceutical market, which was forecast to be over 
$735 billion in 2008 (IMS 2008). The corporate officers of public companies have a 
fiduciary duty to their shareholders, i.e. a legal obligation to optimise the value of the 
shareholders’ investment. As a result, Pharma tends to invest in R&D for medicines which 
are effective against diseases or ailments suffered by a large number of patients in 
industrialized countries who, directly or through health insurance or national health 
systems, can afford to pay prices far beyond the capacity of the average citizen of 
developing world countries.4 Accordingly, R&D of medicines to treat diseases affecting 
predominantly or only the developing world is severely neglected. 
Lack of access to medicines, not only in poor countries but also in many industrialized 
countries, is also linked with the operation of the patent system (Sterckx 2007). 
To quote again from the speech of GlaxoSmithKline’s CEO at Harvard Medical School, 
from which we also borrowed the opening quote for this chapter: 
Our industry has treated IP [intellectual property, in this context patent law] as if 
it is written in stone. Yes it is vital but we shouldn’t forget that IP is always a 
balance, a grand bargain, with society. (Witty 2009, 2) 
Indeed, in the past, the patent laws of many countries did not permit drug substances 
as such to be patentable, only processes for preparing them. To “design around” such 
process patents, i.e. to invent alternative, non-infringing processes, was normally 
relatively straightforward, and so the pharmaceutical companies in such process-patent 
countries could produce cheaper, generic, copies of new medicines for sale in their own 
countries, in other ‘only-process-patent’ countries, and in countries where the originator 
company had failed to seek patent protection. A large proportion of the medicines sold in 
Africa were produced in this way by Indian companies for example. 
However, in the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (1994), an 
Annex was introduced – essentially under pressure from the United States, itself under 
pressure from companies such as Pfizer – which requires all countries which would be 
 
                                                     
4 Bear in mind, for example, that the annual treatment cost with Herceptin ®, a medicine for the treatment of 
certain breast cancers, is about $30,000. 
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party to the World Trade Organization to permit patenting of drug substances as such. 
This Annex, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, better 
known as the TRIPs Agreement (WTO 1994), means that in future the ability of generic 
pharmaceutical companies to sell affordable copies of new medicines will be severely 
restricted.5 
4.4 Earlier proposals for addressing the lack of access to 
medicines 
Several suggestions for addressing the lack of access to medicines have been made in the 
recent past and some are already in place. All are inadequate in one or more respects. 
The most obvious solution for drug discovery and development is for it to be funded 
by the government of the country whose citizens suffer from the disease in question. For the 
developing world however, this is a pipedream as such governments generally have more 
pressing demands, legitimate or otherwise, on the money they may have. 
To some commentators, it is equally obvious that ‘big Pharma’, in view of the ‘obscene 
profits’ it makes, should carry out such R&D as part of its obligation to the community. 
Again, however, this is a pipedream in view of the fiduciary duty of management to 
shareholders. To change this legal obligation would be possible, but would require 
international synchronisation and strict enforcement to avoid companies in one country 
being disadvantaged in competition against companies from others. Although desirable 
and attractive, this solution seems unlikely in the visible future. 
Perhaps such R&D should be seen as a role for academia and/or public research institutes? 
After all, much if not most of the fundamental research underlying the pharmaceutical 
industry has been and is being done in this context (NIH 2000). However, academic 
research needs to be funded, and such funding comes from national governments, 
supranational institutions, industry and charities. Charity funding of R&D of medicines 
for neglected diseases is uncertain given the sums at issue,6 industrial funding is unlikely 
 
                                                     
5 With regard to the developments leading up to the TRIPs Agreement: see Sell (1998), Matthews (2002) and 
Drahos & Braithwaite (2002). 
6 While the work of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is to be strongly applauded, we cannot rely on such 
support to continue at the level required to address global health problems in full – a more structural solution 
is required. 
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for the abovementioned reasons, and state funding of this kind of R&D is either unlikely 
or is subject to the politicians’ need to justify their actions to their electorate when facing 
re-election, i.e. uncertain. Moreover, even if basic research in academia to identify 
potential medicines is government financed, academia does not have the resources or 
skills, or even desire perhaps, to take a project through development, clinical trials and 
manufacturing. Thus, while academia and governments have a role to play, this alone is 
not enough to remedy the lack of access to medicines faced by hundreds of millions of 
people. 
4.5 Currently proposed solutions 
The solutions proposed until now essentially involve: (a) limiting patent protection; (b) 
compulsory licensing of patents; (c) voluntary licensing of patents (including patent 
pools); (d) parallel inducement; (e) orphan drug protection; (f) supranational funding of 
R&D; (g) advance market commitments; and (h) prizes. We will briefly comment on each 
of these schemes. 
Option (a) – Patents 
This represents the status quo – the patent system has worked to deliver medicines for 
diseases and ailments of the affluent and the military, but it is clearly inadequate to meet 
the needs of patients in the developing world or indeed the needs of those suffering from 
rare diseases anywhere in the world. 
Option (b) – Compulsory licensing of patents 
Before the entry into force of the WTO-TRIPs Agreement, many countries made it possible 
for licences to be granted to produce patented medicines even when the patentee was 
unwilling to grant licences voluntarily. One of the main developments instituted by TRIPs 
was a severe restriction of this ability. While some relaxation occurred with the so-called 
Doha Declaration on The TRIPs Agreement and Public Health (2001),7 compulsory licensing is 
still relatively unused and does not address the issue of encouraging R&D in new drugs. 
 
                                                     
7 WTO Document WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001. 
  101 
Option (c) – Voluntary licensing of patents (including patent pools) 
Patent holders may of course voluntarily license others under their patents. This may be 
attractive if the patentee does not wish itself to commit to R&D against a particular 
disease, while still wishing to keep the option open to benefiting from R&D success by the 
company that does, e.g. benefiting through royalties, access to cross-licences, access to 
compound libraries, etc. One way to achieve this is to create a patent “pool”, where a 
group of patentees commit to allow others access to their patents under conditions they 
are comfortable with. This is the scheme recently proposed by Andrew Witty, CEO of one 
of the world's foremost pharmaceutical companies, GlaxoSmithKline. Witty’s proposal, 
although a welcome development, was restricted to a shortlist of specified diseases, 
excluding HIV, and Witty notably stated that “[i]f – as we hope – something new comes 
out of such research the full benefits should go solely to the [least developed countries]. 
The terms and spirit of the pool should ensure this happens” (Witty 2009, 2, emphasis 
added). Unfortunately, this does not imply that benefits would be reaped by the poor 
outside the least developed countries. 
For these reasons, the healthcare NGO Médecins sans frontières has rightly criticised 
GSK’s offer as inadequate to deal with the problem (MSF 2009). 
Option (d) – Parallel inducement (including fast track review) 
One of the more egregious proposals for improving access to medicines for the poor in 
the least developed countries, involves the reward of the originator company with an 
otherwise unrelated inducement. One suggestion has been priority review vouchers 
(Ridley et al. 2006) whereby the company obtaining market approval for a medicine 
against a neglected disease would receive entitlement to priority in US regulatory 
approval review for another medicine, e.g. one aimed at developed world diseases or 
ailments. This clearly gives the originator an unfair advantage in the developed world 
market. Another such proposal has been made by Professor John Barton of Stanford 
University and Jeff Kindler, CEO of Pfizer, in their letter of 13 August 2008 to the US Senate 
Finance Committee (Kindler & Barton 2008). One key to the Barton/Kindler proposal is 
that: “Developed-world nations would commit themselves to develop detailed 
mechanisms to ensure that their government pharmaceutical purchasing authorities pay 
an adequate price to encourage research” (Kindler and Barton 2008, 1). Translated, what 
Pfizer is asking for is that one inducement to carry out R&D for neglected diseases would 
be for developed world governments to refrain from using their purchasing power to 
negotiate downwards the prices Pharma wishes to charge in the developed world for all 
its products. 
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Option (e) – Orphan drug protection 
This is also the status quo in the United States. It works to deliver medicines to treat rare 
diseases of the wealthy or those with health insurance, but it is not a solution to the needs 
of the developing world. 
Option (f) – Supranational funding of R&D of medicines for neglected 
diseases  
This proposal is exemplified by the Medical Research and Development Treaty (Love 
2005). However, it relies on supranational commitment to support R&D as well as on 
modifications to patent laws and freedom to patent. Moreover, as Hollis and Pogge point 
out, it seems to give flexibility in funding allocation to an extent that would “enable 
governments to make resource allocations based on domestic political interests, rather 
than global health needs” (Hollis and Pogge 2008, 104). 
Option (g) – Advance market commitments 
This is the subject of the proposal that developing world governments should commit to 
ordering X million doses at a dose price of $Y of a medicine to treat disease Z when the 
medicine is market-approved (Kremer & Glennerster 2004). This scheme faces three 
particular problems: the uncertainty as to whether the government will meet its 
obligation when the time arises; the risk that a competitor wins market approval first; 
and the uncertainty as to whether medicines delivered to the country will actually reach 
the intended patients if the local healthcare system is inadequate. Some may argue that 
the second problem, the risk of losing the race, is also faced by Pharma in normal practice 
– i.e. under option (a). However, a ‘me too’ drug may still sell well, especially if 
competitively priced, hence in normal practice Pharma does not face total loss by coming 
second to the developed world market. Under scheme (g), though, the first company to 
arrive on the market may capture all the available advance market commitments. 
Option (h) – Prizes  
The final option involves a system whereby Pharma is rewarded by a monetary prize for 
bringing a new medicine to market rather than (only) by the grant of a patent monopoly. 
One such system, which replaces patents, has been proposed by James Love, Director of 
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the NGO Knowledge Ecology International,8 and was introduced before the US legislators as 
the Medical Innovation Prize Act by Senator Bernard Sanders (Sanders 2007). However, 
being entirely non-compliant with the abovementioned WTO-TRIPS Agreement (1994), 
this scheme had a snowball in hell’s chance of seeing daylight. 
The prize is a tried and tested system, which was used for example with the 
determination of longitude in the 18th century.9 With regard to R&D of medicines for 
neglected diseases, if the prize would be awarded by a national government or charity, its 
availability on delivery would be doubtful in view of the uncertainty as to whether the 
government will meet its commitment when the time arises (again, as demonstrated by 
the case of longitude). Justifiable doubt would provide the management of Pharma with 
further bias, if more is necessary, against taking the decision to commit to R&D in relation 
to developing world diseases. 
4.6 A new idea: The Health Impact Fund (HIF) 
The HIF, as recently proposed by Thomas Pogge and Aidan Hollis, is essentially a 
supranationally-funded prize system intended to address the problem of affordable 
access to new medicines for diseases primarily affecting developing countries (Hollis & 
Pogge 2008). 
Put very briefly, HIF involves a supranational body, majoritatively funded by 
developed countries, paying an annual prize for up to ten years to a company bringing a 
new medicine to market, with the size of the payment reflecting the reduction in global 
health burden attributable to the use of that medicine and with the medicine being sold 
at a pre-agreed and hence affordable price. As currently proposed, HIF does not preclude 
the company that has developed the drug or the ‘originator company’ from using its 
patents to exclude competitors, and so the originator’s investment can be recovered by 
the combination of the profit component in the agreed price and the annual prize 
payments. 
 
                                                     
8 KEI is an organization committed, inter alia, to improving the availability of medicines and particularly to 
schemes involving supranational funding of medicine development or payment by prize rewards rather than 
by the grant of (patent) monopolies. See www.keionline.org.  
9 In the 18th century, the British government offered a prize of £ 20,000 (about US$ 4.5 M in today’s currency) for 
an accurate means of determining longitude. The problem was solved by a clockmaker, John Harrison, working 
between 1730 and 1772. See Sobel (1995). 
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One key feature of the HIF is that the registrant company must commit to provide open 
licences to the relevant patents at the end of the reward period, i.e. within 10 years of 
market launch. A second key feature is the fact that no HIF reward is payable before the 
year after market launch. In these two features lie the two major objections to the HIF – 
that it does less than possible to maximise the availability of medicines at the most 
affordable prices and that it does little to ease the decision by Pharma to enter into an 
R&D project by reducing either the amount of money at risk or the period before 
investment is recouped if the project is successful. 
4.7 The debate over HIF’s potential impact on the generic 
pharmaceutical industry 
In an earlier form of the scheme, HIF was intended to require the originator to permit 
generic competition from the outset and thus the originator company would have recovered 
its investments through smaller profits on sales and a prize which took into account the 
impact of both the originator’s product and the generic copies.  
In our view, introducing the pre-agreed price and permitting the use of patent 
monopolies represents a retrograde step in the development of HIF as the goal of HIF is 
to maximise reduction in global health burden, something which is facilitated by the 
downwards pressure on price that results from generic competition. The case of 
antiretroviral drugs provides a perfect example. In 2000, a year’s treatment course for 
HIV/AIDS cost more than US$ 10,000 per person. At that stage, these so-called ‘first 
generation’ antiretrovirals were only available from the pharmaceutical companies that 
held the patents on these drugs. Currently, the most commonly used triple-drug 
antiretroviral treatment in the developing world costs less than US$ 100 per year. The 
reason why the price of these drugs has dropped with 99% over a period of only six years 
is that these products were not under patent in several countries with pharmaceutical 
manufacturing infrastructure – e.g. Brazil and India. This enabled local manufacturers in 
those countries to legally produce generic versions of the brand name medicines patented 
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in developed countries. Moreover, those generic medicines could also be exported to 
other developing countries where the medicine was not covered by a patent.10 
Pogge and Hollis’s HIF scheme has attracted severe criticism from James Love of 
Knowledge Ecology International. Love, who has published his correspondence on the subject 
with Pogge and Hollis online (Love 2008a; 2008b), particularly criticises the stepping back 
from open licensing which occurred in the maturation of the HIF scheme. 
Pogge and Hollis’s main justifications11 for modifying the initial form of the scheme 
were essentially that (a) the removal of a requirement for open licensing would make HIF 
more attractive to Pharma both to participate in and to refrain from challenging the 
scheme, and (b) HIF makes open licensing redundant as the registrant is incentivised by 
HIF to supply at the lowest price. 
Even though the first of these arguments rings true, the second justification is clearly 
flawed. In this regard, it deserves repeating that generic competition has been shown in 
the field of anti-retrovirals to be able to bring prices down by 99% while GlaxoSmithKline 
in its recent offer to help access to medicines has merely offered to reduce prices in the 
least developed countries by ‘at least 75%’ (Witty 2009).  
James Love has expressed particular concern about the effect of HIF on the generics 
industry, arguing that, as structured, the downwards pressure on price encountered 
where generic competition arises, would be reduced under HIF: 
 [T]he […] HIF approach […] would marginalize the generics industry in developing 
countries, make it harder to credibly threaten a compulsory license, raise the costs 
of generic suppliers (fewer economies of scale or scope), and make the political 
environment for [compulsory licensing] or UNITAID type [voluntary licensing] 
quite difficult. […] Finally, it is only a minor virtue that the HIF would ask for an 
 
                                                     
10 Unfortunately, all this is changing as a result of the entry into force of the WTO-TRIPs Agreement, which 
forces all member states to grant product (and not only process) patents in all fields, including pharmaceuticals. 
See Sterckx (2007). Moreover, in view of problems regarding rapidly spreading resistance to first-generation 
treatments, patients receiving such treatments increasingly need to shift to newer drugs to which they are not 
resistant, but which are under patent and hence hugely expensive. 
11 Besides the two justifications mentioned, the following were also given: (c) the entry of generic competition 
would make it difficult to assess the HIF reward; (d) the problem of counterfeiting of medicines would be smaller, 
or would be more controllable; (e) distributors would not be tempted to trade in the higher profit margin 
versions of the medicine rather than the lowest price to customer version; (f) the registrant would be able to 
recoup a higher profit in countries able to bear a higher price and so would find the scheme more attractive; (g) 
registrants might fear misuse of licensed technology, i.e. for the preparation of things other than the registered 
medicine; and (h) registrants might be constrained in their ability to sublicense by their own licensors. 
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open license after ten years. For many products, the effective patent and product 
life is not much longer than this anyway, particularly given late product 
registrations in developing countries. (Love 2008a) 
Indeed, by not mandating generic competition, HIF does not give a strong enough 
incentive to the registrant or the scheme administrators to drive prices down. 
HIF also leaves some other important problems unaddressed and raises some new ones. 
These are briefly discussed in the next sections, before we turn our attention to HIF’s 
main strengths in comparison with other schemes. 
4.8 Problems resulting from HIF’s linkage with patents 
A company which owns or has licensed all relevant patent rights to a new medicine may 
register that medicine under the HIF scheme and thereby become entitled to a reward 
under the scheme for each of the first ten years, or each remaining year of the first ten 
years, following first marketing authorization. Accordingly, patents must exist for the 
medicine or its process of preparation or use. In view of this feature of the scheme, 
rewards are not payable on products deemed to be previously known or obvious 
modifications of known medicines,12 or on medicines which are or are shortly to become 
off-patent.  
Since a company wishing to benefit from the HIF scheme must make use of the patent 
system, it will have every incentive to use that system to exclude competing products, 
whether identical or not. Moreover, since the company must have patent cover for the 
medicine, the decision whether to register with HIF or not will be based on the 
comparison of the expected profit levels should the medicine be marketed conventionally 
with the expected HIF rewards if the medicine is HIF registered. For a medicine with a 
significant expected developed world market, e.g. one effective against cancer, heart 
disease or age-related diseases, it seems unlikely that HIF registration would occur. 
 
                                                     
12 As such products would not meet the legal patentability requirements of novelty and inventive step – see 
Cockbain (2007). 
  107 
4.9 Problems arising from the obligations HIF registrants 
must accept 
In return for becoming eligible for the HIF rewards by registering a medicine, the 
registrant must agree to sell the medicine at a pre-agreed price, which will cover 
production costs but will have little profit margin. A HIF registrant must also agree to 
license others under its patents relating to the medicine after the ten-year reward period 
ends. Since the pre-agreed price covers production costs, the only incentive to reduce 
production costs is to increase sales and hence the medicine’s impact on global health 
burden and thereby increase the reward the registrant may receive. However, once a 
company has begun sales of a patented medicine it has little incentive to change the 
production process, unless faced by generic competition, since regulatory approval 
problems may arise if the production process is changed. As we explained earlier, under 
HIF, generic competition is not foreseen until the ten-year reward period is over. 
Where there is generic competition, for example in countries where no relevant 
patents exist or where the HIF registrant has elected not to seek market authorization, 
the health impact of the generic products will be ascribed to the registrant in assessing 
the HIF reward. Where no patents exist, generic manufacturers require no licences and 
so fall outside the control of the registrant and/or HIF. As a result, there may be some 
difficulty in determining the local sales volume of the generic products and this will 
complicate the calculation of the component of the HIF reward which is based on the 
health impact resulting from sales of generics. 
Pogge and Hollis also propose that HIF registrants must accept to ‘make a good faith 
effort to obtain market clearance wherever the product is needed’ and to ‘preauthorize 
the HIF to seek market clearance for the product wherever the registrant has failed to do 
so and to subtract the cost of this effort from the registrant’s next health impact reward 
payment’ (Hollis & Pogge 2008, 14). For products useful in many countries, the registrant 
is thus being asked to bear the costs of obtaining market approval in all such countries, 
either directly or through a reduced HIF reward, costs most likely to arise in the early 
years of the reward period. This potentially delays the time to break-even, making the 
scheme less attractive. 
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4.10 Problems resulting from the baseline calculation of the 
health impact 
According to Pogge and Hollis, the health impact of a HIF registered medicine would be 
assessed as the attributed incremental health impact of the medicine measured as the 
difference between actual health and a baseline representing the expected health level 
projected from the actual health at medicine launch (or two years earlier) and, in this 
projection, excluding the contribution of the medicine (and any other medicines sold 
exclusively by the registrant). For non-communicable diseases, the impact would be 
assessed on the basis of the treated patients, e.g. as the increase in quality-adjusted life 
years (QALYs). For communicable diseases, the impact would include all other indirectly 
affected individuals. As Pogge and Hollis admit, this would make HIF the largest health 
assessment agency in the world. 
Unfortunately, excluding only the medicine itself and any of the registrant’s other 
products from the baseline calculation makes the HIF reward susceptible to reduction in 
the event that other medicines targeting the same disease are launched during the reward 
period. This may cause two problems to arise. Firstly, that the decision to commit to R&D 
is made more difficult in view of the likelihood of the HIF reward being reduced. Secondly, 
the registrant is incentivised to use the patent system to exclude or delay the arrival of 
competing products, either ‘me-toos’13 or quite different products, or at minimum to 
require licence fees that counterbalance the HIF reward reduction. This would not achieve 
the goal of promoting access to medicines. 
4.11 Problems regarding security of funding 
As conceived, HIF would be funded by national governments committing to contribute a 
percentage of Gross National Income, e.g. 0.03%, over a period of at least 10 or 12 years. 
Before R&D is initiated based on an expectation of repayment by HIF rewards, or at least 
before development reaches phase III clinical trials, some certainty is needed of there 
being adequate sums in the HIF when the HIF rewards fall due. This involves reasonable 
certainty that enough countries commit and will meet their commitments and that the 
 
                                                     
13 A ‘me-too’ is a pharmaceutical which is closely similar, structurally, to an existing product, but which may 
have minor benefits, e.g. in terms of reduced side effects, enhanced uptake, etc. 
  109 
numbers of medicines registered will not be so high that the size of the HIF rewards will 
be inadequate. Payments to HIF would effectively be foreign aid and since relatively few 
countries are generous with foreign aid, this may appear too uncertain to “pull” drug 
developers into the scheme. 
If the governmental commitment required is limited to 10-12 years, as it is under the 
current proposal, then HIF would be essentially an incitement for a ‘single round’ of R&D 
- those reaching the market first will gain a large share, those arriving later may find that 
the fund is drying up when they ask for their rewards over their 10-year reward period. 
As not all new medicines arising out of HIF would reach the market at the same time, the 
HIF reward funding will have to be guaranteed over a longer period. 
Finally, we turn to the strong points of HIF vis-à-vis other proposed schemes. 
4.12 The attraction of HIF: the reward 
The HIF rewards would be paid from a fund financed by contributions from countries 
party to the scheme, those contributions being a fixed percentage of the contributing 
country’s Gross National Income. The fund for each year will be divided between all HIF 
registered medicines currently within their ten-year reward period in proportion to the 
effect each has had that year on reducing global health burden. The fewer the eligible 
medicines, the larger the reward and vice versa. Since the decision to initiate R&D on a 
drug is generally taken about ten years before market approval, at the time of decision 
the company will have no means of knowing what level of HIF reward it might receive if 
it commits to start work on a medicine which would not be profitable if sold 
conventionally.  
However, R&D expense escalates dramatically as the development progresses and by 
the end of phase II clinical trials, the time to market approval may be short enough to 
make the likely size of HIF reward more estimatable. Thus it may well be the case that HIF 
would encourage R&D to progress to this stage for products that would not be profitable 
with conventional sales. Some research and development into diseases of the developing 
world does take place already14 and HIF may stimulate the companies involved with such 
 
                                                     
14 GlaxoSmithKline, for example, has a research centre dedicated to diseases of the developing world and 
employing 100 research scientists in Tres Cantos, Spain (Witty 2009). Likewise, in 2002 Novartis set up the 
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R&D to bring products to the market by allowing the decision to enter the most costly 
stage of clinical trials to be made with a reasonable expectation of sufficient reward 
within a tolerable period. 
Moreover, that reward, coming as it would from a supranational body, could be more 
confidently expected to materialise then would be the case where it was dependent on 
the continued existence of charitable funding or on the vagaries of national politics. 
4.13 The attraction of HIF: a potential solution to the “last 
mile” problem 
A very strong point of the HIF scheme is that it takes into account what Pogge and Hollis 
refer to as the “last mile” problem of ensuring delivery of medicines to the patients (Hollis 
& Pogge 2008, 71-81). It achieves this by making the HIF reward proportional to the 
measured health impact – if the medicine does not reach the patients, there cannot be a 
health impact and hence no HIF reward.  
This is undoubtedly the most original and convincing aspect of the HIF scheme.  
With this case study we conclude Part I of this dissertation, in which we looked at 
globalization and our responsibilities regarding global justice. In Part II we will turn our 
attention to the feasibility objections, i.e. suggestions that cosmopolitan justice should 
not be strived for because it cannot be attained. We will start by assessing feasibility 
objections at the level of the individual moral agent (chapter 5). Subsequently, in chapters 
6 and 7, we will shift our focus to feasibility problems at the institutional level. Our 
 
                                                     
Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases (NITD) in Singapore, an operation with over 100 researchers and 
supporting staff (see Novartis 2008). However, such efforts must be viewed with a smidgin of cynicism. 
According to Witty, the Tres Cantos centre is funded in part by its partners, the Medicines for Malaria Venture 
and the Global Alliance for TB Medicine Development, while the Novartis web-site identifies NITD's focus as 
being on Dengue fever, TB and malaria. While TB and malaria are indeed problematical in the developing world, 
TB is also a problem for AIDS sufferers and malaria also one for developed world tourists and military - i.e. it 
seems that the focus is on medicines that may find a satisfactory conventional market. As far as Dengue fever is 
concerned, it may be noted that in a talk at a conference arranged by Médecins Sans Frontières in London in June 
2005, Dr Paul Herrling, Head of Corporate Research at Novartis, speaking about NITD, admitted that NITD was 
concentrating on diseases that had analogues, such as West Nile and hepatitis, for which there might be a 
conventional market for effective medicines. 
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context for this discussion will be the problem of climate change, as it presents a clear-
cut case for the application of our minimalist conception of harm and injustice. 
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Chapter 5 Moral disengagement and the 
motivational gap in climate change1 
5.1 Introduction 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), human influence is 
extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming of the climate 
system since the mid-20th century (IPCC 2013, 17). Continued emissions of greenhouse 
gases will cause further warming and changes in all components of the climate system, 
further resulting inter alia in sea level rise, increased frequency and duration of 
heatwaves, more frequent temperature extremes, and changes in precipitation patterns. 
Already occurring and future predicted impacts of these climatic changes on human life 
include increased mortality, food and water insecurity, the spread and exacerbation of 
diseases, conflicts resulting from resource scarcity, and increased migration (see for 
example Costello et al. 2009; IPCC 2014a; McMichael and Lingren 2011; Watts et al. 2015). 
Climate change thus jeopardizes the fundamental human rights of current as well as 
future people, including their rights to life, health, adequate food and water, adequate 
housing, and self-determination (Bell 2011, 100-102; 2013; Caney 2010; OHCHR 2009).2  
The 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate change reaffirms the essential goal of holding 
the increase in global temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial temperature, 
while pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels (UNFCCC 2015, Article 2). However, current policy projections would see a warming 
 
                                                     
1 This chapter is based on the following article: Peeters et al. “Moral disengagement and the motivational gap in 
climate change.” Ethical Perspectives (under review). 
2 Discussion of the so-called non-identity problem falls beyond the scope of this chapter, since non-philosophers 
rarely invoke such sophisticated arguments. Following inter alia Bell (2011, 104-108), Shue (2011, 293) and 
Vanderheiden (2008, 217-230), we would argue that future not-yet-born individuals will possess rights when 
they are born, even though their particular identities may not yet be determined today. 
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of 3.6°C by 2100, and the combined national mitigation ambitions (as expressed in the 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions) would still lead to a median warming of 2.7 °C 
(2.2-3.4 °C) (Climate Action Tracker 2015). Also consider that in March 2015, only 32% of 
Americans reported to ‘worry a great deal’ about global warming or climate change (Jones 
2015).  
The predominant explanation for the inadequacy of these responses in the climate 
ethics literature refers to the ineptitude of our moral judgment system to identify climate 
change as an important moral problem (Jamieson 2006, 476-477; 2010, 436-437; 2014, 148-
150; Markowitz and Shariff 2012, 243). Another explanation for the widespread inaction 
is compellingly defended by Gardiner (2006, 407-409; 2011a, 301-338), asserting that 
people face strong temptations to pass the buck onto future people, the poor and nature. 
Indeed, the opportunity costs involved in tackling climate change are perceived as 
daunting (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001, 107) and people likely prefer maintaining their 
consumption patterns.3 In this chapter, we will argue that these explanations are not 
mutually exclusive and illustrate that the complexity of climate change provides certain 
latitude for emitters to deploy selective moral disengagement. Such strategies of moral 
disengagement facilitate a reconstruction of climate change and one’s contribution to it, 
allowing emitters to maintain a consumptive lifestyle and to emit greenhouse gases, 
without having to accept moral responsibility for the resulting climate-related harms.4  
Successfully abating climate change will depend on substantial actions undertaken by 
a broad range of actors, including international institutions, nation-states, corporations, 
and civil society organisations.5 We will nonetheless predominantly focus on individual 
emitters. Both in the literature and popular opinion, there are persistent doubts about 
the agency of individual emitters in tackling climate change – providing an important 
 
                                                     
3 Another explanation might trace the current inaction to ignorance about the anthropogenic causes of climate 
change and its harmful effects. However, following Vanderheiden (2007, 91), we believe that with five 
scrupulously researched and widely disseminated IPCC Assessment Reports, ‘claims to reasonable ignorance 
concerning anthropogenic climate change are fully implausible’, especially in the developed world where per 
capita emissions are highest.  
4 Since we do not use moral responsibility in the basic desert sense, our account is not vulnerable to the objections 
of free will scepticists. Rather, we use it as the criterion underpinning the Polluter Pays Principle, which we would 
advocate as the core principle for distribution of the burdens involved in tackling climate change, although it 
should be supplemented to cover the remaining portion of climate change for which no moral responsibility 
can be identified – for example, for the past emissions of deceased polluters, non-anthropogenic climate change, 
and the greenhouse gases emitted to meet one’s basic rights (see also Caney 2010a). Further discussion of the 
distribution of the burdens of tackling climate change falls beyond the scope of this chapter. 
5 It should also be emphasized that mechanisms of moral disengagement are deployed at all these levels to evade 
responsibilities. 
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explanation for the fact that ethical and political analysis has mostly focused on the role 
of nation-states and international institutions. Some of these doubts about individual 
agency are legitimate; but we argue that many of them rather correspond to moral 
disengagement.6  
In the following section, we will therefore explain our assumptions about the extent 
to which individual emitters effectively have agency in abating climate change. 
Subsequently, we will illustrate how mechanisms of moral disengagement are being 
deployed in climate change to evade moral responsibility for climate-related harms. In 
the fourth section, we will discuss the relationship between moral disengagement and the 
two explanations for the current inadequacy of responses to climate change mentioned 
above. Before highlighting the main points of our argument in the conclusion, we will 
tentatively discuss some strategies for tackling moral disengagement and addressing the 
motivational gap. 
5.2 The agency of individual emitters 
In current carbon-dependent energy regimes, essentially everyone is compelled to emit 
greenhouse gases in order to fulfil one’s basic rights; no individual can reasonably be 
expected not to emit these emissions and, to that extent, he or she cannot be identified 
as being morally responsible for climate change (Shue 2011, 309; Vanderheiden 2008, 72). 
However, this exemption does not hold for emissions that are the result of a profligate 
lifestyle, which can be easily foregone without sacrificing one’s basic rights. Therefore, 
emitters should acknowledge moral responsibility for the contribution of their avoidable 
emissions to the harmful effects of climate change (Caney 2009, 179; McKinnon 2012, 100; 
Vanderheiden 2008, 72). Rather than treating this issue into any more theoretical detail, 
we will clarify it in the examples of energy and meat consumption.7 
Consider first energy consumption: Gardner and Stern (2008, 20-21) mention that US 
households account for about 38% of national carbon emissions through their direct 
 
                                                     
6 See Peeters et al. (2015). 
7 Shue (1993, 55) has famously made a differentiation between subsistence and luxury emissions. This terminology 
and the distinction are contested (see for example Gardiner 2004, 585-6). Nonetheless, we agree with Shue that 
to ignore such distinctions altogether is to discard one of the most fundamental distinctions in ethics, namely 
the distinction between needs and wants. Moreover, even though differentiating between different sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions remains an important line-drawing problem, ‘both extremes of this spectrum are 
abundantly clear’ (Shue 2013, 392, footnote 32). 
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actions, constituting ‘a huge reservoir of potential for reducing carbon emissions and 
mitigating climate change that can be tapped much more quickly and directly’. They have 
composed a short list, consisting of 9 immediate, low-cost actions regarding 
transportation and living by which individuals and households in the US can reduce their 
total direct energy consumption. Dietz et al. (2009, 18452-18456) similarly identify a 
behavioural wedge: some effective, nonregulatory behaviourally oriented policies and 
interventions can reduce US national emissions by 7.4% with little or no reduction in well-
being. Some frequently mentioned actions include: maintain correct tire pressure, alter 
driving (avoid sudden accelerations and stops), reduce highway speed, temper heating 
and air conditioning, use only warm (or cold) water for clothes washing, dry clothes on a 
line, and switch from bathing to (short) showering. 
It should be noted that many poor people do not have a reasonable alternative for fossil 
fuels or wood to cook their food or irrigate their crops, which implies that they depend 
on the emission of greenhouse gases to realise their basic rights. Nonetheless, the fact 
that energy consumption can significantly be reduced by behavioural changes with little 
or no cost indicates that a substantial amount of greenhouse gases emitted by the global 
consumption elites is the result of a profligate, wasteful way of life.  
Also consider meat consumption. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations estimates the total greenhouse gas emissions from livestock supply chains to be 
14.5% of all human-induced emissions (Gerber et al. 2013, 15). This is most likely a 
conservative estimate, since other analyses show figures as high as 51 per cent for the 
total contribution of livestock and by-products to annual worldwide greenhouse gas 
emissions (Goodland & Anhang 2009, 11). In any case, a transition to a low-meat, 
vegetarian or vegan diet would substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions, mitigation 
costs and land use requirements for food production (Garnett 2009; Scarborough et al. 
2014; Stehfest et al. 2009). 
Again, it should be clear that in societies where access to a nutritionally varied 
selection of foods is limited, and where there are serious problems of mal- and under-
nutrition, keeping a goat, a pig, or a few chickens can make a critical difference to the 
adequacy of people’s diet (Garnett 2009, 497). These people cannot be expected to 
surrender their consumption of animal products needed to meet their basic rights, and 
can therefore not be held morally responsible for the effects of these emissions. In 
contrast, the meat intake of the global elites can be characterized as overconsumption and 
over-nutrition. For these people, adequately nutritional plant foods are sufficiently 
available, and dietary changes are thus perfectly feasible (Garnett 2009, 496-497). 
In sum, although individuals depend on the emission of a certain amount of 
greenhouse gases to lead decent lives, a substantial amount is the result of a profligate 
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lifestyle (including wasteful energy consumption and the overconsumption of meat). 
Individual emitters can easily avoid these emissions by choosing one of the alternatives 
that are readily available, or by changing one’s habits and behaviour. Since these 
emissions are subject to choice of and control by individuals, they can be held responsible 
for them. In the following section, we will argue that claims to exonerate emitters from 
moral responsibility for the consequences of their wasteful emissions are unconvincing 
and rather correspond to moral disengagement.  
5.3 Mechanisms of moral disengagement in climate change 
According to Albert Bandura (1991, 68, 71-72; 1999, 193-194; 2002, 101-102), moral conduct 
is motivated and regulated by the on-going exercise of self-reactive influences, which 
keep conduct in line with personal and societal standards. People ordinarily act in ways 
that generate satisfaction and a sense of self-worth, but refrain from behaving in ways 
that violate their moral standards because such conduct will bring self-condemnation. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of socio-cognitive processes by which people can 
dissociate moral self-reactions from their conduct. These processes, known as mechanisms 
of moral disengagement enable people to engage in activities that serve their self-interest, 
but violate their moral standards by inflicting harm, without having to face the restraints 
of self-condemnation (see also Bandura et al. 2001, 126-127). A substantial body of 
evidence has indeed demonstrated the disinhibitory power of moral disengagement (see 
for example Bandura 1999; 2002; 2007; Bandura et al. 2001; Barsky 2011; Bersoff 1999). 
A few notable exceptions notwithstanding,8 the deployment of selective moral 
disengagement remains underexplored in the climate case. We will follow Bandura’s well-
developed taxonomy to illustrate how the different strategies are deployed in the case of 
climate change. Rather than attempting an exhaustive overview, we will mainly focus on 
some well-documented instances of moral disengagement in the climate change 
literature and public discourse.  
 
                                                     
8 Some of the illustrations Bandura discusses in his seminal article of 2007 to argue that selective moral 
disengagement impedes ecological sustainability apply to climate change. In addition, Stoll-Kleemann et al. 
(2001) provide empirical evidence of similar psychological processes in focus group research in Switzerland. 
Markowitz and Shariff (2012, 244) mention a guilty bias: to allay negative recriminations, individuals engage in 
biased reasoning to minimize perceptions of their complicity. 
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5.3.1 Mechanisms of moral disengagement related to reprehensible 
conduct 
The first disengagement mechanism relating to reprehensible conduct (i.e. emitting 
greenhouse gases to attain luxuries) is social and moral justification: harmful conduct is 
made acceptable by portraying it as being in the service of socially worthy or morally 
valued purposes (Bandura 1991, 73). Belief in the worthiness of an enterprise eliminates 
the self-condemnation that might otherwise be evoked by its harmful aspects, thereby 
enabling people to preserve the positive image of themselves as moral agents even when 
inflicting harm on others (Bandura 2002, 103).  
From the perspective of individual emitters, it is said, climate change is only an 
unwelcome by-product of their daily, apparently innocent activities, but is not part of 
their purposes (Gardiner 2011b, 45). Sinnott-Armstrong (2005, 288), for example, 
examines driving for fun in a sport utility vehicle on a beautiful Sunday afternoon, and 
renders it socially acceptable by portraying it as serving the socially worthy purpose of 
recreation: ‘maybe you do not like to go for drives in sport utility vehicles on sunny 
Sunday afternoons, but many people do’. Nonetheless, from a moral perspective, appeal 
to the goal of recreation clearly fails to exonerate emitters from moral responsibility for 
the contribution of such greenhouse gas emitting activities to the harmful effects on 
climate change. 
Second, since the perception of behaviour is coloured by what it is compared to, 
advantageous comparison is another powerful strategy to disengage moral self-control 
(Bandura 1999, 195-196; 2002, 175). By exploiting this contrast principle, reprehensible 
conduct can be made to appear righteous. Let us return to Sinnott-Armstrong’s analysis 
of recreational driving. One of his major arguments is that people should not be held 
responsible for harms ‘by calling their acts causes of harms when their acts are not at all 
unusual, assuming that they did not intend the harm’ (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, 290, 
emphasis added). Since outings in a fuel-intensive car are not unusual, he concludes that 
these should not be seen as a cause of global warming or its harms. This should be 
understood as a pragmatic heuristic: if agents who are doing no worse than average are 
condemned, then the worst offenders would have no incentive to improve their acts, 
because even should they reduce their activities to average levels, they could still expect 
to remain subject to blame (Ibid.). Therefore, he argues, condemnation should be 
reserved for the worst offenders.  
This argumentation clearly corresponds to an advantageous comparison since it 
encourages the search for and comparison with the worst emitters, in order to attempt 
to exculpate one’s own greenhouse gas emitting acts. Even if we ignore the fact that it is 
an instance of the ad populum fallacy, Sinnott-Armstrong’s heuristic would still be 
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incapable of exonerating individual emitters from their responsibility, since it might be 
questioned whether their greenhouse gas emitting acts are in fact not at all unusual. 
Worldwide data about outings in a fuel-intensive car are lacking, but consider for example 
meat consumption: in 2011, an average of 77 and 118 kilograms of meat was consumed 
per capita in Belgium, respectively the US, while the world average was merely 42 
kilograms (FAO 2015). Although eating large quantities of meat does not appear to be 
unusual in the Belgian or US context, it is in a global context. Since climate change is a 
global problem, greenhouse gas emitting acts should be scrutinized with reference to the 
global context, rather than to a specific geographical or economic background. Belgian 
meat consumers should effectively be held responsible according to Sinnott-Armstrong’s 
own heuristic – contrary to his argument – because they are among the worst offenders 
in the global context.  
A third strategy of moral disengagement relating to the reprehensible conduct is 
euphemistic labelling. Since language shapes the perceptions and thought processes 
relating to actions, euphemistic labelling is a convenient and widely used device to mask 
harmful conduct and to reduce or eliminate personal responsibility for it (Bandura 1991, 
79; 1999, 195). For example, Bandura (2007, 19) argues that the term global warming 
conveys ‘the image of a mildly pleasant condition’. In contrast, however, Republican 
strategist Frank Luntz (2002, 142) advised the G.W. Bush administration precisely the 
contrary: ‘while global warming has catastrophic connotations attached to it, climate change 
suggests a more controllable and less emotional challenge’. 
We do not deny that part of the challenge climate change poses to our moral judgment 
system is indeed that greenhouse gases are emitted by seemingly usual, everyday 
activities that may serve socially worthy purposes. However, the arguments discussed 
above merely provide rationalizations of such greenhouse gas emitting activities, rather 
than convincingly exonerating emitters from moral responsibility. We will return to this 
in the fourth section.  
5.3.2 Mechanisms of moral disengagement related to injurious effects 
Climate change and its effects are frequently subject to outright denial, for example by 
the oil industry and conservative think tanks (Oreskes & Conway 2010, chapter 6). More 
subtle strategies of moral disengagement with respect to the consequences of one’s 
actions are deployed as well. Minimizing consequences, for example, is often used regarding 
climate change: a warmer climate is seen as making life more pleasant for people living 
in the north. However, expected beneficial effects of climate change (such as an initial 
increase in agricultural productivity in northern Europe – EEA 2015, 34) are greatly 
outweighed by negative impacts in both northern and southern countries.  
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If minimization does not work, the evidence of harm can be discredited in a number of 
ways (Bandura 1999, 199). Consider for example the persistent ‘climate myth’ that global 
warming is caused by changes in the radiation output of the sun or in the Earth’s orbit, 
rather than by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, knowledge about human 
influence on the climate system at least dates back to Svante Arrhenius’ 1896 findings 
regarding the influence of atmospheric carbon dioxide on the global temperature, and 
each Assessment Report of the IPCC confirms anthropogenic greenhouse gases as the 
dominant cause of global warming. The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report even states that ‘the 
best estimate of the human-induced contribution to warming is similar to the observed 
warming over this period’, rendering the effect of natural factors insignificant (IPCC 2013, 
17). Other attempts of sceptics to distort or obscure scientific findings have been similarly 
debunked in a way accessible to lay audiences (see, for example, Beck s.d.). 
The scientific consensus about climate change is becoming increasingly confident, and 
remaining uncertainties are increasingly revisited as risks through estimations in terms 
of probabilities (Bell 2011, 110; IPCC 2013, chapters 11 and 12). In fact, it can be argued 
that there is a disproportional focus on scientific uncertainty in climate change, while 
much of it is manufactured or grossly exaggerated in order to create the false impression 
that some questions remain unsettled or that some conclusions are much less widely 
accepted by scientists than they actually are (Vanderheiden 2008, 197). In addition to 
clearly being unrealistic, demanding full scientific certainty merely serves as a convenient 
justification for inaction (Bandura 2007, 21) – even though in the face of the possibly 
catastrophic impacts of climate change, inaction is clearly a dangerous way of dealing 
with any remaining uncertainty.  
In sum, although scientific uncertainties remain and clearly complicate matters, they 
do not impede a general, robust moral judgment about the threats climate change poses 
to the enjoyment of human rights and the actions needed to tackle it. Rather, the 
strategies of denial, minimizing consequences and discrediting evidence of harm are used to 
evade moral responsibility for the contribution of emissions resulting from a profligate 
lifestyle to climate change.  
5.3.3 Mechanisms of moral disengagement operating at the intersection 
between reprehensible conduct and injurious effects 
Diffusion and displacement of responsibility for culpable behaviour are two potent 
dissociative practices that operate by obscuring the relationship between actions and the 
effects they cause, minimizing an individual’s agentive role (Bandura 1991, 81; 2002, 106).  
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First, the exercise of moral self-control can be weakened when personal agency is 
obscured by diffusing responsibility for reprehensible conduct (Bandura 1999, 198; 2002, 
107). A frequently deployed form in the climate case involves reference to collective action, 
which makes an individual’s contribution to an aggregate harmful effect seem trivial. Any 
harm done by a group of people can always largely be ascribed to the behaviour of the 
others in the group (Bandura 1991, 85; 1999, 198).  
Adverse climate-related impacts result from the sum of individual greenhouse gas 
emissions that each provide exceedingly small contributions to the overall large 
aggregate effects of climate change (Schwenkenbecher 2014, 172; Vanderheiden 2008, 
163). Consequently, it has been argued that individual greenhouse gas emissions are 
entirely faultless, since, taken separately, their effects are insignificant (Sinnott-
Armstrong 2005, 289). However, this view commits a mistake in moral mathematics, 
involving the belief that imperceptible effects cannot be morally significant.9 On this view, 
an act cannot be right or wrong because of its effects on other people if these effects are 
imperceptible (Parfit 1987, 77). In contrast, Parfit (1987, 83) argues that each of our acts 
may be very wrong, even if their effects are imperceptible, since our acts may together 
make these people very much worse off. Kagan (2011, 132-133) even denies the possibility 
of imperceptible effects to exist, since there will always be at least one perceptible 
difference, however small it may be. The infinitesimal contribution of a single greenhouse 
gas emission might be so tiny as to be imperceptible, but it is not zero (Vanderheiden 2008, 
162). In addition, the global temperature has risen by 0.85°C since 1880, which already led 
to significant climatic changes adversely impacting human life, and current levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions make further detrimental climatic changes increasingly likely 
(IPCC 2013, 194; 2014b, 124-125). In this light, it is safer to assume that individual 
greenhouse gas emissions have an exceedingly small but fully real effect (in that they increase 
the risk that vulnerable people suffer from climate change harms), rather than 
considering them to be morally insignificant (see also McKinnon 2012, 103). 
Second, displacement of responsibility for climate change occurs both with respect to 
reprehensible conduct and injurious effects. Regarding the latter, blaming some or all of 
global warming on natural cyclic climate changes, rather than on human activities, 
absolves those with consumptive lifestyles of responsibility for the rising temperatures 
 
                                                     
9 Another so-called mistake in moral mathematics is ignoring the effects of sets of acts: ‘even if an act harms no one, 
this act may be wrong because it is one of a set of acts that together harm other people’ (Parfit 1987, 70, emphasis 
in original). Against this argument, Jamieson (2014, 172) objects that in the climate change case, for virtually 
every emitter x there is a smaller group which does not include x such that it is true that if that group were to 
act differently then climate change would not occur, since climate change will occur whether or not x engages 
in greenhouse gas emitting activities. We do not have the space here to explore this discussion into more detail, 
but we will rather focus on the mistake of ignoring imperceptible effects, which is not considered by Jamieson. 
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(Bandura 2007, 19-20). However, as argued in section 5.3.2 above, the contribution of 
natural causes to climate change is insignificant, and scientific knowledge about human 
influence on the climate system is well-established.  
Displacement of responsibility with respect to one’s conduct entails that people are 
spared from self-condemnation if they are not (or do not perceive themselves to be) the 
actual agents of their actions (Bandura 1991, 81; 2002, 106). In the climate case, it has 
indeed been argued that agents are involved in complex social systems, where their 
choices are co- or pre-determined by the choices of others and choices of the past, which 
present them with certain kinds of infrastructure and cultural expectations regarding, 
for example, energy use (Gardiner 2011b, 46).  
To assess this claim, we should return to our discussion of individual agency in section 
5.2. In the current context of a fossil-fuel intensive economy, it cannot be denied that 
essentially all individuals are currently compelled to emit some level of greenhouse gases 
to fulfil their basic rights. To that extent, individual emitters cannot be identified as being 
morally responsible (Shue 2011, 309; Vanderheiden 2008, 72). However, even though 
contextual factors influence the range of an individual’s actions, the compulsion claim is 
unconvincing with respect to emissions resulting from their profligate consumption 
(such as wasteful energy consumption and the overconsumption of meat), because these 
are not essential for meeting one’s basic rights. These emissions are subject to choice of 
and control by individuals, so they can be held responsible for them (Caney 2009, 176; 
Vanderheiden 2008, 178).  
Citizens – rightfully – expect guidance of their national governments regarding 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions, and those governments as well as international 
institutions can be held responsible for their lack of ambition. Nonetheless, such a wait-
and-see attitude of citizens is another instance of moral disengagement through 
displacing responsibility: even in the absence of effective (trans)national policies to tackle 
climate change, emitters retain moral responsibility for the effects of the emissions that 
are a result of their profligate lifestyle.10 In addition, Klein considers ‘the idea that change 
is something that is handed down from above by our betters, rather than something we 
demand ourselves’ to be one of the greatest psychological barriers to climate action (Klein 
2014, 212). 
 
                                                     
10 Moreover, if an individual emitter wants to invoke the argument that it is the task of the government and 
supranational institutions to address climate change, he or she at the very least has the obligation to vote for 
parties that represent the most likely chance of success (Maltais 2013, 602). We will discuss this issue in more 
detail in chapter 6.  
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Clearly, climate change is a collective action problem, requiring structural responses 
by national governments and international institutions. However, this observation fails 
to convincingly exonerate individual emitters from moral responsibility for the harmful 
effects of the emissions resulting from their profligate energy and meat consumption.  
5.3.4 Mechanisms of moral disengagement related to victims 
An especially egregious strategy of moral disengagement is dehumanization. The strength 
of moral self-control depends on how wrongdoers regard the people they mistreat: 
through perceived similarity, the joys and suffering of those with whom one identifies 
are more vicariously arousing than those of strangers, out-group members or those 
divested of human qualities (Bandura 1991, 87-88; 2002, 108-109; Markowitz and Shariff 
2012, 245). Hence, while it is difficult to inflict suffering on humanized persons without 
risking self-condemnation, strangers can be more easily depersonalized or dehumanized, 
thereby disengaging self-condemnation that would inhibit harmful conduct.  
Markowitz and Shariff (2012, 244-245) argue that because of the spatial and temporal 
remoteness between the causes and effects of climate change, its victims are likely to be 
seen as less similar to oneself or as out-group members, and therefore as less deserving 
of moral standing. Such perceived remoteness indeed fosters the estrangement 
conducive to dehumanization: ‘it is easier to harm others when their suffering is not 
visible and when destructive actions are physically and temporally remote from their 
injurious effects’ (Bandura 2002, 108). 
In the following section, we will criticize the emphasis on the spatial and temporal 
remoteness of climate change’s effects more thoroughly, but here we should already like 
to mention that it obscures a much more morally salient fact, namely that climate change 
exacerbates the existing inequities between the global consumption elites and the global 
poor. We would call this the stratified remoteness between the sources and the impacts of 
climate change: whereas the rich have caused most of the problem, poor and 
marginalized people suffer more from climate-related harms – wherever and whenever 
they live – since they are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change and have less 
adaptive capacity (IPCC 2014a, 1066-1069; UNDP 2007, chapter 2). Unfortunately, since 
emitters with a profligate lifestyle identify themselves with other members of their elite 
rather than with their poor contemporaries (Jamieson 2010, 434), stratified remoteness also 
implies the kind of estrangement that fosters dehumanization. 
With respect to climate change, this strategy of moral disengagement is de facto at work 
in proposals for a positive social discount rate, which divests future people of their human 
qualities by ascribing less value to their rights or interests, the further they are into the 
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future (Caney 2009, 164-165). However, since neither location in space or time, nor 
membership of a socioeconomic class is a morally relevant feature, it is inappropriate to 
discriminate against persons on these bases (Caney 2009, 168-169). 
5.4 Moral disengagement and the motivational gap 
Our brief discussion in the previous section indicates that strategies of moral 
disengagement are abundantly used with respect to climate change. How does this 
observation contribute to explaining the inadequacy of current responses to climate 
change?  
The predominant explanation in the climate ethics literature maintains that our moral 
judgment system is not well equipped to identify climate change as an important moral 
imperative or morally intense issue (Jamieson 2006, 476-477; 2010, 436-437; Markowitz 
and Shariff 2012, 243). People do not tend to conceptualize climate change as an urgent 
moral problem because it is not accompanied by the characteristics of a paradigm moral 
problem: ‘climate change is not a matter of a clearly identifiable individual acting 
intentionally so as to inflict an identifiable harm on another identifiable individual, 
closely related in time and space’ (Jamieson 2010, 436-437). Jamieson (2010, 438; 2014, 168-
169) therefore concludes that viewing climate change as a problem of individual moral 
responsibility requires a revision of our everyday understandings of moral responsibility. 
Indeed, due to its inherent complexity – including the perceived social acceptability of 
greenhouse gas emitting activities, the remaining scientific uncertainties, and the 
collective action involved – the challenge climate change poses to our moral judgment 
system is undeniable. Nonetheless, these arguments should also be subjected to thorough 
critical scrutiny, since people have the ability to psychologically reconstruct a problem 
in order to reduce its moral intensity or urgency, on which the application of ethical 
standards importantly depends (Barsky 2011, 61).  
Consider for example an often-invoked argument to explain why climate change does 
not provoke strong moral intuitions, namely the spatial and temporal remoteness of the 
effects of one’s greenhouse gas emitting activities. The causes and effects of climate 
change are indeed dispersed in space and time, in the sense that greenhouse gases emitted 
from any geographical location affect the climate globally and into the future (Gardiner 
2006; Jamieson 2014, 102). Indeed, this is likely to reduce the moral intensity of climate 
change. Nonetheless, the emphasis in the literature on (and the general perception in the 
wider audience of) the remoteness of climate-related effects is deceitful, since concerns 
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about vulnerability do not only apply to people who live distant in space or time (Gardiner 
2011b, 45; Jamieson 2010, 439). Although future people will likely suffer most, climate 
change’s harmful impacts are already massively affecting human life today (Watts et al. 
2015, 1). The IPCC states that ‘on all continents and across major ocean regions, significant 
impacts have now been observed’ (IPCC 2014a, 1010, emphasis added). For example, in 2004, 
climate change was already responsible for 3% of diarrhoea, 3% of malaria and 3.8% of 
dengue fever deaths worldwide; and the total mortality attributable to climate change 
was about 141,000 deaths, of which 85% were child deaths (WHO 2009, 24, 50). Moreover, 
climate change not only affects people living in distant places, but also Western Europe 
and the US (EEA 2015, 9-10; Melillo et al. 2014). For example, the amount of precipitation 
falling in very heavy events from 1958 to 2012 has markedly increased in the US, inter alia 
by 71 per cent in the Northeast (Melillo et al. 2014, 37). 
Hence, although the dispersion of causes and effects of climate change contributes to 
its complexity, emphasis on the spatial and temporal remoteness of its harmful effects is a 
deceitful characterization of climate change. Invoking it to condone inaction does not 
provide a valid justification, yet rather amounts to moral disengagement. Whereas the 
complexity of moral problems has usually been studied as impeding the formation of a 
robust moral judgment, the extent to which the factors contributing to this complexity 
correspond to or facilitate mechanisms of moral disengagement should be acknowledged 
as well (Bandura 1991, 81-82).11 In fact, the inherent complexity of climate change 
precisely provides the necessary latitude for emitters to reconstruct the problem of 
climate change and the contribution of their profligate consumption to it (Gardiner 2006, 
408; 2011a, 46).  
The role of moral disengagement is to reduce dissonance or inconsistency between 
personal or societal moral standards and the pursuit of self-interested desires that would 
conflict with these standards (Bandura 2002, 102; Bersoff 1999, 28; Stoll-Kleemann et al. 
2001, 111). According to Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001, 112), the most important internal 
inconsistency with respect to climate change lies in the disjunction between the need to 
mitigate climate change and the personal preference for particular lifestyles or 
consumption habits: people might feel anxiety over climate change, but resent the 
changes in behaviour that are required to effectively mitigate climate change (such as 
using public transportation or reducing energy and meat consumption). The opportunity 
costs involved in shifting away from profligate lifestyles are perceived as daunting (Stoll-
 
                                                     
11 Gardiner (2011a, chapter 9) calls this the problem of moral corruption, which he illustrates by drawing parallels 
with the biased reasoning of the Dashwoods in Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility. Our analysis in the previous 
section clearly confirms Gardiner’s diagnosis, and we believe that the moral psychological literature on moral 
agency and moral disengagement provides an analytical framework for his intuitive parallels. 
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Kleemann et al. 2001, 107; Klein 2014, 212). Moral disengagement thus allows emitters to 
maintain a consumptive lifestyle and to emit greenhouse gases, without having to accept 
moral responsibility for the resulting climate-related harms.  
5.5 Tackling moral disengagement 
According Jamieson (2006, 476), what we need to address climate change is ‘a sense of 
ownership and identification with the outcomes that our actions produce. It is this sense 
of ownership and identification that allows us to overcome the alienation from the 
collective consequences of our actions’.12 The abundant and pervasive deployment of 
moral disengagement forms a formidable obstacle to successfully responding to climate 
change, because it is precisely such biased reasoning that enables the alienation from the 
consequences of one’s conduct. The question therefore remains as to how moral 
disengagement can be addressed. 
Three avenues for tackling moral disengagement arise from our analysis in the 
previous section. First, we can attempt to increase the moral urgency of climate change 
by enhancing people’s moral judgment of their contribution to the problem. Gardiner 
(2013, 132) argues that the lack of robust moral concepts to completely capture climate 
change does not imply that ‘we lack the ability to make any ethical judgements at all’. 
Even though our available moral concepts of harm and moral responsibility may 
ultimately be inadequate to fully capture the complexity of climate change, they 
nonetheless allow us to judge that it forms a strong moral imperative for action; the 
threat climate change poses and what (initially) should be done to tackle it are sufficiently 
clear. Defending a partial moral judgment (for example, by focusing on already observed 
climatic changes and on the fully real – albeit imperceptible – harmful effects of one’s 
individual emissions) reduces the opportunity for deploying strategies of moral 
disengagement, since ‘the less moral ambiguity there is surrounding a situation, the less 
latitude an agent has in negotiating reality in such a way as to provide justification for an 
unethical action’ (Bersoff 1999, 37). Communicators should incessantly continue to 
explain to individuals that they really do have agency in climate change, and create 
awareness about the behavioural changes individuals can undertake or the availability of 
 
                                                     
12 Jamieson (2006, 480-481; 2014, 185-193) argues that this requires nourishing and cultivating certain green 
virtues, including humility, temperance, mindfulness, cooperativeness, and respect for nature. We agree that virtue 
ethics might play an important role in tackling climate change, and Jamieson’s account provides a well-
developed overview of the most important virtues involved.  
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alternatives for greenhouse gas emitting activities (for example, related to energy and 
meat consumption). 
A second strategy is to encourage people to evaluate and reconsider their self-
interested motives that conflict with morality – in the case of climate change, the 
accumulation of wealth and the pursuit of a profligate lifestyle. Moreover, we could draw 
more attention to the intrinsic satisfaction provided by pro-environmental and pro-social 
behaviour, to the negative consequences of materialistic pursuits on physical and 
psychological well-being for individual agents themselves (including noise, pollution, 
stress, congestion and consumer anxiety), and to the non-material sources of life 
satisfaction (such as more time for leisure, personal contacts, political participation and 
social well-being) (Peeters et al. 2013; Brown & Kasser 2005, 350; De Young 2000, 515-516; 
Soper, 2007, 211, 221; 2008, 567-587). People who adjust their values and self-interested 
motives in this light may consume less wastefully, emit less greenhouse gases, and would 
not experience the need for resorting to moral disengagement in order to avoid moral 
responsibility for climate-related harms.  
These two initial strategies will already reduce the opportunity for moral 
disengagement and the need therefor. In addition, we submit that the propensity for moral 
disengagement itself should be tackled as well. However, in contrast to the vast body of 
research providing conceptual analysis and empirical evidence of moral disengagement, 
relatively little attention has been devoted to addressing the propensity to disengage 
moral self-sanctions from harmful conduct. We can thus only make some tentative 
suggestions. 
Most importantly, biased reasoning will facilitate a consumptive lifestyle (without 
having to accept moral responsibility for its consequences) only to the extent that the 
emitter believes that her reasoning is valid (Bersoff 1999, 37). This implies that increasing 
public knowledge about the facts regarding climate change, debunking false beliefs and 
invalidating biased reasoning can potentially reduce moral disengagement. For example, 
as we discussed in section 5.3.1 above, it has been argued that individual emitters should 
not be held responsible for the effects of their greenhouse gas activities, because these 
are presumed to be not at all unusual. Demonstrating that this reasoning is invalid could 
prevent appeal to it. Nonetheless, this should be done in a well-founded and respectful 
way, rather than by inducing feelings of guilt, which might backfire by provoking even 
further alienation through moral disengagement.  
In contrast, action on climate change should be linked to positive moral emotions, 
which might decrease defensive reaction and allow individuals to recognize tackling 
climate change in a rewarding rather than discouraging manner – for example by 
increasing feelings of competence and pride about rising to the challenge of reducing 
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one’s contribution to climate change (De Young 2000, 521-522; Markowitz & Shariff 2012, 
245; Williams & DeSteno 2008, 1007-1017). We should aim at increasing people’s perceived 
self-efficacy, since a strong sense of self-efficacy not only promotes pro-social and pro-
environmental behaviour, but also curtails the propensity to disengage moral self-
sanctions from harmful conduct (Bandura 1995; Bandura et al. 2001, 125; De Young 2000, 
521-522).  
Moreover, according to Gardiner (2011a, 301), ‘serious moral agents strive to protect 
themselves against rationalization, self-deception, and moral manipulation’. We would 
therefore submit that a better general understanding of moral psychology and the 
function of moral disengagement might render people less inclined to deploy such biased 
reasoning. People might be more self-critical and less prone to deploying moral 
disengagement if they are aware that it is a kind of (self-)deception. Moreover, for people 
who generally see themselves as moral and honest, moral disengagement might lose 
much of its attractiveness when contrasted with moral integrity – that is, reducing 
inconsistency between conduct and moral standards by changing one’s behaviour rather 
than the perception thereof.  
5.6 Concluding remarks 
Although the observed and expected impacts of climate change pose a significant threat 
to some key human rights of current as well as future people, current responses to it are 
manifestly inadequate. An important explanation for this refers to the inability of our 
moral framework to fully capture climate change. Although, due to its inherent 
complexity, climate change indeed poses a significant challenge to our moral judgment 
system, this explanation disregards people’s ability to psychologically reconstruct a 
problem in order to reduce its urgency or minimize perceptions of their own contribution 
to it. In fact, the complexity of climate change precisely provides the necessary latitude 
for emitters to deploy moral disengagement, which enables them to dissociate self-
condemnation from harmful conduct.  
In our view, an important challenge for climate ethics is to identify to which extent 
our conventional moral framework is indeed inadequate to capture complex moral 
problems such as climate change; and to which extent such arguments in fact correspond 
to or facilitate biased reasoning. As we have illustrated, virtually all of the mechanisms of 
moral disengagement are deployed in climate change: social and moral justification; 
advantageous comparison; euphemistic labelling; denial of consequences; minimizing 
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consequences; discrediting evidence of harm; diffusion of responsibility; displacement of 
responsibility; and dehumanization. These strategies allow emitters to pursue a 
consumptive lifestyle without having to accept moral responsibility for the harmful 
consequences of the emissions from their profligate consumption. 
We have tentatively suggested some strategies for tackling moral disengagement. In 
addition to enhancing people’s moral judgment of their contribution to climate change 
and encouraging them to reconsider their materialistic pursuits, the propensity for moral 
disengagement itself should be tackled. Although more research in this respect is needed, 
moral disengagement might be reduced through deconstructing biased reasoning in a 
well-founded and respectful way, linking action on climate change to positive moral 
emotions, and promoting a better general understanding of moral psychology and the 
function of moral disengagement.  
In this chapter we have discussed how strategies of moral disengagement can 
significantly contribute to the lack of motivation of individuals to tackle climate change. 
In the next chapter we will elaborate on two specific strategies of moral disengagement, 
namely the diffusion and displacement of responsibility. More specifically, we will 
examine how these mechanisms might contribute to feasibility problems at the 
institutional level. 
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Chapter 6 The delegated authority model 
misused as a strategy of disengagement in the case 
of climate change1 
6.1 Introduction 
Climate change represents one of the most serious and far-reaching challenges facing 
humankind in the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, the response to it is characterized 
by inaction at all levels. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the harmful 
effects of climate change are outrightly denied or blamed on natural processes, scientific 
uncertainties are overly emphasized, and evidence is discredited. Many claim either 
ignorance or that it is not their fault (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). Regarding their 
engagement in greenhouse gas emitting activities, emitters maintain that it makes no 
difference whether they do it or don’t and that any way, everybody does it (Gabor 1994).2 They 
also claim not to have any alternative because their economy is completely dependent on 
fossil fuels, or because the social and cultural context in which they are embedded 
imposes values and expectations that inescapably influence their choices and actions. 
Finally, many people believe that addressing climate change is exclusively the job of 
others – primarily the government and supranational institutions.  
In this chapter we will focus on this last argument, and evaluate to what extent it is 
legitimate. More specifically, we will assess the explanation for the ubiquitous inaction 
that refers to the delegated authority model (Gardiner 2011a). Although it remains largely 
implicit in political theory, this model underpins the legitimacy of political institutions 
 
                                                     
1 This chapter is based on the following article: De Smet, Andries, Wouter Peeters, and Sigrid Sterckx. (2016) 
“The delegated authority model misused as a strategy of disengagement in the case of climate change.” Ethics 
and Global Politics, 9. 
2 In his book, Gabor explores justifications and excuses ordinary people provide for their transgressions. 
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and their leaders, depending on their ability to solve problems that are difficult to address 
at the individual level. Since the institutions created to abate the significant threat 
climate change poses to basic human rights fail to do so, their legitimacy is seriously 
questionable. The only way they might still claim to be legitimate is by appealing to 
considerations of feasibility. If the implemented policy turns out to be the best one 
available under the current circumstances, the institutions would arguably be no longer 
blameworthy for the failure to provide a robust response to climate change. The question 
thus arises: how should we evaluate the options open to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the states that constitute this institution (the 
Parties to the UNFCCC), and the citizens of these states?  
More specifically, we will examine whether the failure to design a policy that respects 
basic human rights is due to unwillingness on the part of the political representatives or 
due to genuine unfeasibility. In answering this question, we will pay special attention to 
the input-side of the delegated authority model, referring to individuals who delegate 
their responsibilities to a collective level when those responsibilities are difficult to 
discharge at the individual level. However, we will argue that delegating responsibility to 
a collective level can only exonerate the individual if it is done in a consistent way; 
otherwise it is nothing more than blame-shifting or displacing responsibility. Hiding 
behind the delegated authority model should then be characterized as a mechanism of 
moral disengagement (see Bandura 1999, 193-209; Bandura et al. 1996, 364; Tsang 2002, 
25)3 through which people deny their individual responsibility in an unjustifiable way. 
We will attempt to settle this matter and explore how this affects our responsibility for 
tackling climate change.  
6.2 Human rights threatened by climate change 
Recent literature has drawn attention to the impact of climate change on human rights.4 
An important contribution has been provided by Simon Caney, who defines human rights 
as ‘minimum moral thresholds to which all individuals are entitled, simply by virtue of 
 
                                                     
3 For a comprehensive overview of the deployment of other strategies of moral disengagement in climate 
change, see Peeters et al. (2015). For a more concise overview, see chapter 5. 
4 A human rights approach to climate change faces some theoretical challenges. See, for example, Stephen 
Gardiner (2013). Nonetheless, without assuming that the human rights approach can provide a comprehensive 
account of climate change, we agree with Caney (2010, 83) that the minimalist normative position on the basis 
of some fundamental rights can enjoy ecumenical support from a variety of different ethical perspectives. 
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their humanity, and which override all other moral values’ (Caney 2010, 73). He focuses 
on three key rights: the right to life; the right to health; and the right to subsistence. 
Employing a modest and minimal conception of human rights, Caney (2009; 2010) 
demonstrates that anthropogenic climate change violates these rights. 
In 2008, expressing concern about the threat climate change poses to the enjoyment 
of human rights, the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted Resolution 7/23 
on Human rights and climate change, requesting the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to prepare a study on the relationship between 
climate change and human rights (UNHRC 2008; OHCHR 2014). The report submitted by 
the OHCHR (2009) was presented and discussed at the tenth session of the UN Human 
Rights Council on 15 January 2009. Subsequently, the HRC (2009) adopted Resolution 10/4 
on Human Rights and Climate Change, noting that:  
Climate change-related impacts have a range of implications, both direct and 
indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights, including, inter alia, the right 
to life, the right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health, the right to adequate housing, the right to self-determination and human 
rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation.5  
The OHCHR report describes the influence of climate change on several human rights 
codified in the International Bill of Human Rights – consisting of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966a), and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966b) – as well as other 
relevant UN treaties and conventions. Arguably, the OHCHR report interprets the human 
rights at issue in a broader way than Caney’s minimal conception. To strengthen our 
argument, we will adopt his minimalist normative position. We will justify our position 
in the fourth section; here we will start by elaborating Caney’s account. 
First, Caney (2009, 230-31; 2010, 76-78) mentions the right to life. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966a, article 6.1) states that ‘every human being has 
the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life’. Caney employs a minimal conception of this right as a merely negative 
right, not making the more contentious claim that persons have a positive right to have 
their life protected against all kinds of threats. Even using this minimal conception, a 
number of the observed and projected impacts of climate change will pose a substantial 
 
                                                     
5 While resolutions and reports of the HRC are important policy guidance documents, they do not establish 
binding treaty interpretations or obligations. On the role and functioning of the HRC, see Olivier De Schutter 
(2010, 855-896).  
 140 
threat to the right to life. Climate change will result in an increase of the frequency and 
intensity of extreme weather events such as storms, heat waves, and floods. Since these 
disasters already have devastating effects on mortality, their increased frequency and 
intensity will jeopardize many people’s enjoyment of the right to life, particularly in the 
developing world.6 Climate change poses a significant threat to human security in 
general, but of specific relevance here is the observation that some of the factors that 
increase the risk of violent conflict are sensitive to climate change, and also to policy 
responses (IPCC 2014, 771-775). 
Second, climate change will have a detrimental impact on the effective enjoyment of 
the right to health. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966b, 
article 12) recognizes ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health’.7 The full realization of such a right requires inter 
alia provisions for the reduction of infant mortality, the improvement of environmental 
and industrial hygiene, the prevention and treatment of diseases, and the assurance of 
medical service and attention in the event of sickness. The wording in the report of the 
OHCHR indeed implies a broad interpretation of the right to health. In contrast, Caney’s 
minimal account affirms only a negative right ‘that other people do not act so as to create 
serious threats to their health’, since he considers the conception of the right to health 
as mentioned in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (aspiring 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health) as maximalist and 
therefore open to objections by critics (OHCHR 2009, paragraph 31; Caney 2010, 78). 
Nonetheless, both accounts agree that human-induced climate change clearly results 
in a variety of different threats to the right to health, affecting millions of people, especially 
those with a low adaptive capacity (OHCHR 2009, paragraphs 32-34; Caney 2010, 78-80). 
The IPCC distinguishes three basic pathways by which climate change affects health (IPCC 
2014, 716-717). First, the increases in the frequency of extreme weather will not only raise 
mortality (as mentioned above), but also directly impact human health in general. 
Second, there are effects mediated through natural systems. Temperature, precipitation 
and humidity have a strong influence on the spread and transmission of vector-borne 
diseases (such as malaria and dengue fever), water- and food-borne diseases (such as 
cholera and other diarrhoeal diseases), and allergic diseases (IPCC 2014, 722-730; Costello 
et al. 2009, 1702-1708; McMichael & Lindgren 2011, 407-408). The health impacts of 
climate change encompass shifts in the patterns, spread and transmission of these 
 
                                                     
6 See Costello et al. (2009, 1702-1708); McMichael and Lindgren (2011, 406-7); IPCC (2014, 720-722).  
7 The right to health is also indirectly implicated by The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘everyone has the 
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family’ (UN 1948,  article 
25.1. 
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diseases. Finally, some health impacts that are heavily mediated through human 
institutions include nutrition and water insecurity, occupational health concerns (such 
as heat strain and heat stroke), mental health problems (in terms of increasing stress as 
a result of harsher weather conditions), and compounded health risks as a consequence 
of increased human movement, social disruptions and conflict (resulting inter alia in the 
spread of infectious diseases and malnutrition) (McMichael & Lindgren 2011, 409-410; 
IPCC 2014, 730-733, 766-770, 771-775). 
The third human right under consideration is the right to subsistence. According to 
Caney’s minimal conception, ‘all persons have a human right that other people do not act 
so as to deprive them of the means of subsistence’ (Caney 2009, 232; 2010, 80-82). Climate 
change will compound existing food insecurity, particularly threatening smallholder and 
subsistence farmers (Costello et al. 2009, 1704-1705; McMichael & Lindgren 2011, 408; 
UNDP 2007, 27). Although impacts will occur unevenly, overall, higher temperatures and 
changes in precipitation will reduce both the quantity and quality of global food yields, 
result in shifts of fish populations, affect livestock, and possibly lead to food-price shocks. 
The IPCC concludes with high confidence that “climate change will have a substantial 
negative impact on (i) per capita calorie availability, (ii) childhood undernutrition, 
particularly stunting and (iii) on undernutrition-related child deaths and DALYs 
disability-adjusted life years in developing countries” (IPCC 2014, 731). Moreover, 
climate change will exacerbate water insecurity in many regions, an insecurity which 
already impairs hygiene, reduces farm yields, increases infectious diseases, and can 
become a source of conflict. Not only changing temperatures and precipitation patterns, 
but also changing run-off patterns, glacial shrinkage and increasing floods and droughts 
will substantially compromise flows of water for irrigation and human consumption. 
In addition to these three fundamental rights, climate change will also impact the 
effective enjoyment of other human rights.8 Nonetheless, we will base our argumentation 
on the minimalist list of key rights threatened by climate change, namely the right to life, 
the right to health, and the right to subsistence, understood as negative rights. 
 
                                                     
8 For a discussion of these additional rights, see Peeters et al. (2015). 
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6.3 The delegated authority model 
The characterization of anthropogenic climate change as a violation of the basic human 
rights to life, subsistence, and health is gaining wide recognition. This is reflected in the 
adoption of Resolution 10/4 on Human Rights and Climate Change by the HRC in 2009. The 
seriousness of this characterization should heighten the urgency of tackling climate 
change. However, as this task appears to be overwhelming for individuals to perform, 
people tend to look at the institutional level for solutions. This idea is at the core of the 
delegated authority model, which underpins the legitimacy of political institutions and their 
leaders, depending on their ability to solve problems that are difficult to address at the 
individual level. It has remained largely implicit in political theory, but Stephen Gardiner 
(2011a, 53) makes the model explicit:  
According to a long tradition in political theory, political institutions and their 
leaders are said to be legitimate because, and to the extent that, citizens delegate 
their own responsibilities and powers to them. The basic idea is that political 
authorities act in the name of the citizens in order to solve problems that either 
cannot be addressed, or else would be poorly handled at the individual level, and 
that this is what, most fundamentally, justifies both their existence and their 
specific form.  
In the case of climate change, the delegation of responsibilities has failed to be 
successful. According to Gardiner (2011a, 53-54), responsibility for this failure most 
directly falls on recent political leaders and current institutions, especially since they 
have assumed the mantle of responsibility and have acted as if they were capable of 
discharging this role (for example, by making speeches, promising progress, and 
organizing frequent meetings under the UNFCCC). Hence, since they have failed to 
discharge the responsibilities delegated to them, they can legitimately be morally 
criticized for this failure.  
In the next section we will examine whether this issue really is as straightforward as it 
is often depicted. More specifically, we will question whether the failure to implement a 
robust policy to tackle climate change necessarily implies that the relevant institution 
loses its legitimacy. 
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6.4 The legitimacy of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane point out that consent of democratic states is in 
itself not sufficient to make a global institution legitimate. Moreover, given the diversity 
of moral standpoints, an institution can be legitimate without being fully just. They 
propose three ‘substantive criteria’ that institutions should meet in order to be 
legitimate: minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit and institutional integrity 
(Buchanan & Keohane 2006, 419). We will explain these criteria and assess to what extent 
the UNFCCC can be said to meet them, although this is not a straightforward exercise.  
The first criterion Buchanan and Keohane propose is ‘minimal moral acceptability’. To 
be worthy of our support, an institution must not persist in committing serious 
injustices.9 Although the UNFCCC is not committing these injustices directly, it 
nonetheless fails to prevent the violation of the basic human rights at issue. Therefore, 
the legitimacy of the UNFCCC can already be challenged on the basis of this first criterion. 
Thanks to ethicists such as Simon Caney and Derek Bell (2011), as well as the report of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights cited in the second 
section above, the characterization of climate change as a violation of basic human rights 
is gaining wide recognition. Moreover, at the Conference of Parties in Cancun in 2010, it 
was acknowledged that climate change is a major threat to human rights that needs to be 
urgently addressed by all parties (UNFCCC 2010, Preamble). However, this has not 
resulted in a strong and binding policy to avoid such massive violations of human rights 
by mitigation and/or adaptation. As we have discussed in the second section, climate 
change already jeopardizes the human rights to life, health, and subsistence, and this 
situation is likely to exacerbate. Thus, even if we only take the normatively minimalist 
position that a limited list of basic human rights should at least be respected, the current 
global governance institution performs poorly. By violating the duty to respect basic 
human rights, the UNFCCC and its member states do not meet the criterion of minimal 
moral acceptability, implying that its legitimacy has been dealt a sharp blow.  
 
                                                     
9 Since reasonable disagreement seems to exist about what exactly justice entails, we adopt a minimalist 
normative position, namely respect for the fundamental human rights to life, to subsistence, and to health, as 
discussed in the second section above (and in chapter 2). We agree with Buchanan and Keohane that this is a 
minimal requirement for legitimacy, but postulating more demanding moral requirements of justice in terms 
of a more extensive set of rights might be hard to justify in view of the current disagreement about justice. See 
Buchanan and Keohane (2006, 419-422) and Valentini (2013, 100). 
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The second criterion for the legitimacy of global governance institutions is ‘comparative 
benefit’ (Buchanan & Keohane 2006, 422). This is a relatively straightforward condition 
and in line with the delegated authority model. The justification for having global 
governance institutions is primarily instrumental: the basic reason for individuals and 
states to support these institutions is that they provide benefits that cannot otherwise be 
obtained. If an institution cannot effectively provide these benefits, then this failure 
undermines its claim to the right to rule. We would have reasons to question whether 
those in charge of the institution are genuinely committed to providing the expected 
benefits that were invoked to justify the creation of the institution.  
It is clear that the UNFCCC, in its current form, is not optimally respecting human 
rights. Hence, the UNFCCC and its Parties do not appear to deliver the envisioned benefits, 
the provision of which is the basic rationale for their justification. This not only raises 
doubts about the level of commitment of the actors involved, but also threatens the 
legitimacy of the UNFCCC.  
However, Keohane and Buchanan emphasize that we should understand benefit here 
as comparative, which means that ‘[t]he legitimacy of an institution is called into question 
if there is an institutional alternative, providing significantly greater benefits, that is 
feasible, accessible without excessive transition costs, and meets the minimal moral 
acceptability criterion’ (Ibid.). To settle this matter, much more needs to be said on the 
concept of ‘feasibility’. We will postpone this discussion to the following section. 
The third criterion that Keohane and Buchanan propose is ‘institutional integrity’ (Ibid., 
422-24). This criterion refers to the extent to which the actual performance of an 
institution and its self-proclaimed goals align. If there is a large disparity between them, 
we have reason to question the legitimacy of the institution. If an institution does not 
meet this criterion, its representatives can be considered ‘either untrustworthy or grossly 
incompetent’.  
The UNFCCC defines ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system’ as its ‘ultimate objective’ (UNFCCC 1992, article 2). Since global carbon emissions 
have rapidly increased in the past two decades, and continue to rise, it is clear that the 
UNFCCC falls short on its main objective. This would support the conclusion that the 
agents involved in this institution are untrustworthy or incompetent and, hence, that the 
UNFCCC does not meet the criterion of institutional integrity. However, in our view, the 
problem is not that delegates are not concerned about global warming, but rather that 
they have conflicting commitments. On the one hand, they have special obligations 
towards their compatriots. On the other hand, they have general obligations towards 
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humanity at large. They need to find a balance between (perceived) national interests and 
general interests on a global scale, as we will explain below.  
What should we conclude from this brief evaluation? Does its failure to meet one of the 
criteria immediately imply that the UNFCCC is illegitimate as a global governance 
institution? Buchanan and Keohane (2006, 424) refer to John Rawls (1971) to 
conceptualize their three substantive criteria as ‘counting principles’: ‘the more of them 
an institution satisfies, and the higher the degree to which it satisfies them, the stronger 
its claim to legitimacy’. The results of our evaluation of the UNFCCC do not look 
promising: the UNFCCC clearly fails the first criterion (minimal moral acceptability), and 
it scores rather poorly on the second criterion (comparative benefit). Furthermore, it 
does not seem to meet the third criterion (institutional integrity), although we have 
conceded that this might be due to the conflicting commitments of delegates, rather than 
to their untrustworthiness or incompetence. However, Buchanan and Keohane also argue 
that it would be excessive to claim that their criteria are necessary conditions, because 
there might be extraordinary circumstances in which an institution would fail to satisfy 
one or two of them, yet still reasonably be regarded as legitimate. The only way to save 
the legitimacy of the UNFCCC would be to prove that the current arrangement really is 
the best feasible option. If there is no feasible institutional alternative and the non-
institutional alternative would make things even worse, the UNFCCC could still claim to 
be legitimate, even if inadequate.10 We will now examine whether there are valid reasons 
to underpin this claim. 
6.5 The feasibility of an institutional alternative 
We will start this section by elaborating ‘International Paretianism’, a principle defended 
by Eric Posner and David Weisbach (2010; 2012). In their view, a climate treaty, in order 
to be feasible, should not make any of the participating states worse off: 
Any treaty must satisfy what we shall call the principle of International 
Paretianism: all states must believe themselves better off by their lights as a result 
of the climate treaty. International Paretianism is not an ethical principle but a 
pragmatic constraint: in the state system, treaties are not possible unless they have 
 
                                                     
10 Given that the UNFCCC does not meet the criterion of minimal moral acceptability and the fact that its 
institutional integrity is questionable, it can only remain legitimate if no better alternative is feasible. 
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the consent of all states, and states only enter treaties that serve their interests. 
(Posner & Weisbach 2010, 6, footnote omitted)  
Posner and Weisbach (2012, 3) emphasize that International Paretianism is not an 
ethical principle, but rather a feasibility constraint: ‘It is a device to discipline our 
thinking to ensure that our recommendations can actually be implemented’. According 
to them, the failure of the climate negotiations is caused by focusing too much on 
ethically appealing but infeasible proposals. Although acknowledging that exactly 
determining feasibility is challenging, they propose to use International Paretianism as 
the standard. With respect to the climate negotiations, this means that a treaty must be 
designed so that all states consider themselves better off than in the status quo (Ibid., 3-
7). This condition does not preclude a climate treaty, since unabated climate change will 
worsen the status quo for most (if not all) states. It does, however, preclude a treaty that 
makes certain states ‘net losers’, for example if they would have to pay more than they 
gain by mitigating climate change.  
On this basis, Posner and Weisbach argue that a treaty is only feasible if it serves the 
interests of the high emitting states. If not, these powerful states will not comply, which 
will substantially undermine the efficacy of the treaty.11 However, Caney rightly points 
out that infeasibility should be distinguished from unwillingness. Showing that a 
proposed obligation is impossible, is indeed relevant, but saying that certain agents are 
unlikely to comply, is not a compelling argument to support such a conclusion:  
The emitter cannot say (to borrow Posner and Weisbach’s words) that “[f]easibility 
rules out” signing this treaty. He cannot because it is not true: it is quite possible 
for him to do this. He, therefore, cannot appeal to the infeasibility of committing 
himself to Pareto-inferior policies because it is not infeasible for him to reduce his 
 
                                                     
11 Martino Traxler is also concerned with pragmatic constraints, but offers an alternative proposal. He claims 
that states can be motivated to comply with a treaty, if they consider it to be fair. He therefore argues that we 
should ignore past emissions and instead focus on equalizing the burdens involved in tackling climate change. 
These equally burdensome shares can be determined by looking at the relevant opportunity costs. Although 
this criterion might imply that the developed countries have much more demanding obligations than the 
developing countries, Traxler believes that it would keep them from defecting from doing their fair share. He 
thinks that his proposal would put ‘the most moral pressure possible on each nation to do its part’ (Traxler 2002, 
129). However, this proposal has been criticized by Stephen Gardiner and Darrel Moellendorf with arguments 
similar to those used by Caney to criticize International Paretianism. See Moellendorf (2009) and Gardiner 
(2004). 
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emissions. Infeasibility here is not a bar. It should be called what is it, namely 
“unwillingness.” (Caney 2014, 130, footnote omitted) 
Posner and Weisbach might argue that it is impossible for elected representatives to 
adopt a strong climate policy, because they would be voted out of office if they would do 
so. According to some climate ethics commentators,12 citizens of developed countries are 
unlikely to urge their politicians to negotiate robust climate policy, since they are likely 
to be unwilling to bear the economic costs involved and averse to the curtailment of their 
material freedoms this is likely to entail. In general, politicians therefore believe that they 
could be punished if they implement strong measures. If this is true, they would (at least) 
partly be justified in thinking that they should defend national economic interests, 
instead of an adequate climate policy.13 As their electorate gives them the impression that 
they will be punished for implementing an ambitious mitigation plan, this no longer 
counts as a feasible option. Caney admits that this argument has some plausibility, but 
thinks it is not convincing. He argues that members of a political community as a whole 
can adopt a stronger climate policy, which refutes the infeasibility-claim (Caney 2014, 
131). If both the elected representatives and the electorate would fulfil their respective 
responsibilities, emissions could be significantly reduced. 
We agree with Caney that a stronger climate policy is in principle feasible for a political 
community as a whole. However, this does not necessarily entail that it is feasible from 
the perspective of the elected representatives under the current circumstances. Caney 
rightly notes that considerations of feasibility always need to be examined from the point 
of view of specific agents. We would argue that adopting a stronger climate policy might 
in fact be infeasible from the perspective of political representatives and that this 
infeasibility cannot be reduced to mere unwillingness. Political representatives seem 
justified in claiming that there is more at stake since they have reason to think that they 
are at risk of being voted out of office.  
In contrast to the dominant binary conceptualization of feasibility (holding that an 
action is either feasible or infeasible), Holly Lawford-Smith (2013, 245) has developed the 
concept of ‘scalar feasibility’ as ‘a tool for ranking alternative theories along one of the 
dimensions relevant to making decisions about what to actually do’. We agree that this 
provides a more nuanced approach to evaluate the options available to the political 
 
                                                     
12 See, for example, Jamieson (2011, 29) and Compston & Bailey (2012, 7). 
13 Recent empirical research (Bernauer & Gampfer 2015) suggests that public support for unilateral policies to 
tackle climate change is strong. However, this support is not (yet) reflected in widespread political support for 
politicians and parties that make this issue a priority. Until this condition is met, we believe politicians are (at 
least partly) justified in thinking they will be electorally punished if they implement strong and costly measures. 
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representatives under the UNFCCC. In contrast to the binary understanding, a scalar 
conceptualization of feasibility is better suited to accommodate options that depend on 
the behaviour of others: 
Ending global poverty and achieving global carbon neutrality are both possible. But 
we don’t want to say these things are feasible, because we don’t want to count all 
merely possible actions as available in the relevant sense, and we certainly don’t 
want to ignore the importance of collective action problems for infeasibility. The 
full solution to the problem, I think, comes from insisting on agent-relativity in 
feasibility assessments. By that I mean that it is very important that we distinguish 
the agent whose option set we’re interested in from all the other agents upon whose 
actions the outcome might depend. (Lawford-Smith 2013, 250-251, footnote 
omitted) 
Important to note in this context is that Lawford-Smith assumes that the agents 
involved at least try to produce the relevant outcome, primarily because she does not 
want to let agents off the moral hook too easily. There are, however, certain ‘soft 
constraints’ that can limit the feasibility of a proposal. She considers the three most 
obvious kinds of soft constraints to be economic, institutional, and cultural constraints. 
We would submit that the entrenched way in which the UNFCCC currently functions, 
represents an institutional soft constraint for the political representatives. The signing 
members of the Conference of the Parties, the decision-making body of the UNFCCC, are 
professional politicians in their respective states. Consequently, they have to justify their 
decisions to their national electorate, which substantially undermines their innovative 
or game-changing power, at least as things currently stand. They are incentivized to give 
disproportionate priority to their national (short-term, economic) interests, at the 
expense of vulnerable people elsewhere.14 This does not make the adoption of a strong 
 
                                                     
14 In some developing countries, especially Bolivia and the small island states (AOSIS), the electorate has in fact 
granted their politicians a strong mandate to tackle climate change: since these countries are the most 
vulnerable to climate change, a robust policy clearly is in their national interest. Rather than addressing our 
argument to the citizens of these countries, we focus our attention on the citizens of the developed countries. 
Not only do these countries have the highest per capita emissions, they also have a disproportionate influence 
on the outcome of the negotiations in the UNFCCC. Part of the problem has to do with the procedural rules of 
the UNFCCC, more specifically the crucial role of consensus decision-making. This rule of procedure gives every 
country the ability to block an agreement, even if the vast majority would benefit from this agreement 
(Bodansky & Diringer 2014, 5). Majority voting could break this crippling deadlock, but seems unlikely given the 
current political background. On the limits of consensus decision-making and the possible implementation of 
majority voting in the UNFCCC, see Vogel (2014, 14), Kemp (2014) and the next chapter. 
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climate policy infeasible in the binary sense, but it clearly makes it less feasible in the 
scalar sense (Lawford-Smith 2013, 254-255).  
Can these considerations regarding feasibility save the legitimacy of the UNFCCC? The 
answer is no. Given the institutional framework in which the elected delegates are 
embedded, we can arguably grant them that they are ‘trying’. However, Buchanan and 
Keohane’s conditions of minimal moral acceptability and institutional integrity remain 
unfulfilled, which means that the UNFCCC can only be legitimate if it is the best available 
option (i.e. if it meets the second criterion). Caney convincingly argued that this is not 
the case, as members of a political community as a whole (both politicians and electors) 
are indeed able to adopt a stronger climate policy. The introduction of the concept of 
scalar feasibility does not change this conclusion. It does, however, indicate that 
individual electors are to an important extent responsible for the illegitimacy of the 
UNFCCC. In the last section we will examine how these conclusions affect the 
responsibility of individual agents in tackling climate change. 
6.6 How to deal with the illegitimacy of the UNFCCC on the 
individual level? 
The delegation of responsibilities to tackle climate change from the individual to the 
collective level has obviously not led to success. However, in contrast to the general 
perception, we concluded the previous section by acknowledging that this failure should 
not in the first place be ascribed to the elected delegates. To a certain extent, their claim 
that a stronger climate policy is not feasible is justified, since their electors fail to give 
them a strong mandate to strive for a robust climate policy. Caney (2014, 131) rightly 
points out that ‘both elected and electors have responsibilities’. The failure of the 
electorate to discharge its shared political responsibility severely limits the availability 
of feasible options for their political representatives to defend a robust agreement to 
tackle climate change. The implications of this failed delegation of responsibility for the 
responsibility of individual agents are twofold.  
6.6.1 No more hiding behind the delegated authority argument  
Most people believe that climate change can best be addressed by governments and 
supranational institutions – since individual actions lack efficacy. Indeed, Gifford (2011, 
293) mentions that ‘because climate change is a global problem, many individuals believe 
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they can do nothing about it as individuals’. This rationale underpins the delegation of 
responsibility to the collective level.15 The validity of this delegation-strategy, however, 
depends on the way in which we actually perform this delegation. We would submit that 
the delegation of responsibility has failed in the case of climate change, because the input-
side of the model has not fulfilled its part. Most citizens of developed countries do not 
urge their politicians to negotiate a robust climate policy, but rather vote in ways that 
give them the impression that they could be punished if they implement strong measures. 
Politicians thus are (at least partly) justified in thinking that they should defend national 
economic interests, instead of an adequate climate policy. As responsibility is not 
delegated to the collective level in a consistent way, most citizens of developed, high 
emitting countries can no longer invoke this model of political legitimacy as an excuse 
for the general inaction regarding climate change.  
Hiding behind the delegated authority model should therefore be characterized as a 
mechanism of moral disengagement.16 As explained in the previous chapter, this concept 
refers to the psychological mechanisms that people widely use to reconstruct a problem 
in order to evade their individual responsibility in an unjustifiable way. This tendency for 
moral disengagement is well known in moral psychology, and should be understood in 
the broader context of moral agency. According to Albert Bandura (et al.) moral conduct 
is motivated and regulated by the on-going exercise of self-reactive influence. This self-
regulatory system operates through self-monitoring, judgmental, and self-reactive 
subfunctions:  
In this self-regulatory process, people monitor their conduct and the conditions 
under which it occurs, judge it in relation to their moral standards and perceived 
circumstances, and regulate their actions by the consequences they apply to 
themselves. They do things that give them satisfaction and build their sense of self-
worth. They refrain from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards, 
because such conduct will bring self-condemnation. (Bandura 1999, 193-194).17  
However, people sometimes do behave in ways that violate their moral standards. 
Since this results in a state of dissonance which is psychologically uncomfortable, people 
are naturally inclined to try to reduce or eliminate this inconsistency (Festinger 1957, 18). 
An important method to achieve this goal is to convince oneself and others that one’s 
reprehensible conduct still falls within moral standards through changing the perception of 
 
                                                     
15 See also Sinnott-Armstrong (2005); Jamieson (2007, 160-183); Gardiner (2011); Johnson (2003, 271-287); Cripps 
(2013, 148). 
16 For a discussion of moral disengagement in relation to climate change, see Peeters et al. (2015).  
17 See also Bandura (1991, 68; 2002, 102) and Bandura et al. (1996, 364). 
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one’s actions and reconstructing the situation so as to reduce its moral intensity (Barsky 2011, 62; 
Gabor 1994, 177; Sykes & Matza 1957, 666; Tsang 2002, 25-26, 37). In this way, moral 
disengagement enables individuals to engage in unethical behaviour without facing 
moral self-condemnation. It resolves the inconsistency between one’s moral standards 
and self-interested conduct by articulating reasons why the reprehensible conduct is a 
justifiable or excusable exception to the general normative rules (Ashforth & Anand 2003, 
16). 
Specifically in the context of climate change, Gardiner has analysed this propensity of 
people to psychologically reconstruct (the perception of) their reprehensible behaviour 
in terms of moral corruption, which involves the shirking of one’s responsibilities and off-
loading them onto others (especially future people, the poor, and nature) through 
deceptive arguments, and thus subverts our understanding of the issue at stake.18 We 
would argue that two such deceptive arguments or strategies of moral disengagement are 
specifically deployed in the attempt to deny individual responsibility under a delegated 
authority model, namely displacement and diffusion of responsibility (Bandura 1991, 81; 
2002, 106; 2007, 19).  
The underlying idea of displacement of responsibility is that people do not feel personally 
responsible if they are not (or do not perceive themselves to be) the actual agents of their 
actions. Climate change is a collective action problem, for which ‘institutions are the well-
known solution’ (Neuteleers 2010). Indeed, large-scale collective action problems cannot 
be solved by the isolated actions of even large numbers of individual persons (Shue 1988; 
Cripps 2013; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). In contrast, collective institutions have a great 
capacity to take measures regarding regulation, enforcement and coordination of climate 
action, and investment in renewable energy. There seems to be a widespread belief that 
national governments and supranational institutions (such as the UNFCCC) are the only 
causally efficacious actors.19 In general, people therefore also appear to blame this 
collective level for its failure to address climate change, and (implicitly or explicitly) hold 
their own obligations to be fulfilled with the delegation of responsibility. In this way, they 
invoke the delegated authority argument to exonerate themselves from blame for the 
violations of basic human rights we mentioned above. However, we would argue that they 
could only be exonerated if they grant their political representatives a mandate that is 
robust enough to effectively tackle climate change. If they fail to indicate that they attach 
great importance to the implementation of a strong climate policy, they are responsible 
for the failed delegation of responsibilities to tackle climate change and can no longer 
hide behind the delegated authority model. We would argue that this condition is not met 
 
                                                     
18 See Gardiner (2011b, chapter 9). 
19 Peeters et al. (2015, 33).  
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and that we should urgently recognize that the delegated authority model is being 
misused to facilitate moral disengagement and to evade responsibility for the violation of 
basic human rights entailed by climate change.  
The second relevant strategy of moral disengagement is diffusion of responsibility, 
through which people aim to exonerate themselves from responsibility by emphasizing 
division of labour, group decision-making and collective action. Under a delegated 
authority model, people might invoke the argument that their individual vote does not 
suffice to give a strong mandate to their political representatives in order to diffuse their 
share of responsibility for the current inaction. However, by invoking the argument that 
their vote does not make any difference at all, people commit a mistake in moral 
mathematics, namely ignoring small chances (Parfit 1984, 73-75). The possible benefit (that 
is, mandating political representatives to insist on a robust climate policy) is arguably so 
large that it outweighs the small cost of voting, even on the infinitesimal chance that an 
individual vote might make a difference.  
Conversely, it can be maintained that the chance of making a difference is too small to 
outweigh the cost of voting, even if the possible benefit is enormous. In each case, 
however, it is inaccurate to assume that an individual vote does not make any difference 
at all, since each individual vote increases the political support for robust climate change 
policies and encourages politicians to take such leadership risks. Although this benefit 
might be minute, we agree with Cripps (2013, 148) that promotional actions (such as 
voting for and supporting parties that explicitly advocate robust policy measures to 
tackle climate change) ‘can still contribute to a stockpile of impetus for collective change’. 
Therefore, rather than convincingly exonerating people from responsibility, the deceitful 
reference to the delegation of responsibility corresponds to moral disengagement 
through diffusion of responsibility.  
Since the delegated authority model is being misused to facilitate moral 
disengagement (through both displacement and diffusion of responsibility), we are no 
longer justified to shift the blame for the failure to effectively tackle climate change onto 
our representatives and the institution they constitute, and we can no longer deny that 
we, as individuals, bear an important responsibility. 
6.6.2 Take responsibility, both politically and individually 
How, then, should we understand this responsibility? Gardiner has argued that the 
political representatives can legitimately be morally criticized for their failure to 
discharge the responsibilities delegated to them. Above we explained why we believe this 
statement should be qualified to some extent. We claim that it might arguably be 
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infeasible for our representatives to implement a stronger policy to tackle climate 
change, but only because we as the electorate do not fulfil our responsibilities – we fail to 
give them a strong mandate to insist on robust climate action. We agree with Gardiner’s 
conclusion that the failed delegation of responsibilities does not let individual citizens off 
the hook: 
If the attempt to delegate effectively has failed, then the responsibility falls back on 
the citizens again, either to solve the problems themselves or, if this is not possible, 
to create new institutions to do the job.20 If they fail to do so, then they are subject 
to moral criticism, for having failed to discharge their original responsibilities. 
(Gardiner 2011a, 54) 
With regard to the first part of this conclusion, we would submit that there are indeed 
good reasons to question whether we should exclusively look at the collective level to 
tackle climate change – not only because the responsibility falls back on the citizens when 
the delegation has failed, but also because ‘what states do must be carried out ultimately 
by individuals’ (Lichtenberg 2014, 9). Moreover, the potential effect of action undertaken 
by individuals and households to reduce their emissions should not be disregarded. 
Vandenbergh et al., for example, have identified low-hanging fruits: seven actions which, 
together, can provide a reasonable chance of reducing annual individual and household 
emissions by seven per cent within five years. Gardner and Stern have composed a short 
list, consisting of nine immediate, low-cost actions regarding transportation and living by 
which individuals and households in the US can reduce their total direct energy 
consumption by one-quarter (which would amount to 10 per cent of total national 
greenhouse gas emissions in the USA). Dietz et al. have specified a behavioural wedge: some 
effective, nonregulatory behaviourally oriented policies and interventions can reduce 
emissions in the household sector by approximately 20 per cent within 10 years. The IPCC 
 
                                                     
20 Gardiner is skeptical regarding the potential functioning of the UNFCCC (see Gardiner 2014). He argues that 
the current institutions are not designed, and therefore ill-equipped, to promote intergenerational concerns 
(the ‘tyranny of the contemporary’). He claims (Ibid., 308) that the UNFCCC has “so far proven inadequate to the 
task, largely because of the dominance of national institutions and their familiar—short-term and economic—
concerns”. Therefore, we need a global constitutional convention to overcome this “institutional gap” with 
respect to future generations. We agree with Gardiner that his proposal would boost intergenerational 
concerns. However, rather than concluding that there is an inherent defect in the UNFCCC that makes its failure 
inevitable, we believe that citizens should first and foremost acknowledge their political responsibility in 
determining policies. The UNFCCC and the constituting states might be able to tackle climate change, yet the 
possibilities at hand should be used responsibly. As long as the responsibility at the input-side of the delegated 
authority model is not fulfilled, it is premature to conclude that the UNFCCC cannot be effective in tackling 
climate change. 
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similarly identifies a whole range of everyday activities in which behavioural change 
could result in a high energy saving and greenhouse gas emissions reduction.21  
It cannot be denied, however, that states (in principle) have a great capacity to tackle 
climate change, and that collective agreements will be necessary in order to outline 
climate action, and to take measures that cannot be taken by individuals (inter alia, 
regulation and enforcement, coordination, investment in renewable energy, and 
reduction of fossil fuel subsidies). For this reason, we are not (yet) prepared to give up on 
the delegated authority model. According to Gardiner, if the delegation has failed and 
individuals are incapable of solving the problem themselves, they should create new 
institutions – or, we would add, reform existing institutions – to tackle climate change. In 
our view, acknowledging the political responsibility of individual citizens in determining 
the policies pursued by the existing institutions is a precondition for this. Climate change 
can be tackled by the UNFCCC and the constituting states, yet we need to make 
responsible use of the possibilities at hand.  
This means that we need to make it clear to our political representatives that we attach 
great importance to the effective tackling of climate change. We need to grant our 
representatives a more robust mandate to take the necessary actions, even if these are 
harmful for our national economic interests. We thus have to disassociate ourselves from 
the ‘dominant view’ that ‘those involved in the creation and revision of international 
laws, treaties, agreements, or conventions or of intergovernmental agencies and 
organizations are morally permitted (and perhaps even required) robustly to advance the 
interests of their home country in such negotiations’ (Pogge 2013, 298). In this way, 
Thomas Pogge convincingly advocates a cosmopolitan stance, whereby the design of 
global institutional arrangements is guided by the needs and interests of all human 
beings, weighted equally. As we have argued above, the UNFCCC does not currently meet 
this condition.  
If we fail to grant our representatives a robust mandate to tackle climate change, we, 
as citizens, are responsible for the resulting illegitimacy of the UNFCCC. Moreover, and 
morally even more problematic, we also become complicit in the resulting violations of 
basic human rights: 
 
                                                     
21 See Vandenbergh, Barkenbus & Gilligan (2008, 1720); Gardner & Stern (2008, 20-21); Thomas Dietz et al. (2009, 
18452-18456); IPCC (2014, 686-687, especially table 9.2). Although we agree with Cripps’s defense of duties and 
actions to promote collective action, we believe her dismissal of unilateral individual duties to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions is too quick. See Cripps (2013). For an extensive defense of unilateral duties to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions on the basis of individual agency, see Peeters et al. (2015). 
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A citizen giving in to this temptation – disposed for instance to present herself as 
less likely to vote for the current government if it worked toward global human 
rights fulfillment at some expense to domestic economic interests – should then 
judge herself […] to be implicated in, and co-responsible for, her government’s 
human rights violating negotiating successes. (Pogge 2013, 311) 
Although it remains difficult to establish what exactly one (politically) has to do in 
order not to be complicit, we believe that the minimal moral obligation citizens have 
under the delegated authority model is to vote for parties that explicitly advocate robust 
policy measures to tackle climate change, since this way of voting signals a willingness to 
accept the costs of a strong climate policy (Maltais 2013, 602). On the one hand, it can be 
objected that this obligation is insufficient and that individual citizens have more 
substantial political obligations to combat climate change. For example, it can be argued 
that they have an obligation to ceaselessly protest against the current policy of the 
UNFCCC and its constituting states, and to work for more robust green political 
movements. We would argue that citizens at least have the obligation to vote for parties 
that explicitly advocate robust policy measures to tackle climate change and that this 
obligation can be compatible with other, more substantial political obligations.22  
On the other hand, some commentators might argue that such an obligation is too 
intrusive. Aaron Maltais (2013, 604, footnote omitted) counters this objection as follows: 
[…] it should first be made clear that I am not suggesting that individuals can 
justifiably be coerced to vote a certain way. Rather, the claim is that in order to 
demonstrate sufficient concern for the interests of those who will be harmed by 
global warming one at the very least has a moral obligation to vote green. This claim 
does not challenge each individual’s democratic and legal right to vote as they see 
fit. What it does challenge is the idea that how one votes has some special 
exemption from moral assessment.  
 
                                                     
22 See Caney (2014, 125-149). Caney discusses six kinds of action that agents can perform: enforcement, 
incentivization, enablement, creating norms, undermining resistance, and civil disobedience.  
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Especially if we want to invoke the argument that it is the task of national governments 
and supranational institutions to address climate change, we at the very least have the 
obligation to vote for parties that represent the most likely chance of success.23  
6.7 Concluding remarks 
Anthropogenic climate change can clearly be characterized as a violation of at least the 
basic human rights to life, subsistence, and health, even when these are interpreted in a 
minimal (negative) way. This characterization should increase the urgency of tackling 
climate change, but this task appears to be overwhelming for individuals to perform. 
People therefore tend to look at the institutional level for solutions, which is the 
underlying rationale for the delegated authority model. This model indeed seems to justify 
the general idea that addressing climate change is primarily the job of governments and 
supranational institutions. In this chapter we examined the legitimacy of this argument.  
We first examined whether the failure to implement an adequate policy to tackle 
climate change necessarily implies that the relevant institution (the UNFCCC and its 
Parties) loses its legitimacy. To answer this question, we relied on the theoretical 
framework developed by Buchanan and Keohane. Since the UNFCCC has not been able to 
agree on implementing a robust climate policy, it violates the duty to respect basic human 
rights, and thus clearly fails the criterion of minimal moral acceptability. Moreover, 
although we have conceded that this might be due to the conflicting commitments of 
delegates rather than to their untrustworthiness or incompetence, the UNFCCC does not 
seem to meet the criterion of institutional integrity for it clearly falls short on its main 
objective (namely, to prevent dangerous climate change). Hence the only way the 
legitimacy of the UNFCCC could be saved, is by proving that the current arrangement 
really is the best feasible option.  
In this regard, we argued that political representatives might indeed claim that a 
stronger policy is infeasible from their perspective. The political community as a whole, 
however, cannot, because the illegitimacy of the UNFCCC is caused by our failure to fulfil 
our responsibility at the input-side of the delegated authority model, rather than being 
 
                                                     
23 As we mentioned above, individuals also have an individual responsibility to reduce their greenhouse gases 
(see also Peeters et al. 2015). Discussing this responsibility into more detail falls outside the scope of this chapter, 
since our focus here is on the legitimacy of the delegated authority argument. 
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primarily due to the elected representatives. Since we fail to delegate our responsibility 
to the collective level in a consistent way, we can no longer invoke the delegated 
authority argument as an excuse. In order to make a convincing claim that it is the task 
of the government and supranational institutions to address climate change, we at the 
very least have the obligation to vote for parties that explicitly advocate robust policies 
to tackle climate change. If we fail to fulfil this minimalist task, invoking the delegation 
of responsibilities is tantamount to moral disengagement, namely through diffusion and 
displacement of responsibility. If we do not vote for parties that are most likely to make a 
difference, we can no longer hide behind the delegated authority argument and should 
accept our complicity in the massive violations of basic human rights caused by the 
failure to successfully tackle climate change. 
We have concluded this chapter by discussing what the failed delegation of 
responsibility in this context might imply for our responsibility as individual agents. In 
the next chapter, we will broaden our scope and examine how this situation could be 
remedied at the level of individual voters, politicians, and institutional reforms. 
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Chapter 7 Adjudicating conflicts between justice 
and democracy: The climate change challenge1 
7.1 Introduction: The relationship between democracy and 
justice 
In this chapter we will focus our attention on the relationship between democracy and 
justice. Keith Dowding, Robert Goodin and Carole Pateman distinguish three different 
ways of viewing this relationship (Dowding, Goodin, & Pateman 2004, 13-14). On the first 
view, the concept of democracy and the concept of justice rule over separate spheres, 
which are hermeneutically isolated from one another. As a consequence, the possibility 
of conflicts between them is automatically obviated (2004, 13). On the second view, 
democracy and justice are conceptualized as ‘different sides of the same coin’ (2004, 14): 
either both values imply each other, or there is an underlying value that implies both of 
them. Again, genuine conflicts between democracy and justice are impossible, or they can 
be solved by referring to the underlying value. On the third view, however,  
 ‘democracy’ and ‘justice’ are genuinely distinct and genuinely competing values 
that might both be in play simultaneously. In any given case they might pull in 
different directions; and when they do, there is no straightforward way to 
adjudicate the conflict by reference to any underlying value that underwrites them 
both. (Dowding et al. 2004, 14) 
In this chapter we will develop arguments for the third view, i.e. that the possibility of 
genuine conflicts between justice and democracy is real. In our view, the case of climate 
change (and the democratic efforts to tackle it) provides a clear illustration of such a 
 
                                                     
1 This chapter is based on the following article: De Smet, Andries, and Sigrid Sterckx. “Adjudicating conflicts 
between justice and democracy: The climate change challenge” (under review). 
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conflict. In what follows, we will examine how possible conflicts between democracy and 
justice should be solved. In order to be able to do this, we first need to indicate in more 
detail how we conceive of both democracy and justice. 
7.1.1 Democracy 
We need to clarify what we mean by ‘democracy’ and how we justify it against alternative 
options, as well as trying to identify the limits to its authority. As our starting point we 
will take Tom Christiano’s (2015, section 1) broad definition of democracy as ‘a method of 
group decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an 
essential stage of the collective decision making’. This definition can accommodate 
different political arrangements, ranging from direct participation and majority rule to a 
representative democracy with consensus rule, and many others. In the following 
sections we will discuss how these different democratic arrangements can influence the 
relationship between democracy and justice and what this implies for the possibility of 
conflicts between them. The democratic arrangements that are designed to tackle climate 
change will be the context for this exercise. 
Regarding the justification of democracy, Christiano (2015, section 2) distinguishes 
between a consequentialist defence and an intrinsic defence. The former compares the 
outcomes of a democratic procedure with those of alternative procedures such as a 
monarchy or an aristocracy. The intrinsic defence of democracy refers to specific 
qualities that are inherent to the democratic method. In this account, democracy is 
commonly said to give expression to the ideas of liberty and equality in a way that endows 
it with intrinsic value, independent of its outcomes.  
We do not wish to deny that democracy can have intrinsic value. However, we follow 
Richard Arneson (2003, 122) when he argues that:  
what renders the democratic form of government for a nation morally legitimate 
(when it is) is that its operation over time produces better consequences for people 
than any feasible alternative mode of governance. 
Arneson acknowledges that many types of evidence support the conclusion that 
democracy has the best overall result, but he emphasizes that this judgment is contingent. 
In other words, ‘[D]emocracy is extrinsically not intrinsically just’ (Arneson 2004, 41). This 
is why Arneson believes we should view democracy as a tool or instrument that should 
be valued for its results, not for its own sake (2004, 42). Yet this immediately raises the 
question as to which standard should be used to evaluate these results. 
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This question gives rise to further questions, for example regarding the limits to the 
authority of democracy. Do citizens have an obligation to obey democratic decisions, 
irrespective of their content? Is the fact that some rule is democratically decided upon 
enough to endow it with an overriding normative force? These questions lie at the core 
of the debate on the nature of the relationship between democracy and justice. 
In general, people are thought to have an obligation to obey the state, if that state has 
political authority. The political authority of democracy can be defended in different 
ways.2 Here, we will discuss potential moral limits to this authority. Christiano (2015, 
section 5.3) distinguishes between internal and external limits: 
An internal limit to democratic authority is a limit that arises from the 
requirements of democratic process or a limit that arises from the principles that 
underpin democracy. An external limit on the authority of democracy is a limit that 
arises from principles that are independent of the values or requirements of 
democracy. 
Internal limits thus function as safeguards for the democratic process. They are in place 
to ensure that the political rights of citizens are protected against democratic threats. An 
example of such internal limits are constitutional laws designed to protect minorities. A 
related problem is the existence of persistent minorities (Christiano 2015) or persistent 
losers (Dahl 1956). These are people who are always at the losing end of democratic 
decisions, due to the use of majority rule. Keith Dowding (2004, 36) summarizes this 
problem as follows: 
The problem is not simply that some people do not get the government they want, 
but rather that minorities do not get what they want on issues which are of 
importance to them but to which the majority is relatively indifferent. 
This situation seems undesirable, but is it sufficient to limit democratic rule? How can 
we decide in which cases people are justified in claiming that their preferences are 
neglected in an unjustifiable way? Dowding (2004, 39) points out that we can only settle 
this matter by referring to a theory of justice. Here we enter the domain of the external 
limits to the political authority of democracy. 
 
                                                     
2 For a discussion of political authority, see Christiano (2013). Exploring this issue in detail falls outside the scope 
of this chapter. 
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As mentioned earlier, external limits are limits to democratic authority that arise from 
values independent of democracy, such as justice. How we should decide when a 
consideration of justice should outweigh a consideration of democracy, however, is highly 
controversial. It is generally assumed that considerations of justice should be promoted 
in a democratic way. Conflicts of value should ideally be solved through democratic 
procedures. However, there are external limits to the political authority of democracy: 
‘when decisions made in a democracy are felt to be too unjust then, in the name of justice, 
that democratic decision may be challenged undemocratically’ (Dowding et al. 2004, 24). 
In the following section, we will sketch an account that indicates when a democratic 
decision should be characterized as too unjust. More specifically, we will argue for a 
specific external limit to the political authority of democracy and identify particular 
conditions under which democratic decisions should be overruled by considerations of 
justice.  
7.1.2 Justice 
Deciding when a democratic decision should be overruled by considerations of justice is 
no easy task and should be handled with extreme caution. People hold divergent beliefs 
about what constitutes the good life. They disagree about the ideal structure of society 
and what exactly constitutes justice. Ideally, these differences are accommodated 
through democratic procedures. However, a number of questions arise. For example, does 
every view deserve (equal) respect? Can every disagreement be said to be reasonable? In 
this section we will make some observations on these issues, taking the recent work of 
Laura Valentini as our starting point. 
Valentini has developed an argument based on the notions of equal respect and 
reasonable disagreement.3 She starts by claiming that duties of justice, unlike duties of 
friendship or duties of charity, generate ‘rightfully enforceable entitlements’ (Valentini 
2013, 94). This means that these entitlements may be enforced without wrongdoing, even if 
people are not sufficiently motivated to comply. Since this is a defining feature of duties 
of justice, we should not decide lightly which duties are to be considered duties of justice. 
To settle this matter, Valentini advocates a specific conception of ‘public reason’: 
In other words, the demands of justice must be determined through “public reason,” 
corresponding to the area of overlap between different reasonable interpretations 
of equal respect. When it comes to establishing enforceable entitlements, we can 
therefore only assume the moral imperative to protect a set of fundamental rights. 
 
                                                     
3 See also chapter 2. 
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Beyond this threshold, equal respect itself prevents us from unilaterally 
establishing the conditions under which our social arrangements count as just or 
unjust. (Valentini 2013, 100) 
Important here is the way in which Valentini understands public reason. She 
distinguishes between public reason positively understood, i.e. what is de facto endorsed by 
the world at large, and public reason normatively understood, i.e. what anyone committed 
to equal respect ought to endorse (Valentini 2013, 102). This distinction clearly 
corresponds to the area of tension between democracy and justice. 
Valentini (2013, 100) concludes that justice demands respect for fundamental rights.4 
We agree with her that more demanding conceptions of global justice are difficult to 
justify, given the reasonable disagreement that exists. Important to note is that the duty 
at issue is a duty to respect fundamental rights, not to promote them. The interpretation of 
fundamental rights as negative rights makes this a normatively minimalist position, which 
is widely acceptable. In order to increase its acceptability even more, we will further slim 
down this account, by restricting which rights should always be respected.  
Simon Caney has elaborated a minimal conception of human rights.5 He defines human 
rights as ‘minimum moral thresholds to which all individuals are entitled, simply by 
virtue of their humanity, and which override all other moral values’ (Caney 2010, 165). 
According to Caney, everyone is entitled to three key rights: the right to life, the right to 
health, and the right to subsistence. He (2010, 166) explicitly mentions that, in order to 
strengthen his argument, he uses the least contentious and most modest formulation of 
each of these rights, and that this position can be ‘adopted from within a wide variety of 
different conceptions of the good and ethical worldviews’ (Caney 2010, 169). 
In the remainder of this chapter, we will use this minimalist position as our theory of 
justice. Like Valentini, we argue that equal respect and reasonable disagreement require 
respect for basic human rights, yet nothing more. Consequently, we believe that the 
violation of such rights counts as an external limit to the political authority of democracy. 
The violation of basic human rights can never be justified by referring to the democratic 
nature of the underlying decision-making process. In cases like that, we would submit 
 
                                                     
4 In addition to this outcome component, Valentini also argues for a procedural component, establishing a set of 
fair procedures to determine what justice might demand beyond respect for fundamental rights (2013, 103). 
5 He has also examined the implications of this account with regard to climate change. See section 6.2. We will 
discuss this further in section 7.2. 
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that it is perfectly justified to overrule democratic decisions by considerations of justice.6 
In the next section, we will apply this theoretical framework to the case of climate change.  
7.2 Case study: The climate change challenge 
In this section we will first explain why we think the way in which climate change is 
currently handled is an excellent illustration of the tension that may exist between 
democracy and justice. Next, we will examine how this tension is caused in general, and 
subsequently we will focus on the specific functioning of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the institution at the heart of the conflict. 
7.2.1 The problem of persistent losers 
In the previous section we outlined our minimalist theory of justice, arguing that 
respecting basic human rights is a necessary precondition for a just world. We mentioned 
Simon Caney and his focus on three key rights: the right to life; the right to health; and 
the right to subsistence. The question then arises whether climate change indeed has a 
negative impact on these basic human rights. 
Already occurring and future predicted impacts of climate change on human life 
include increased mortality (related, for example, to the increased frequency and 
magnitude of extreme weather events), food and water insecurity, the spread and 
exacerbation of diseases, conflicts resulting from resource scarcity, and increased 
migration (see, for example, Costello et al. 2009; IPCC 2014; McMichael & Lindgren 2011). 
In this way, climate change jeopardizes the fundamental human rights of current as well 
as future people, including their rights to life, health, and subsistence (Bell 2011, 100-102; 
Caney 2010; OHCHR 2009). Even when employing a modest and minimal conception of 
human rights, anthropogenic climate change clearly violates these rights, as ethicists like 
Caney and Bell have convincingly argued. This poses a serious problem for the political 
authority of the relevant democratic institutions.  
Moreover, there seems to be a second problem that aggravates this situation. In the 
context of climate change, we are faced with the problem of persistent minorities or 
 
                                                     
6 This position is less extreme than it might seem at first glance. Consider for example the international realm, 
where human rights violations are often invoked to justify humanitarian interventions. 
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persistent losers. The same group of people always seems to be at the losing end of the 
democratic decisions. Although the rich can be said to have caused most of the problem, 
poor and marginalized people suffer more from climate-related harms, wherever and 
whenever they live, since they are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change and 
have less adaptive capacity (IPCC 2014, 803-810, 1066-1069; UNDP 2007, chapter 2). We 
fully acknowledge that developed countries already face and increasingly will face 
adverse effects of climate change, yet our focus here is primarily on developing countries. 
In developing countries more people will be negatively affected by climate change and 
they will have fewer resources to adapt to these impacts. Effectively tackling climate 
change is thus even more important from their point of view. However, until now, their 
interests have never been sufficiently protected in the decision-making processes. They 
do not get what they want on issues which are of particular importance to them, because 
the other countries are relatively indifferent to these issues. As mentioned in the previous 
section, this is exactly how Keith Dowding (2004, 36) summarizes the problem of 
persistent losers. 
7.2.2 The failure of democracy? 
How, then, could this situation come about? How is it possible that the basic human rights 
of particular groups of people are continuously violated under (arguably) democratic 
political institutions? Two complementary explanations seem to be at play in causing this 
enduring injustice. The first explanation refers to the fact that ‘existing political 
institutions focus unduly on the short-term and fail to give adequate protection to 
people’s long-term interests’ (Caney forthcoming, 3). In this context, Caney mentions the 
book The Blunders of our Governments by Anthony King and Ivor Crewe (2014, 356-359; 395), 
in which it is claimed that the lack of accountability for the future impacts of their policies 
makes politicians short-sighted, often with disastrous results. Politicians indeed seem to 
focus too much on the next election and to neglect the long term impacts of their policies. 
Caney (forthcoming, 3) labels this ‘harmful short-termism’, referring to an unjustified 
failure to safeguard long-term interests. A similar point is made by David Shearman and 
Joseph Wayne Smith (2007), who argue that liberal democracy as such is ill-suited to 
provide sustainable solutions. They believe that liberal democracy is flawed because it 
leads to the tragedy of the commons (2007, 11). Shearman and Smith also explain this 
harmful situation by pointing to the fact that politicians lack accountability for the future 
impacts of their policies. Since politicians think (with good reason) that they will be 
rewarded or punished based on their record regarding economic growth, rather than for 
their efforts to avoid future negative effects of climate change, their incentive is 
problematic. Shearman and Smith’s grim conclusion therefore is that: ‘[D]emocracy leads 
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to social decay because politicians, with some exceptions, are short-term caretakers and 
career seekers, and they are only focused on the next election’ (2007, 85). 
We need not endorse their strong conclusion to acknowledge the fact that democratic 
institutions are not very successful in tackling climate change. Besides the harmful short-
termism we just discussed, there is another, complementary, explanation for this failure. 
This second explanation points to another problem of accountability. Politicians do not 
only lack accountability for the future adverse effects of their policies, but also for the 
adverse effects their policies have on current people who do not belong to their respective 
constituencies. Both factors seem to cripple the effective functioning of the UNFCCC, as 
we will discuss in the following section. 
7.2.3 The failure of the UNFCCC 
The UNFCCC is the global governance institution designed to tackle climate change. It 
defines “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” as its 
‘ultimate objective’ (UN 1992, Article 2). Until now, this institution has not been very 
successful, given the enduring violations of basic human rights that are caused by climate 
change. In this section we will try to explain this failure. 
A first important problem has to do with the democratic nature of the decision-making 
process within the UNFCCC. More specifically, the requirement that all decisions within 
the UNFCCC should be made by consensus ‘could give a small number of countries the 
ability to block an agreement from which the vast majority would benefit’ (Bodansky & 
Diringer 2014, 5) In fact, consensus decision making comes down to giving every party a 
veto, for: ‘In consensus decision making the objecting party can simply maintain a veto 
until its demands are met’ (Kemp 2014, 4). It is clear that this procedure can result in a 
group of persistent losers, even if they do not represent a minority. Requiring consensus 
could in principle protect minorities, but only if all parties are equally committed to 
finding an agreement. The failure to conclude a strong treaty clearly indicates that this 
condition is not met. We will come back to this issue later. 
Even if this procedural problem could be solved, the problems of accountability 
mentioned above would still remain. The signing members of the Conference of the 
Parties, the decision-making body of the UNFCCC, are professional politicians in their 
respective states. Consequently, they have to justify their decisions to their national 
electorate, which substantially undermines their innovative or game-changing power, at 
least as things currently stand. They are incentivized to give disproportionate priority to 
their national (short-term, economic) interests, at the expense of vulnerable people 
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elsewhere. The problem is not that delegates are not concerned about global warming, 
but rather that they have conflicting commitments. On the one hand, they have special 
obligations towards their compatriots. On the other hand, they have general obligations 
towards humanity at large. They need to find a balance between (perceived) national 
interests and general interests on a global scale. Moreover, politicians also lack 
accountability towards future people, which results in the harmful short-termism Caney 
mentioned. As a consequence, the violation of basic human rights caused by climate 
change endures. This harmful situation can never be justified by referring to the 
democratic nature of the underlying decision-making process. 
7.2.4 Conclusion regarding the case study 
We have applied a minimalist theory of justice to the case of climate change. We can 
conclude that climate change is indeed responsible for the violation of basic human 
rights, which poses a serious problem for the political authority of the relevant 
democratic institutions. Moreover, we have argued that the authority of these 
institutions faces even more pressure, because there is a group of persistent losers who 
never get what they want on issues that are of particular importance to them (for 
example the protection of their human rights). We examined how this tension between 
democracy and justice can be explained and, in this regard, we have highlighted two 
problems of accountability. As politicians lack accountability for the future impacts of 
their policies, they have a tendency for harmful short-termism. Second, they also lack 
accountability for the adverse effects their policies have on current people that do not 
belong to their respective constituencies, which contributes to the failure to agree on a 
strong policy to tackle climate change. The UNFCCC, designed to put a robust policy in 
place, even faces a further problem, due to its procedural rules. Its requirement of 
consensus decision making cripples its effective functioning and aggravates the problem 
of persistent losers. 
Together, these different explanations clearly indicate why democratic institutions in 
general, and the UNFCCC in particular, fail to implement a strong policy to tackle climate 
change. The tension between democracy and justice really becomes tangible in the 
context of climate change. Could our understanding of this tension and its causes guide 
us in our efforts to solve it? 
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7.3  How to solve the conflict between democracy and 
justice? 
In this section we will discuss different solutions for the conflict between democracy and 
justice that exists in the context of climate change. We will propose three possible 
strategies for ‘making democracy just’ (Goodin 2004, 107), namely ‘role reminders’, 
institutional reform, and the role of litigation and courts. 
7.3.1 Role reminders and the internalization of just reasons 
Robert Goodin (2004, 107) describes the task of making democracy just as follows: ‘to 
ensure that democracy takes account of all right (justice-relevant) reasons, and only right 
(justice-relevant) reasons, and does so in the right (just) way’ (emphasis added). 
Therefore, it is essential that people internalize justice-relevant reasons, and only those 
reasons. Goodin (2004, 109) argues that this should be done through ‘motivational 
prompts’, encouraging democratic agents to attach more importance to justice-relevant 
reasons than they might otherwise do. In order to achieve this, he proposes the 
mechanism of ‘role reminders’: 
I do not aim to ‘change’ people, exactly. I merely aim to ‘remind’ people, when 
acting politically in their public capacities, that they are acting in their public 
capacities. By situationally sensitizing them to the roles in which they are acting, 
such ‘role reminders’ might help to draw political actors’ attention to the 
performances (obligations and expectations) that are appropriate to that role. 
(Goodin 2004, 110) 
The idea behind these role reminders is that people will focus more on the common 
good and less on their self-interested preferences, when fulfilling a political role such as 
voting. Goodin acknowledges that achieving this is a complex challenge, but not an 
impossible one. Our focus here will not be on the different ways in which altruistic 
political action could be encouraged. Instead, we will discuss what such political action 
should entail, or, put differently, which obligations we have in our role as citizens. We will 
argue that we have the stringent obligation to demand from our politicians that they do 
what is necessary to end the violation of basic human rights caused by climate change. 
This means that we must hold them accountable for the future impacts of their policies, 
as well as for the impacts of their policies on people who do not belong to their respective 
constituencies. We have a political obligation to demand from our politicians that they 
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stop their harmful short-termism and end the problem of persistent losers in the case of 
climate change as soon as possible. 
In other words, we need to make it clear to our political representatives that we attach 
great importance to the effective tackling of climate change.7 We need to grant them a 
more robust mandate to take the necessary actions, even if these are harmful to our 
(perceived) national economic interests. We thus have to disassociate ourselves from the 
‘dominant view’ that ‘those involved in the creation and revision of international laws, 
treaties, agreements, or conventions or of intergovernmental agencies and organizations 
are morally permitted (and perhaps even required) robustly to advance the interests of 
their home country in such negotiations’ (Pogge 2013, 298). Thomas Pogge convincingly 
advocates a cosmopolitan stance, whereby the design of global institutional 
arrangements is guided by the needs and interests of all human beings, weighted equally. 
If we fail to grant our representatives a robust mandate to tackle climate change, we, as 
citizens, become complicit in the resulting violations of basic human rights: 
A citizen giving in to this temptation – disposed for instance to present herself as 
less likely to vote for the current government if it worked toward global human 
rights fulfillment at some expense to domestic economic interests – should then 
judge herself […] to be implicated in, and co-responsible for, her government’s 
human rights violating negotiating successes. (Pogge 2013, 311) 
It is difficult to establish what exactly we (politically) have to do in order not to be 
complicit in this way. Do we have an obligation to ceaselessly protest against the current 
policy of the UNFCCC and its constituting states? Should we start our own political 
movement or party? We believe that the minimal moral obligation we have is to vote for 
parties that explicitly advocate robust policy measures to tackle climate change, since 
this way of voting signals a willingness to accept the costs of a strong climate policy 
(Maltais 2013, 602). Some commentators might argue that such an obligation is too 
intrusive. However, Maltais counters this objection as follows: 
[…] it should first be made clear that I am not suggesting that individuals can 
justifiably be coerced to vote a certain way. Rather, the claim is that in order to 
demonstrate sufficient concern for the interests of those who will be harmed by 
global warming one at the very least has a moral obligation to vote green. This claim 
does not challenge each individual’s democratic and legal right to vote as they see 
 
                                                     
7 See also section 6.6.2.  
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fit. What it does challenge is the idea that how one votes has some special 
exemption from moral assessment. (Maltais 2013, 604, footnote omitted) 
In this way, role reminders can motivate us to fulfil our political obligation as voters. 
Yet the further question arises as to what this mechanism might imply for the obligations 
of our political representatives. More specifically, what do they need to do when we, as 
citizens, fail to fulfil our task? If the citizens they represent vote for a policy that is unjust, 
politicians need to strike a balance between justice and democracy. The fact that 
representatives are only accountable to their own electorate for giving priority to their 
interests and rights, makes it even more plausible that they will prioritize democratic 
demands over considerations of justice.  
However, this situation will sometimes be unjustified. In section 1 we have argued that 
the violation of basic human rights can never be justified by referring to the democratic 
nature of the underlying decision-making process. This violation should count as an 
external limit to the political authority of democracy. Consequently, it can sometimes be 
perfectly justified to overrule democratic decisions by considerations of justice. 
Moreover, this might be a characterizing feature of duties of justice. Laura Valentini 
claims that duties of justice, unlike duties of friendship or duties of charity, generate 
‘rightfully enforceable entitlements’ (Valentini 2013, 94). This means that these 
entitlements may be enforced without wrongdoing, even if people are not sufficiently 
motivated to comply. As this is a defining feature of duties of justice, we should not decide 
lightly which duties are to be considered as duties of justice. We have explained earlier 
why, in view of reasonable disagreement and equal respect, only respect for basic rights 
can be required. If we would extend the range of duties of justice, we would be imposing 
our conception of the good on others in an unjustifiable way. 
However, when basic human rights are being violated, politicians can be permitted to 
overrule democratic concerns in order to end this situation. Moreover, politicians thus 
not only have permission to give priority to justice instead of democracy, they can be 
obliged to do so. Reminding politicians of this special obligation that is generated by their 
public role might lead them onto the right track. 
Although politicians might be perfectly justified (and even have an obligation) to 
enforce duties of justice, the current political situation makes this very unlikely. Since 
the signing members of the Conference of the Parties (i.e. the decision-making body of 
the UNFCCC) are professional politicians in their respective states, their focus on getting 
re-elected is perfectly understandable. Hence, under the current political circumstances, 
a solution to the conflict between justice and democracy will have to come from the 
voting citizens. We could, however, also try to change the political framework. 
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7.3.2  Institutional reforms 
If Goodin’s mechanism of ‘role reminders’ would be effective, it would provide an elegant 
solution for the conflict between justice and democracy. If voters and politicians would 
clearly think through which obligations are associated with their respective roles, the 
persisting injustice resulting from climate change could be alleviated within the current 
political structures. Through the way they vote, citizens could hold their politicians 
accountable for the future impacts of their policies, as well as for the impacts of their 
policies on people who do not belong to their constituencies. Politicians could implement 
strong policies to tackle climate change, even if this is not demanded by their electorate. 
However, as things currently stand, this scenario is not very likely. Given the economic 
and financial crisis, voters tend to emphasize the importance of their national economic 
interests even more, and politicians are likely to follow. We will therefore discuss some 
proposed reforms at the institutional level that might offer a way out of the current 
gridlock. 
7.3.2.1 The international level 
First we will discuss a possible change at the international level, namely within the 
functioning of the UNFCCC. We already mentioned that its procedural rules are conducive 
to its failure (see section 7.2.3). Here we will explain this further and discuss a possible 
solution.  
The failure of the UNFCCC to achieve a strong agreement to tackle climate change can 
to a large extent be explained by its use of consensus decision making. In fact, by 
requiring that all decisions within the UNFCCC be made by consensus, the UNFCCC 
sacrifices effectiveness in favour of legitimacy (Biermann & Gupta 2011; Schroeder, 
Boykoff & Spiers 2012). In this context, Luke Kemp refers to the ‘Law of the Least 
Ambitious Program’ (Hovi & Sprinz 2006, 28). This is the tendency for unanimous decision 
making to produce ‘‘lowest-common denominator’ outcomes and serving the interests of 
the least ambitious party’ (Kemp 2014, 4). Indeed, under consensus decision making, 
every country has a de facto veto to block an agreement, hence this scenario is not hard 
to imagine. Kemp therefore argues for majority voting as an alternative that could avoid 
this rather perverse effect. Moreover, he believes that voting is a better consensus-
builder than consensus decision making itself: 
Voting often acts as a deterrent to blocking, a kind of ‘nuclear threat’ that 
encourages compromise. […] Voting switches the emphasis away from minority 
blockers and gives greater leverage to the majority. The threat of a vote often forces 
the least ambitious to become more accommodating. (Kemp 2014, 4) 
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More specifically, Kemp argues that majority voting could result in a semi-global 
approach to international climate policy. The idea is that by bypassing less ambitious 
countries like the United States, more progressive outcomes could be reached by a semi-
global, critical mass of countries. In this way, majority voting could prove both more 
efficient and more effective than the current consensus decision making.  
What, then, are the chances of majority voting being adopted into the UNFCCC? Kemp 
discusses two possible ways in which this might happen, namely amending the 
Convention itself or by adopting the rules of procedure (Kemp 2014, 7). Amending the 
Convention would give rise to tremendous legal difficulties, due to the requirement of 
ratification (Kemp 2014, 7-8). Adopting the rules of procedure does not need ratification, 
yet it does require consensus agreement. Kemp believes this second strategy can be 
successful, but acknowledges that this is ‘largely contingent upon underlying political 
and institutional dynamics’ (Kemp 2014, 9). We agree with Kemp on the latter point, but 
we have serious reservations about the feasibility of this option. We believe that the 
historical record of the UNFCCC and its path dependency do not give cause for optimism. 
Kemp, however, argues that this failure might be a necessary intermediate step on the 
way towards success: ‘The most important factor in breaking path dependency in the 
UNFCCC is crisis. Political failures have a catalysing effect upon the negotiations’ (Kemp 
2014, 15). The short term failure of the UNFCCC might then prove to be crucial for its long 
term success (Kemp 2014, 27). This might well be, but it seems just as probable that the 
failure of the UNFCCC might lead to the bankruptcy of the practice of international 
negotiations. For this reason, it might be recommendable to turn to the level of the 
individual states. Which institutional reforms could be implemented at the national level 
to solve the conflict between democracy and justice in the case of climate change? 
7.3.2.2 The national level 
The failure of most democratic national governments to implement a strong policy to 
tackle climate change can be explained by the very lack of accountability we discussed 
earlier in the section on the failure of democracy (section 7.2.2). Whereas the proposed 
institutional reform of the UNFCCC (majority voting instead of consensus decision 
making) primarily attempts to fix the disastrous effects of the lack of accountability 
towards non-compatriots, we will here focus more on reforms to end harmful short-
termism.  
We will critically assess a ‘five-fold package’ of reforms, proposed by Caney 
(forthcoming). He explicitly mentions as his overarching aim ‘to enhance the 
accountability of the decision-making process in ways that take into account the interests 
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of persons in the future’ (Ibid., 1). His proposal is partly inspired by the system that is 
currently operating in Finland8, which could be interpreted as evidence of its feasibility.9  
Caney’s proposal consists of five possible reforms with the aim of ending harmful 
short-termism (Ibid., 1-2). First, he proposes to require incoming governments to issue a 
Manifesto for the Future, in which they outline the long term effects of their policies. 
Second, a Committee for the Future should be implemented to assess the adequacy of the 
government’s Manifesto for the Future. Third, there should be a regular Visions for the Future 
day, to enable the opposition to scrutinize the Manifesto and the progress made by the 
government. Caney emphasizes that this should be done in a public deliberative forum, 
as this could have a ‘chastening effect’ (Ibid., 2). Moreover, ‘by instituting such a feature 
into the parliamentary process it would put pressure on politicians to take seriously the 
impacts of their decisions on the long-term’ (Ibid.).  
These three elements can only work well if governments, the opposition, civil society 
organizations, and the general public have access to ‘reliable analyses of the impacts of 
government action and inaction’ (Ibid., 2). That is why Caney argues for an Independent 
Council for the Future, an external body ‘whose role is to produce periodic reports that (a) 
chronicle long-term trends and the likely impact of current policies and alternative 
policies, as well as (b) looking back to the past to draw attention to changes over time’ 
(Ibid.). The fifth and final element of his proposal is the implementation of Performance 
Indicators which would focus on long term goals and assess performance over long time 
periods. Together, this ‘five-fold package’ of reforms should tackle the harmful short-
termism that characterizes the way national democracies currently work. 
Caney (Ibid., 4-6) then suggests four criteria to evaluate proposals to tackle harmful 
short-termism: effectiveness, moral legitimacy, political sustainability, and political 
accessibility. We agree with Caney that his proposal would make a positive difference to 
the protection of long-term interests and that it does not violate any relevant moral 
criteria. However, regarding the third and fourth criteria, i.e. political accessibility and 
sustainability, we do have some reservations. We believe that Kemp’s claim (2014, 9) that 
the adoption of the rules of procedure is ‘largely contingent upon underlying political 
and institutional dynamics’ is equally applicable in this context.  
 
                                                     
8 See http://www.futurejustice.org/blog/guest-contribution/guest-article-a-committee-for-the-future. 
9 Caney argues that most other proposals face practical and/or moral obstacles (Caney forthcoming, 12-14). He 
mentions Thomas Wells’ proposal to allocate voting rights to civic organizations (Wells 2014), Andrew Dobson’s 
(1996) and Kristian Ekeli’s (2005) proposal of elected representatives for the future, and Philippe Schmitter’s 
(2000) proposal to allocate votes to parents on behalf of their children. Discussing these proposals in detail falls 
outside the scope of this chapter. 
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Caney is correct to point out that the example of Finland proves that the 
implementation of a similar proposal is not impossible. However, the fact that examples 
such as this one are so rare, raises questions about the likelihood of the implementation 
of Caney’s proposal. In this way, it does not score high on the criterion of political 
accessibility, namely ‘whether and how likely it is that can we get from ‘here’ to ‘there’’ 
(Caney forthcoming, 6). When considering the criterion of political sustainability, a 
similar concern can be raised. Caney (Ibid., 5) describes this criterion as the ‘tendency to 
remain in operation over time’. He argues that we should assess whether proposals are 
designed in such a way that they are difficult to undo, once they are implemented. Since 
Caney’s proposal is not yet implemented, we can only assess similar proposals that have 
been put into practice. Again, the historical record does not give much cause for 
optimism. Caney (Ibid., 5-6) acknowledges that initiatives implemented in Israel 
(Commission for Future Generations) and the UK (Sustainable Development Commission) 
had a rather short life. The Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations in 
Hungary did not fare any better. The evidence at hand regarding the political 
sustainability of Caney’s proposal thus remains inconclusive, at best. 
We are certainly not claiming that Caney’s five-fold package is unfeasible or 
undesirable. However, we do think there are important considerations that urge us to be 
cautious. The stakes are so high that we should not rely on a solution with a small 
likelihood of being effectively and sustainably implemented. 
7.3.3 The role of courts and litigation 
So far, we have discussed two strategies for making democracy more just, namely role 
reminders and institutional reform. We believe these strategies should be pursued first 
and foremost. However, given the current non-ideal circumstances, another, ‘last resort’ 
type strategy should not be dismissed. Since role reminders and the proposed 
institutional reforms do not offer any guarantees regarding the ending of the violation of 
basic human rights, another, more drastic instrument might be justified, or even 
obligatory. We will end this section by arguing for an obligation to sue underachieving 
governments. 
Caney is rather reluctant regarding this option, because ‘the extent to which this 
approach can successfully reduce harmful short-termism depends on what laws or 
constitutional provisions are in operation in the first place’ (Caney forthcoming, 13). He 
is right to point this out, but there are some promising precedents. The NGO ClientEarth 
recently started a case against the UK government for their failure to comply with 
European air quality standards. In April 2015, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of 
ClientEarth and ordered the UK government to draw up an air pollution clean-up plan. 
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Moreover, in June 2015, the District Court of The Hague ruled in favour of the 
environmental NGO Urgenda, ordering the Dutch government to adopt more aggressive 
targets for the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions.10 Thus, even under the existing 
legislation, there is some leeway to reduce harmful short-termism. 
In this context, we would like to refer to the Oslo Principles,11 a document in which an 
international think tank of legal experts argues that states should already be held 
accountable for the emissions of greenhouse gases on their territory. Their claim is based 
on international human rights law, tort law, and environmental law. The precautionary 
principle plays a crucial part in their argumentation. These ‘Oslo Principles’ can provide 
the legal basis for law suits against governments that fail to fulfil their obligations 
regarding climate change. Current cases like Urgenda in The Netherlands and Klimaatzaak 
in Belgium could benefit significantly from this publication. 
These promising precedents do not refute Caney’s statement that ‘courts operate 
‘downstream’ and have to work with whatever laws have been passed’ (Caney 
forthcoming, 13). However, they do give us good reason to maintain that litigation can be 
a successful strategy to end harmful short-termism. We fully support Caney’s proposal 
and agree that it could be highly beneficial in shaping policy making ‘upstream’. Yet, 
given the urgency and gravity of the current situation, we have an obligation to pursue 
every possible solution. This means ending the violation of basic human rights through 
mechanisms of role reminders and institutional reforms if possible, and through 
litigation if necessary. 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we focused our attention on the relationship between democracy and 
justice. We argued that the possibility of genuine conflicts between democracy and justice 
is real and that climate change is a clear illustration of such a conflict. Our aim was to 
examine how we should deal with this specific conflict between democracy and justice. 
 
                                                     
10 The Dutch government has appealed against the verdict of the district court in The Hague. 
11 For more information on the Oslo Principles, see http://globaljustice.macmillan.yale.edu/news/oslo-
principles-global-climate-change-obligations.  
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We started by advocating an instrumental justification of democracy, claiming that 
democracy should be valued for its beneficial consequences, rather than for its (possible) 
intrinsic value.12 This raised questions regarding the potential moral limits to the 
authority of democracy. We discussed the problem of persistent losers, i.e. people who 
are always at the losing end of democratic decisions. Moreover, we examined external 
limits to democratic authority, i.e. limits that arise from values independent of 
democracy. Deciding on these limits comes down to determining when a democratic 
decision should be characterized as too unjust. We argued that if a democratic decision is 
considered to be too unjust, it should be overruled by considerations of justice. Since this 
is a controversial issue, we argued for the normatively minimalist position that justice 
requires respect for basic human rights. From this perspective, the violation of such 
rights counts as an external limit to the political authority of democracy. The violation of 
basic human rights can thus never be justified by referring to the democratic nature of 
the underlying decision-making process. 
Subsequently, we explained why we think that the way in which climate change is 
currently handled is an excellent illustration of the tension that may exist between 
democracy and justice. We highlighted that climate change is in fact jeopardizing 
fundamental human rights to life, health and subsistence. Moreover, this situation is 
aggravated by the problem of persistent losers; people in developing countries do not get 
what they want on issues which are of particular importance to them, because the other 
countries are relatively indifferent to these issues. We explained this failure of democracy 
by referring to two problems of accountability: politicians do not only lack accountability 
for the future adverse effects of their policies, but also for the adverse effects their policies 
have on current people who do not belong to their own constituencies. Both factors seem 
to cripple the effective functioning of the UNFCCC. The requirement of consensus 
decision making jeopardizes its successful functioning even further. 
We went on to discuss different solutions for this failure of democracy in the case of 
climate change. We proposed three possible strategies for making democracy just, 
namely role reminders, institutional reform, and the role of courts and litigation. We 
made the claim that, as citizens, we have a political obligation to demand from our 
politicians that they stop their harmful short-termism regarding climate change and end 
the problem of persistent losers as soon as possible. Consequently, the minimal moral 
obligation we have is to vote for parties that explicitly advocate robust policy measures 
to tackle climate change. Since this solution can be brought about within the existing 
 
                                                     
12 We believe that an instrumental justification of democracy does not necessarily entail that democracy has no 
intrinsic value. Discussing this issue further unfortunately falls beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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structures, it is the preferable solution and should be pursued first and foremost. If we 
fail to fulfil this obligation, however, we become complicit in the resulting violation of 
basic human rights. In this context, our politicians can be permitted to overrule 
democratic concerns to end this situation. Indeed, politicians not only have permission 
to give priority to justice instead of democracy, they can be obliged to do so, due to their 
public role. However, under the current political circumstances this is very unlikely to 
occur. 
If effective, the mechanism of ‘role reminders’ would provide an elegant solution for 
the conflict between justice and democracy. However, reforms at the institutional level 
might be necessary to break the current deadlock. At the international level, we 
advocated the replacement of consensus decision making by majority voting, since 
majority voting could prove both more efficient and more effective than the current 
procedure. However, the historical record of the UNFCCC and its path dependency do not 
give much cause for optimism. For this reason, we should examine what could be done at 
the level of the individual states. In this context, we critically assessed Caney’s five-fold 
package of reforms. Although commendable, we believe we should not rely on this 
solution in view of its small likelihood of being effectively and sustainably implemented. 
The final solution we proposed is a ‘last resort’ type strategy. Since the preferred 
solutions (role reminders and institutional reforms) do not offer any guarantees 
regarding the ending of the violation of basic human rights, we believe another, more 
drastic instrument might be justified, or even obligatory. This involves suing 
governments that fail to fulfil their obligations regarding climate change. Admittedly, 
courts can only apply existing legislation, but there are some promising precedents, like 
the Urgenda case in the Netherlands. Moreover, the ‘Oslo Principles’ can provide the legal 
basis for law suits against underachieving governments. This strategy could thus prove a 
viable way forward.  
When faced with a grave injustice such as the violation of basic human rights caused 
by climate change, it is unjustifiable to hide behind the democratic nature of the decision-
making process. We cannot stand idly by and declare that ‘this is what democracy wants’. 
The consequences of climate change are too unjust to be tolerated. We urgently need to 
make democracy more just, through mechanisms of role reminders and institutional 
reforms if possible, but litigation might be needed to break the current harmful deadlock. 
With this chapter we conclude Part II on feasibility objections regarding global justice. 
After discussing problems at the individual level (chapter 5) and at the institutional level 
(chapters 6 and 7), we will now focus on the interaction between these two levels. More 
specifically, in Part III we will examine whether a theory of institutional cosmopolitanism 
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might be able to overcome the motivational barriers to feasibility at the level of the 
individual moral agent. 
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Chapter 8 How to overcome the feasibility 
objections at the level of the individual moral 
agent? 
8.1 ‘New Harms’ and the phenomenology of agency  
Human agency is often considered to be a precondition for individual moral responsibility 
(e.g. ‘ought implies can’). Consequently, the apparent lack of individual agency in 
collective action problems such as climate change is often invoked as a justification for 
inaction, as we have discussed in the previous chapters. In this context, Samuel Scheffler 
(2001, 43) argues that an individual agent cannot effectively influence global dynamics or 
be assumed to have any clear notion about the global implications of his or her personal 
behaviour (Peeters et al. 2014, 3). He examines what this might mean for the notion of 
individual responsibility in a globalized context;   
[…] the most immediate effect of coming to see the global perspective as morally 
salient may be, not to present us with a developed, non-restrictive conception of 
normative responsibility, but rather to generate doubts about our practice of 
treating the individual agent as the primary locus of such responsibility. (Scheffler 
2001, 44) 
Scheffler conceptualises the common-sense conception of individual responsibility as 
restrictive, narrowing the individual agent’s moral world to include only personal ties 
and immediate effects of conduct. He argues that this common-sense conception is 
supported by a complex ‘phenomenology of agency’, referring to the characteristic way 
we experience ourselves as agents with causal powers. He describes this phenomenology 
of agency as consisting of (at least) three features: acts having primacy over omissions, 
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near effects having primacy over remote effects, and individual effects having primacy 
over group effects (Scheffler 2001, 38-39).1  
According to Scheffler, our common-sense morality is further supported by ‘a 
widespread though largely implicit conception of human social relations as consisting 
primarily in small-scale interactions, with clearly demarcated lines of causation, among 
independent individual agents’ (Scheffler 1995, 227). In this way, our common-sense 
morality seems to originate in low-population, low-density, low-technology societies, 
with seemingly unlimited access to land and various other natural resources (Jamieson 
1992, 148; 2014, 147). Parfit (1987, 85-86) therefore states that common-sense morality 
works best in small communities (Peeters et al. 2015, 95). We tend to assume individual 
responsibility only for those near and dear to us, and for a long time these limits to our 
moral world coincided quite well with the limits of our causal world. However, when 
facing our current globalized world, this conception seems somewhat out of date.  
The circumstances described by Scheffler and Jamieson are no longer in place. 
Through global processes and dynamics we are causally connected to countless people, 
and our everyday activities affect (and harm) distant strangers in a variety of ways (see 
for example Lichtenberg 2010; 2014, 73-74; Parfit 1987, 86):  
Over the past few decades, but especially in the past few years—with economic, 
environmental, and electronic globalization rapidly increasing; near consensus 
about the threat of severe climate change, whose effects will be felt most by the 
world’s poorest people; knowledge that the provenance of products we use every 
day is compromised in a variety of ways; and, finally, the growing impossibility of 
remaining ignorant of these phenomena—we have learned how our ordinary habits 
and conduct contribute to harming other people near and far, now and in the 
future. The model of harm underlying the classic formulation of the harm 
principle—discrete, individual actions with observable and measurable 
consequences for particular individuals—no longer suffices to explain the ways our 
behavior impinges on the interests of other people. (Lichtenberg 2010, 558-559) 
In this context, no individual’s action can be said to be the cause of harm. Our actions 
are not sufficient in themselves to cause the harm, they rather contribute to an overall 
effect (Ibid., 561). Combined with the perceived (spatial and temporal) remoteness of the 
effects of one’s conduct, this aspect is an important explanatory factor for the 
motivational gap discussed above. In this way, New Harms do really pose a serious 
 
                                                     
1 For an elaborate discussion of the phenomenology of agency in the context of climate change, see Peeters et 
al. 2015, chapter 3. Our discussion here is based on Peeters et al. 2014, 3-4; 2015, 95-96. 
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challenge to our moral judgment system; ‘Since an individual’s actions contributing to 
the New Harms do not produce palpable, immediate, visible effects, we are likely to feel 
no regret, no guilt, no shame, and no drive to act differently’ (Lichtenberg 2014, 77). Even 
if we are harming distant others through our role in the process of globalization, this 
situation might not result in the appropriate psychological state. The sheer magnitude of 
this complex phenomenon appears to be too overwhelming to fully comprehend: 
The global perspective highlights the enormous importance of various large-scale 
causal processes and patterns of activity that the individual agent cannot in general 
control, but within which individual behaviour is nevertheless subsumed in ways 
that the individual is, at any given time, unlikely to be in a position fully to 
appreciate (Scheffler 1995, 232, emphasis added).  
Scheffler thus argues that these considerations put pressure on our common-sense 
practice of treating the individual agent as the primary locus of responsibility. Faced with 
these New Harms, ‘the phenomenology of agency seems like an increasingly poor guide 
to the dimensions of human action that are socially significant’ (Scheffler 1995, 229). More 
specifically, ‘the restrictive conception of moral responsibility, embedded in common-
sense morality and supported by the dominant phenomenology of agency, is ill-suited to 
deliver a moral judgement of climate change that fully covers its complexity’ (Peeters et 
al. 2015, 96).2 Since climate change can be characterized as a matter of omissions, remote 
effects, and group effects, it differs from a paradigm moral problem. Moreover, as it is 
‘not a matter of a clearly identifiable individual acting intentionally so as to inflict an 
identifiable harm on another identifiable individual, closely related in time and space’ 
(Jamieson 2010, 437), we fail to grasp its moral severity and do not perceive it as a problem 
of individual responsibility (Gardiner 2011a, 41; Jamieson 2010, 436; Peeters et al. 2014, 3-
4). As this results in a lack of motivation to tackle climate change, we want to examine 
how this harmful situation can be overcome. 
 
                                                     
2 Gardiner (2006; 2011b; 2013, 132) refers to this as a theoretical storm, which rests on the idea that we lack 
robust theories in the relevant areas. For a discussion of this issue, see Peeters et al. 2015, 95-98. 
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8.2 Increasing moral motivation by enhancing moral 
judgment 
Before turning our attention to the level of institutional responsibilities, we first want to 
explore whether the motivational problem regarding New Harms might be successfully 
tackled in a different way.3 We will start this attempt by discussing a reason to doubt 
whether the motivational gap can be explained solely by the inadequacy of our 
conventional moral concepts that originated in small-scale relations. As we have seen in 
the previous section, commentators like Lichtenberg (2014, 77) argue that the conditions 
regarding whom people affect (and how) have changed only relatively recently, giving 
rise to the concept of ‘New Harms’. In the same line, Parfit (1987, 86) notes that until the 
20th century, most of mankind lived in small communities in which each person could 
only affect a few people close to them. More specifically with respect to climate change, 
Jamieson (1992, 149) observes that, in contrast to the pollution of London in the 
eighteenth century (limited in reach), ‘today no part of the planet is safe’ (Peeters et al. 
2015, 97). 
As we have discussed in chapter 3, our role in the process of climate change generates 
obligations with a potentially universal scope. The perceived remoteness of the effects of 
climate change, together with the  complicating temporal dimension inherent to this 
problem, seems to explain the lack of motivation to tackle it. However, Gardiner (2011a, 
51) and Pogge (2008, 2) rightly argue that climate change is not the first complex problem 
humanity has to face. They point out that issues such as the abolition of slavery, 
colonialism, the civil rights movement, and the emancipation of women, share similar 
features that might hamper the adequate motivational response. Nevertheless , 
‘humanity has made substantial moral progress in its response to these and other forms 
of harmful conduct and social organization’ (Pogge 2008, 2). Faced with this progress, the 
argument that our moral judgment system is unable to cope with these so-called ‘New 
Harms’ loses much of its force.  
If it is true that humanity has been confronted with complex social and 
environmental problems for much longer than many commentators suggest, 
referring to the origins of common-sense morality leaves open the question why, 
 
                                                     
3 In section 5.5 we already discussed three different strategies to tackle moral disengagement, namely enhancing 
people’s moral judgment, promoting alternative values, and tackling the propensity for moral disengagement. 
We will here elaborate on the first strategy. Our discussion here is largely based on Peeters et al. 2015, 95-98, 
108-111. 
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over the past centuries, conventional moral practices have evolved with respect to 
other issues, while remaining (at least, according to the same line of reasoning) so 
thoroughly inadequate to respond to climate change. This explanation does not 
suffice to understand the motivational gap in relation to climate change (Peeters et 
al. 2015, 98).  
We in no way want to deny that climate change poses a serious challenge to our moral 
judgment system, due to its inherent complexity. To the extent that climate change (or 
other harmful aspects of globalization) really is a matter of omissions, remote effects and 
aggregate effects, we do in fact struggle to grasp its moral urgency. In this way, our 
phenomenology of agency does cast doubts on treating the individual agent as the 
primary bearer of responsibility in this context. However, we would argue that ‘the 
predominant or exclusive focus on the omissions involved in climate change, on the 
remoteness of its impacts, and on the fact that its effects are the aggregate result of the 
actions of a number of people is deceitful’ (Peeters et al. 2015, 48). We claim (Ibid., chapter 
3) that climate change can and should be assessed as a matter both of omissions and acts, 
remote effects and near effects, and group effects and individual effects. Characterizing it 
along the lines of the different features of our phenomenology of agency is deceitful and 
fails to provide convincing support for the invoked doubts about individual agency (Ibid., 
59, 73, 91). 
Rather than emphasizing our failure to prevent climate change (an omission), we 
should acknowledge that acts themselves (that is, greenhouse gas emitting activities) are 
causally responsible for the harmful effects of climate change. Since people tend to 
experience their acts as having primacy over omissions (the first feature of our 
phenomenology of agency), this way of framing our role in the process of climate change 
should strongly increase the moral urgency of climate change for individual agents (Ibid., 
52). 
In the same way, we should not focus on the remoteness of climate change’s impacts, as 
climate change also has significant near effects. Since people tend to experience their 
causal influence regarding near effects as more real than regarding remote effects (the 
second feature of our phenomenology of agency), we might expect that emphasizing 
these near effects of climate change will strongly increase its moral urgency for individual 
agents (Ibid., 64).  
According to the third feature of our phenomenology of agency, we tend to minimize 
our causal contributions to group effects relative to individual effects: ‘when an outcome 
is the joint result of the actions of a number of people, including ourselves, we tend to see 
our own agency as implicated to a much lesser extent than we do when we take an effect 
to have resulted solely from our own actions’ (Scheffler 1995, 228). On the basis of this 
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phenomenological feature, people might feel less motivated to take the necessary actions. 
Since climate change is an effect of the joint contribution of many emitters, people tend 
to feel powerless regarding this overwhelming global process. However, as we have 
illustrated in chapter 5, we in fact do have individual agency in this context. 
Characterizing climate change as a group effect thus does not suffice to exonerate us from 
individual responsibility to tackle it (Peeters et al. 2015, 74).  
Consequently, invoking the phenomenology of agency to justify the restrictions on 
individual responsibility imposed by common-sense morality is unconvincing.4 
Moreover, we believe that the invoked argument could actually inspire an opportunity to 
(partly) tackle the motivational gap. Indeed, to the extent that New Harms like climate 
change do in fact approximate the characteristics of a paradigm moral problem, framing 
them along these lines could stimulate people’s ‘drive to act differently’. The first and 
most obvious strategy to increase people’s motivation is thus to enhance their moral 
judgment based on conventional moral ideas.  
Although common-sense morality might not be sufficient to fully capture climate 
change, even on the basis of its restrictive conception of individual moral responsibility, 
there is a strong imperative to act. Even under the minimalist conception of global justice 
we defended in chapter 2, we are clearly harming distant others through our role in the 
process of climate change (see chapter 3). As this position can be ‘adopted from within a 
wide variety of different conceptions of the good and ethical worldviews’ (Caney 2010, 
169), emphasizing the harmful effects of our behaviour should in principle convince 
virtually every one of the moral urgency of ending this situation. Rather than trying to 
persuade people to adopt alternative, more demanding, values, we need to demonstrate 
to them that they are in fact acting wrongly, even measured by their own standards. 
How an argument is framed, can significantly affect the motivation people have to 
fulfil their obligations (Lawford-Smith 2012). More specifically, whether an obligation is 
perceived as an obligation of justice or as an obligation of assistance, seems especially 
relevant. Holly Lawford-Smith (2012, 663) distinguishes between arguments from 
humanity and arguments from justice, using the distinction between omissions and 
actions, respectively. Our phenomenology of agency can thus be deployed in such a way 
that our motivation to fulfil our obligations is significantly strengthened; 
 
                                                     
4 Rather, the inherent complexity of climate change provides them with an opportunity for rationalization: 
the deceitful characterization of climate change along the lines of the phenomenology of agency facilitates some 
strategies of moral disengagement. For a discussion of this issue, see chapter 5. 
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 […] people in general have an omission bias, in that they think omissions causing 
harms are less bad than actions causing equivalent harms. And if it is true that 
people in general have a bias towards harm by omission, then it should be true that 
they will be easier to motivate (pending establishment of a link between guilt and 
remedy) if they can be brought to accept that they themselves, by acting, are 
harming the global poor, rather than merely omitting to help the poor when they 
could. (Lawford-Smith 2012, 666, footnote omitted) 
Rather than trying to work around this psychological constraint, Lawford-Smith (Ibid., 
671) argues that we should accept the omission bias and use the justice argument rather 
than the humanity argument. Using the justice argument will make the fulfilment of our 
obligations (for example global poverty relief) more feasible than using the humanity 
argument (Ibid., 674).5 However, there needs to be a clear link between guilt and remedy 
for the justice argument to strengthen motivation. Lawford-Smith (Ibid., 671-674) refers 
to extensive research (for example Boster et al. 1999) suggesting that guilt is conducive to 
remedial action, if the conditions are right. An important condition is that people must 
believe that they have control over the situation and that there is an available action that 
will reduce their feelings of guilt (Lazarus 1991). In other words, people must feel that 
they have agency and can in fact do something to end or reduce the harmful situation. In 
chapter 5 we already discussed the agency of individual agents regarding meat and 
energy consumption. We will here examine how people can be motivated to tackle 
climate change by framing the problem along the lines of our phenomenology of agency. 
To successfully bridge the motivational gap to tackle climate change, communicators 
thus should incessantly continue to explain to people that they really do have agency in 
this context, emphasizing the acts, the near effects and the individual effects involved in 
climate change (Peeters et al. 2015, 109-111). First, the fact that greenhouse gas emitting 
activities are not as innocent as they might seem needs to be highlighted. By emphasizing 
that one’s emissions are causally responsible for the violation of basic human rights and 
the harmful effects of climate change, we might expect to strengthen the motivation to 
end this harmful situation (Ibid., 109).  
 
                                                     
5 Whether or not we can invoke the justice argument to motivate people depends on whether or not they are in 
fact harming others. In chapter 3 we answered this question regarding the global economic order and climate 
change. We concluded that sustaining the global economic order can violate our negative duty not to harm 
others, but that this conclusion depends on the particular interpretation of the historical benchmark. Failing to 
mitigate climate change, in contrast, does entail a violation of our negative duties, for it actively causes harm 
and worsens the situation of distant others. In this context, we should urgently characterize our corresponding 
obligations as obligations of justice, in order to increase the feasibility of successfully tackling climate change. 
 192 
In this context, John Nolt (2011) estimates that the greenhouse gas emissions of an 
average US citizen cause the serious suffering and/or deaths of about two future persons. 
He fully acknowledges that these calculations are extremely rough.6 Moreover, it remains 
uncertain whether such statistical evidence about harms in the future will evoke the 
strong visceral reactions we would hope for (Lichtenberg 2014, 2; Weber 2006, 106). 
Nonetheless, it is a noteworthy attempt to communicate ‘some sense of the moral 
significance of our own complicity in a greenhouse-gas-intensive economy’ (Nolt 2011, 
9). In this way, the relation between one’s acts and their harmful consequences could be 
significantly highlighted (Peeters et al. 2015, 109). Making this relation more tangible 
could prove an important way to strengthen people’s motivation. 
A second way to tackle the motivational gap is to emphasize that the effects of climate 
change will not only occur in remote places and the far future, but rather are already 
affecting people both near and distant, in the present as well as the future. Paying more 
attention to the already observed climatic changes and their effects on human lives might 
heighten people’s sense of urgency (Ibid.). A strategy that could help to achieve this is to 
humanize the victims of climate change. Personifying the affected populations can make 
people less likely to deploy mechanisms of moral disengagement, and might motivate 
them to take individual responsibility for the consequences of their actions (Bandura 
1999, 202-203). This potential positive effect of increasing perceived similarity and shared 
identity on pro-social behaviour seems supported by recent social psychological research 
(Markowitz and Shariff 2012, 246). Moreover, humanization could also have a positive 
effect on the force of quasi-moral motivations, such as love, compassion, and solidarity 
towards the victims of climate change (see Birnbacher 2009, 281) (Peeters et al. 2015, 109-
110). 
A third way to strengthen motivation is to create more awareness of ‘how greenhouse 
gas emitting activities provide a quasi imperceptible but fully real contribution to climate 
change and belong to a set of acts that together harm other people’ (Ibid., 110). 
Communicators should thus debunk the challenging argument that one’s unilateral 
actions do not make any difference by emphasizing that unilateral actions to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions have an infinitesimal but fully real mitigating effect. Moreover, 
these individual actions can facilitate collective change or have a positive effect on the 
actions of others (Ibid.).7 We agree with Jamieson (2006, 481-482) that: 
Biking instead of driving or choosing the veggieburger rather than the hamburger 
may seem like small choices, and it may seem that such small choices by such little 
 
                                                     
6 They have also been criticized on methodological grounds by Sandler (2011). 
7 For a discussion of the futility thesis, see Peeters et al. 2015, 87. 
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people barely matter. But ironically, they may be the only thing that matters. For 
large changes are caused and constituted by small choices. 
We adopt this strategy in an effort to refute more extreme versions of the claim that 
individual behaviour is subsumed in large-scale processes in ways that the individual 
cannot fully appreciate (Scheffler 1995, 232). Having said that, we fully acknowledge that 
Scheffler’s claim is to a certain extent valid and does provide a distinct explanation of the 
motivational gap. However, this fact does not imply that individuals have no agency in 
this context (Peeters et al. 2015, 110). Emphasizing this fact and more accurately situating 
individual emitters within these processes, could provide an important obstacle to the 
deployment of mechanisms of moral disengagement (Ibid.): ‘the less moral ambiguity 
there is surrounding a situation, the less latitude an agent has in negotiating reality in 
such a way as to provide justification for an unethical action’ (Bersoff 1999, 37). 
8.3 Institutional efficacy and the delegation of 
responsibility 
The first way in which the feasibility objections at the level of the individual agent can be 
overcome thus is to enhance people’s moral judgment based on conventional moral ideas. 
By emphasizing that they are in fact harming others and acting wrongly, even measured 
by their own standards, we might expect to heighten their guilt and, under the right 
conditions, their motivation to end the harmful situation. Using arguments from justice, 
rather than arguments from humanity, could increase the feasibility of our minimal 
conception of global justice. 
Nonetheless, there are some good reasons to explore possible solutions at the 
institutional level (Lichtenberg 2014, 67-70). Faced with a (perceived) problem of 
demandingness and the allocation problem, Lichtenberg argues that collectivizing and 
thereby institutionalizing our duties might provide a valuable way to mitigate these 
problems (Ibid., 67). First and foremost, there is the issue of causal efficacy. Although we 
argued that we do have significant agency regarding New Harms such as climate change, 
it cannot be denied that our individual impact in this context is small. Problems of this 
magnitude cannot be solved single-handedly, collective action is needed; ‘The aggregate 
of individually small investments by large numbers of persons could reach a significant 
sum, especially if cooperation and coordination occurred among those acting in 
fulfillment of duty’ (Shue 1988, 695). Apart from efficacy, Lichtenberg (2014, 69) mentions 
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a second reason to institutionalize our duties, namely that sharing a burden also lightens 
that burden. If we act together as a community, each individual person has to do 
significantly less than he would if acting in isolation (Ibid.). A third, related, reason 
highlights that institutionalizing our duties might result in nearly full compliance, 
especially if the collective action is compelled rather than voluntary (Ibid.). However, 
forcing people to fulfil their obligations might invoke criticism, especially from 
libertarians. We will come back to this objection in the next section. As a fourth reason, 
Lichtenberg (Ibid., 69-70) mentions ‘relative disadvantage’:  
 […] well-being is largely relative, so even apart from the motivation that comes 
from seeing substantial change occur through widespread action, giving up goods 
can involve much less cost to the agent if others give them up too. […] Compelling 
everyone to act eliminates the free rider problem, and individuals then have one 
further reason not to resent contributing to others’ welfare. (Footnote omitted) 
As a final reason Lichtenberg points out that the locus of responsibility for problems 
such as global poverty should be the group rather than the individual, since the existence 
of these problems cannot be disentangled from ‘deep-seated structural features of 
institutions in the contemporary world’ (Ibid., 70).  
All these reasons seem to underwrite the delegated authority model we discussed in 
section 6.3. As explained by Gardiner, this model makes the legitimacy of political 
institutions and their leaders dependent on their ability to solve problems that are 
difficult to address at the individual level; 
According to a long tradition in political theory, political institutions and their 
leaders are said to be legitimate because, and to the extent that, citizens delegate 
their own responsibilities and powers to them. The basic idea is that political 
authorities act in the name of the citizens in order to solve problems that either 
cannot be addressed, or else would be poorly handled at the individual level, and 
that this is what, most fundamentally, justifies both their existence and their 
specific form. (Gardiner 2011a, 53) 
The greater efficacy of institutions thus is the basic rationale justifying their 
existence.8 The delegation of responsibilities to institutions could solve the motivational 
 
                                                     
8 On the claim that tackling climate change is primarily a political or collective responsibility, see, for example, 
Johnson (2003), Cripps (2013), and Jamieson (2005, 304): ‘We should not think that we can do enough simply by 
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problems we experience at the individual level (partly) due to our phenomenology of 
agency. However, we seem to have overstretched this practice in an unjustifiable way. 
This resulted in a certain, narrow vision of modern political justification, according to 
which: 
 […] the role of social and political institutions is to discharge as many ethical 
responsibilities as possible for the citizenry, so that under an ideal system 
individuals would not have to worry at all about such responsibilities, but would 
instead be maximally free to engage in their own pursuits. (Gardiner 2011a, 54-55).  
Gardiner argues that it is precisely because the delegated authority model has been so 
successful in the past that we struggle with acknowledging (the extent of) our 
responsibilities when this delegation fails. In chapter 6 we already argued that we need 
to take responsibility, individually and politically, if we want to invoke the delegated 
authority argument. If we fail to do so, invoking the delegation of responsibilities is 
tantamount to moral disengagement, namely through diffusion and displacement of 
responsibility. In chapter 7, we mentioned the importance of role reminders9 in situations 
where justice and democracy might conflict. In the next section, we will elaborate on 
what this mechanism of role reminders might imply for politicians under a delegated 
authority model. Our focus will be on their responsibilities in overcoming the 
motivational problem at the level of the individual moral agent.  
8.4 Role reminders for politicians: The moral obligation to 
nudge 
In chapter 7 we argued that when basic human rights are being violated, politicians can 
be permitted to overrule democratic concerns in order to end this situation. Moreover, 
politicians thus not only have permission to give priority to justice instead of democracy, 
 
                                                     
buying fuel-efficient cars, insulating our houses, and setting up a windmill to make our own electricity. That is 
all wonderful, but it does little or nothing to stop global warming and also does not fulfil our real moral 
obligations, which are to get governments to do their job to prevent the disaster of excessive global warming’. 
9 We also discussed institutional reforms and the role of courts and litigation as strategies to solve possible 
conflicts between justice and democracy.  
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they can be obliged to do so. Reminding politicians of this special obligation that is 
generated by their public role might lead them onto the right track.  
Although politicians might be perfectly justified (and even have an obligation) to 
enforce duties of justice, the current political situation makes this very unlikely. Given 
the economic and financial crisis, voters tend to emphasize the importance of their 
national economic interests even more, and politicians are likely to follow. Moreover, we 
acknowledge that not everyone will accept that duties of justice should sometimes 
overrule democratic demands. Here we want to argue for an obligation that can 
accommodate both concerns and offers a way out of the current gridlock; the moral 
obligation to nudge.  
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008, 6) describe a nudge as: 
 […] any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and 
cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting the fruit at eye level counts as a 
nudge. Banning junk food does not. 
The concept is most used in the context of libertarian paternalism:  
The libertarian aspect of our strategies lies in the straightforward insistence that, 
in general, people should be free to do what they like – and to opt out of undesirable 
arrangements if they want to do so. […] The paternalistic aspect lies in the claim 
that it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people’s behavior in 
order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better. (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, 5) 
We believe Thaler and Sunstein make a compelling case. Helping people to make 
decisions that will improve their own welfare seems perfectly justified, if they can opt out 
easily. However, when the goal is to improve the welfare of third parties, the issue becomes 
(more) controversial (as we mentioned regarding Lichtenberg’s third reason for an 
institutional solution). Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 1162) call this possibility libertarian 
benevolence. We will here argue that politicians can sometimes have an obligation to 
design default rules in a way that will promote the interests of vulnerable third parties, 
even if this is not demanded through the democratic decision-making process. An 
illustrative example of such a measure is a policy to increase organ donations based on 
presumed consent. Under this policy, people are presumed to be donors, yet they can opt 
out of this arrangement easily. In nations where presumed consent is the default option 
(e.g. Belgium, Austria, Denmark), over 90 percent of people consent to the use of their 
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organs, after death, to benefit others. In nations where people have to take action to opt 
in, this percentage drops dramatically. An example of this option is the United States, 
where only 28 percent register to make their organs available for donation. Thaler and 
Sunstein hypothesize that this difference is not a product of deep cultural differences, but 
rather of ‘the massive effect of the default rule’ (Ibid., 1192). They underpin this claim by 
a report that suggests that over 85 percent of Americans actually support organ 
donation.10 
As the example of organ donation illustrates, the choice architecture can have an 
immense positive impact on the lives of numerous people. From this point of view, the 
case for libertarian benevolence seems quite straightforward. However, there are two 
important counter-arguments to consider.11 The first objection concerns the risk of 
starting down a slippery slope. Since the potential benefits of libertarian benevolence 
seem so great, how will we decide when such interventions are unjustified? This objection 
seems quite plausible, but two responses can be provided. First, it is worth noticing that 
a certain default rule is sometimes inevitable and will always have a considerable effect. 
Concerning organ donation, both an opt in as an opt out system are viable policy options. 
However, choosing one as the default rule cannot be avoided. The fact that sometimes no 
neutral or value-free option exists, should be taken into account when making this 
decision. Second, as long as the opt-out rights are ensured and easily exercised, the 
slippery slope could be curbed considerably. We believe this kind of libertarian check 
refutes the slippery slope argument quite strongly, especially when the inevitability of 
some default rule is also fully acknowledged.   
The second objection is more fundamental and seems more robust. It takes us back to 
the possibility of genuine conflicts between justice and democracy and to the question 
how such conflicts should be solved. To the extent that libertarian benevolence 
prioritises considerations of justice over democratic demands, critics might argue that 
this strategy is unjustified. After all, it seems just as conceivable that democracy should 
be given priority over justice. If people do not want to promote the welfare of (vulnerable) 
third parties, they might be acting blameworthy, yet they are acting well within their 
rights. Especially from a libertarian point of view, it seems unjustified to coerce them in 
any way to behave more altruistically. 
For the sake of the argument, we will not try to question or refute this libertarian 
framework. We grant its proponents that people should not be forced to aid others, as 
 
                                                     
10 http://www.presumedconsent.org/issues.htm (no longer accessible).  
11 Our starting point for this discussion is the rebuttal by Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 1199-1201) of the objections 
raised against libertarian paternalism. 
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long as they did not harm anyone or violate the contracts they voluntarily agreed to. If 
this condition is met, there are no further enforceable duties. In its strongest form this 
implies that you cannot be forced to help someone in extreme need, even with little cost 
to oneself. However, can we still maintain that we are not harming anyone? As we have 
explained in chapter 3, climate change jeopardizes the fundamental human rights of 
current as well as future people, including their rights to life, health, adequate food and 
water, adequate housing, and self-determination. Anthropogenic climate change thus 
violates even our normatively minimalist standard, namely respecting basic human 
rights. Through our part in this process, we are violating the human rights of a specific 
and large subset of persons.12 We argue that this should count as an external limit to the 
political authority of democracy. As explained, this means that ‘when decisions made in 
a democracy are felt to be too unjust then, in the name of justice, that democratic decision 
may be challenged undemocratically’ (Dowding et al. 2004, 24). We claim that our current 
democratic response to climate change is so unjust that it should be challenged 
undemocratically. Consequently, we believe that our politicians are entitled, even 
obligated, to implement measures that could effectively tackle climate change, even if 
their citizens do not demand this.  
However, we here argue for a more limited obligation, namely the moral obligation of 
politicians to nudge. We believe this obligation of libertarian benevolence can 
accommodate the two objections we mentioned in the beginning of this section. First, we 
argue that the obligation to nudge can accommodate the libertarian criticism that the 
fulfilment of our obligations should not be enforced. First of all because we argue for this 
obligation to nudge in contexts where we are harming distant others (chapter 3). 
Moreover, nudging, by definition, rules out coercion. The possibility to opt out of the 
suggested course of action should always be ensured. So even people who want to 
continue to use stringent standards for establishing harm and in this way deny their 
complicity can always choose to opt out. The level of coercion thus is low enough to 
accommodate the libertarian criticism, even if the harmful relationship is denied. 
The second objection referred to the possibility that politicians would be punished at 
the next elections if they would enforce the fulfilment of duties of justice at the expense 
of democratic demands. However, as we already mentioned, the aim of nudging is to alter 
people’s behaviour in a predictable way, yet without forbidding any options. We believe 
that the risk of getting punished electorally can be reduced significantly by ensuring that 
people can opt out relatively easily. Moreover, recent empirical research (Bernauer & 
Gampfer 2015) suggests that public support for unilateral policies to tackle climate 
 
                                                     
12 Our responsibility in causing the harmful effects of climate change is beyond any reasonable doubt. See IPCC 
(2013). 
  199 
change is strong. Although this support is not (yet) reflected in widespread political 
support for politicians and parties that make this issue a priority, we believe it does 
suggest that politicians who fulfil their moral obligation to nudge might not receive the 
electoral punishment they might fear. 
The practice of nudging is gaining more support and even found its way into the White 
House.13 However, the practice of libertarian benevolence, nudging to improve the 
welfare of third parties, remains controversial. We here argue that libertarian benevolence 
not only is justified, but rather should be characterized as a moral obligation for 
politicians. Especially in contexts where we (might) play a role in the violation of basic 
human rights, politicians are perfectly justified in urging us to end our harmful conduct 
and fulfil our obligations of justice. To the extent that we are harming (distant) others, 
the costs of opting out of the proposed action should increase correspondingly. Indeed, if 
we are harming others, the libertarian criticism loses its meaning. 
8.5 Concluding remarks 
We started this chapter by acknowledging that individual agency appears to be rather 
limited in collective action problems such as climate change, which is often invoked as a 
justification for inaction. Our starting point was Scheffler’s claim that the individual 
agent qua individual agent cannot effectively influence global dynamics, which generates 
doubts about our practice of treating the individual agent as the primary locus of 
responsibility in this context. We discussed our phenomenology of agency and how it 
might explain why we fail to attach the moral severity of a paradigm moral problem to 
climate change and other New Harms. Since no individual’s action can be said to be the 
cause of harm and we perceive the effects of our conduct as remote, New Harms do really 
pose a serious challenge to our moral judgment system. Consequently, these harms do 
not result in the appropriate psychological response and we experience a lack of 
motivation to tackle them.  
Before turning our attention to the level of institutional responsibilities, we first 
explored whether the motivational problem regarding New Harms might be successfully 
tackled by enhancing our moral judgment. We started out by questioning whether these 
 
                                                     
13 See, for example, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/barack-obama-to-bring-whitehalls-
nudge-theory-to-the-white-house-10504616.html and 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2015/09/16/obama-nudge-government/#3d5264211f32.   
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New Harms really are so new. Although some current global issues (especially climate 
change) are more intense and have a wider scope, various problems have already 
occurred that also did not fit the paradigm of harm and moral responsibility. Referring to 
the origins of common-sense morality thus cannot explain why, over the past centuries, 
conventional moral practices have evolved with respect to other issues, while remaining 
(at least, according to the same line of reasoning) so thoroughly inadequate to respond to 
these New Harms.  
We then examined how we could enhance our moral judgment regarding climate 
change specifically. We argued that the predominant focus on the omissions involved in 
climate change, on the remoteness of its impacts, and on the fact that its effects are the 
aggregate result of the actions of a number of people is deceitful. We claimed that climate 
change should rather be assessed as a matter both of omissions and acts, remote effects 
and near effects, and group effects and individual effects. More generally, we emphasized 
that how an argument is framed, can significantly affect the motivation people have to 
fulfil their obligations. More specifically, whether an obligation is perceived as an 
obligation of justice or as an obligation of assistance, seems especially relevant. Our 
phenomenology of agency can thus be deployed in such a way that our motivation to fulfil 
our obligations is significantly strengthened. 
The first way in which the feasibility objections at the level of the individual agent can 
be overcome thus is to enhance people’s moral judgment based on conventional moral 
ideas. By emphasizing that they are in fact harming others and acting wrongly, even 
measured by their own standards, we might expect to heighten their guilt and, under the 
right conditions, their motivation to end the harmful situation. However, how successful 
this strategy will be remains to be seen. Moreover, we are still facing a (perceived) 
problem of demandingness and the allocation problem. We therefore also explored a 
second way to overcome these problems, namely collectivizing and thereby 
institutionalizing our duties. In chapter 6 we already argued that the delegation of 
responsibilities to institutions could solve the motivational problems we experience at 
the individual level, but only if we fulfil our responsibilities, both individually and 
politically. In chapter 7 we discussed the importance of role reminders. Here we 
elaborated on what this mechanism might imply for politicians with regard to their 
responsibilities in overcoming the motivational problem at the level of the individual 
moral agent. 
We claimed that our current democratic response to climate change is so unjust that 
it should be challenged undemocratically. Consequently, we believe that our politicians 
are entitled, even obligated, to implement measures that could effectively tackle climate 
change, even if their citizens do not demand this. However, the current political situation 
makes this very unlikely. Given the economic and financial crisis, voters tend to 
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emphasize the importance of their national economic interests even more, and 
politicians are likely to follow. Moreover, we acknowledged that not everyone accepts 
that duties of justice should sometimes overrule democratic demands. Therefore, we 
argued for a more limited obligation that can accommodate both concerns and offers a 
way out of the current gridlock; the moral obligation to nudge. 
We believe that these two strategies (enhancing our moral judgment and libertarian 
benevolence) might prove extremely valuable in overcoming the motivational gap at the 
level of the individual moral agent and consequently increase the feasibility of our 
minimal conception of global justice significantly. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
Almost four years ago, I started this project with the intention to answer some of the 
questions on global justice that personally puzzled me. In this concluding chapter, I will 
provide an overview of these questions and briefly reiterate how we have answered them 
throughout this dissertation. 
9.1 Globalization and global justice 
What is global justice? 
The first question we have addressed in this dissertation is what global justice exactly 
means. When I started this project, I would have answered this question in a utilitarian 
way; global justice should be equated to the greatest happiness for the greatest number. 
However, lurking doubts concerning this position were part of my motivation to attempt 
this project. First of all, utilitarianism faces clear feasibility objections, as it is an 
extremely demanding position. Moreover, far from everyone is convinced that happiness 
is the value or good that we should be promoting globally. There exist a wide variety of 
ethical viewpoints and conceptions of global justice that cannot be dismissed easily. 
Examining how we should deal with this disagreement and developing our own position 
in the debate on global justice thus was the overarching aim of chapter 2. 
We started chapter 2 by providing an overview of the key arguments in the debate 
between realists, society-of-states proponents (and nationalists), and cosmopolitans. 
First, we dismissed political realism as a kind of scepticism, both on empirical and ethical 
grounds. Second, we focused on the society-of-states approach and Godwin’s famous 
question what magic there is in the pronoun ‘my’? We refuted the efficiency argument 
and then assessed intrinsic defences of the priority thesis. Proponents of this thesis all 
believe that the relationship under consideration (nation, state, or community) is 
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intrinsically valuable, that the corresponding obligations are integral to the relationship, 
and that no injustice is involved in giving priority to the relevant group. We granted that 
condition 1 and 2 might be met, yet made an important reservation regarding condition 
3. We argued that whether or not the distributive objection proves the priority thesis to be 
unjust, seems to depend on the extent to which we should give priority to our compatriots. 
In principle, there is nothing inherently wrong with special obligations to compatriots. 
However, this in no way implies that giving priority is always justifiable. Our relationship 
with our fellow human beings also has intrinsic value, which generates certain 
obligations. Consequently, giving absolute priority to those with whom we share a nation, 
state, or community is unjust because it does not give our general obligations their due 
weight. 
The status that one ascribes to special relationships and the corresponding obligations 
thus is a crucial factor in the debate between society-of-states proponents and 
cosmopolitans. In this context we have differentiated between extreme and moderate 
forms of cosmopolitanism, explaining that moderate cosmopolitans can accept that there 
are special responsibilities that we owe to our compatriots but not to distant strangers. 
In this way, moderate cosmopolitanism seems to come close to certain forms of 
nationalism or the society-of-states approach. We have discussed how our general and 
special obligations should be balanced in chapters 6 and 7.  
Before outlining our own position, we have focused our attention on cosmopolitanism. 
We first explained which features are shared by all variants of cosmopolitanism and then 
discussed the different conceptions of cosmopolitanism. Finally, we have assessed the 
most prominent variants of moral cosmopolitanism, namely utilitarianism, a 
contractarian account, a needs-based account, the capabilities approach, a Kantian 
account, and a rights-based account of cosmopolitanism. 
In the final section of chapter 2, we have developed our own position in the debate on 
global justice. We have argued that global justice should be understood in a normatively 
minimalist way, namely as respecting a limited list of basic human rights. More 
demanding conceptions of global justice cannot be justified, given the reasonable 
disagreement that exists and the concept of equal respect. Since this position is a moderate 
(allowing special obligations) and weak (not arguing for global equality) form of 
cosmopolitanism, it will not face as much opposition as extreme and strong accounts. 
Moreover, by limiting our account to negative rights, we can avoid the allocation problem 
we have discussed. Conceptualising our position as rights-based also endows the 
corresponding claims with a special moral status.  
In answering the question what global justice exactly means, we were guided by Rawls’ 
concept of a ‘realistic utopia’. Since our overarching concern is with the feasibility of 
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global justice, we were drawn away from extremely demanding positions (e.g. 
utilitarianism) to the more moderate, minimalist conceptions. However, our normatively 
minimalist position might be criticized for neglecting the utopian side of Rawls’ concept. 
Avoiding the active violation of negative human rights might be said to be too meagre as 
an idealistic goal. To what extent we are already fulfilling this goal is the question we have 
examined in chapter 3. 
Has globalization changed our responsibilities regarding global justice, 
and if so, how? 
In chapter 3 we have examined how our normatively minimalist conception of global 
justice affects the obligations we bear within our current globalized world. In other 
words, we have tried to answer the question whether we are violating the human rights 
of distant others through our role in the process of globalization. We have used the active 
violation of negative human rights as our baseline for determining harm. If one violates 
someone’s human rights, one is, without any doubt, harming that person. Moreover, if 
we are harming someone, we acquire a special relationship with the people whose human 
rights we violate and we bear responsibility towards them, irrespective of whether or not 
we actually value this relationship. We claim that harming someone provides a very 
strong reason to value a relationship. Through the process of harming, our general 
positive duty of charity becomes a special positive duty of justice. We have argued that 
this is not merely a question of semantics; it endows the human right under consideration 
with more stringency and, thus, hopefully, more motivational power.1 
More specifically, we have focused our attention on two aspects of globalization, 
namely the global economic order and climate change. We have argued that sustaining 
the global economic order can violate our negative duty not to harm others, but that this 
conclusion depends on the particular benchmark we use. We have considered three 
possible benchmarks, namely the past, a counterfactual reference, and a benchmark of 
fairness, and have established that only the historical benchmark provides a meaningful 
point of comparison. However, as we can use both a relative and an absolute 
interpretation of this benchmark, we are unable to determine beyond any doubt whether 
or not we are harming distant others through our role in upholding the global economic 
order. 
Failing to mitigate climate change, in contrast, does entail a violation of our negative 
duties, due to our causal role regarding its harmful effects. Consequently, we have a 
 
                                                     
1 We have elaborated on the motivational power of framing an argument in chapter 8.  
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reason to value our relationship with those who are adversely affected by climate change 
and we bear responsibility for them, even if we do not feel (sufficiently) motivated to 
assume such responsibility. The harm we cause through climate change thus grounds 
positive special obligations of justice to remedy this situation, and, at the least, to 
recompense those harmed and to implement the required reforms.2 We urgently need to 
emphasize that failing to fulfil these obligations is a matter of justice, not charity.  
We have concluded this chapter with a plea for caution. Using harm as the decisive 
benchmark does not always provide a clear recommendation, as our discussion of the 
global economic order has illustrated. Since whether or not something is considered a 
harm also determines the status of the corresponding positive duties and, consequently, 
their normative force, depending on such an all or nothing mechanism seems imprudent. 
Therefore, we have argued that the ‘vulnerability presumption principle’ should play an 
important role in this regard. It clearly strengthens our account of characterizing the 
positive duties of mitigating climate change as special obligations of justice. Regarding 
the global economic order, however, we have argued that this principle could inspire us 
to interpret the historical benchmark in absolute numbers, thereby accepting the 
resulting special obligations of justice. We can thus still deny that we are harming distant 
others through our role in upholding the global economic order, yet in doing so we must 
acknowledge that the standards of proof we are using, express a willingness to err at the 
expense of the most vulnerable people. 
Case study: The Health Impact Fund 
The globalized world we live in is characterized by a multitude of causal connections. 
Determining whether or not we are harming others through our role in these processes 
is anything but straightforward. Moreover, the delegation of responsibilities seems to 
complicate these causal relations even further. However, in order to fulfil the 
responsibilities generated by the process of globalization, we need to examine our role in 
these different contexts thoroughly. In chapter 4, we have therefore conducted a case 
study to illustrate the possible tension between globalization and the fulfilment of human 
rights. More specifically, we have focused on the global governance regime designed to 
regulate intellectual property rights (especially patents) and the effects this regime has 
for the global fulfilment of the human right to health (especially access to medicines). 
 
                                                     
2 We have discussed the required reforms to tackle climate change and our responsibilities in this context in 
chapters 6 and 7. 
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Our starting point for this chapter was the lack of access to essential medicines that 
affects more than a third of the world’s population. After explaining how this harmful 
situation is caused, we have discussed a range of proposed solutions to address this lack 
of access to medicines. We have found them all wanting in at least one respect. 
Consequently, we have focused our attention on the Health Impact Fund (HIF), a 
supranational body, majoritatively funded by developed countries, intended to address 
the problem of affordable access to new medicines for diseases primarily affecting 
developing countries.  
We here want to emphasize that the lack of access to medicines is a consequence of the 
incentive structure of the pharmaceutical industry and the current patent protection. 
This is clearly illustrated by the impact the TRIPs Agreement had on poor people in 
developing countries. As the influence of global governance institutions such as the WTO 
on domestic policy-making grows, the boundaries between the national and the 
international spheres are disappearing in various contexts. As a consequence, giving 
absolute priority to our national economic interests, might result in the violation of 
negative human rights elsewhere.  
To the extent that these global governance institutions are determined by democratic 
governments, their citizens become complicit in the resulting violations of human 
rights.3 As citizens of a democratic country, we thus have an important obligation of 
justice to reform these institutions in a way that will end the harmful situation under 
consideration. We are quite directly implicated in the human rights violations and fail to 
meet our obligations, even under our minimal conception of global justice. We thus have 
argued for a cosmopolitan stance, where the design of global institutional arrangements 
is guided by the needs and interests of all human beings, weighted equally. We believe 
that the HIF is an excellent source of inspiration to successfully tackle this enormous 
challenge. 
9.2 Feasibility objections  
In Part I of this dissertation we have tried to answer the questions of what global justice 
is and how the process of globalization has changed our responsibilities in attaining it. In 
Part II, we have examined feasibility objections that suggest that cosmopolitan justice 
 
                                                     
3 If the policies of these global governance institutions turn out not to be determined by democratic 
governments, their legitimacy should be challenged on this important ground.  
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should not be strived for because it cannot be attained. Our focus was on the case of 
climate change, since this aspect of globalization presents a more clear-cut illustration of 
harm than upholding the global economic order (as we have argued in chapter 3). We are 
in fact harming distant others through our role in the process of climate change, and 
consequently bear a special responsibility towards them, irrespective of whether or not 
we actually value this relationship. We have investigated the feasibility objections 
regarding tackling climate change, both at the individual (chapter 5) and at the institutional 
level (chapters 6 and 7). 
The level of the individual 
The most commonly invoked feasibility objection at the level of the individual moral 
agent is that cosmopolitan justice will necessarily remain unfeasible in view of the nature 
of human beings. The claim is that our common sense conception of individual 
responsibility is ill equipped to deal with the new and complex modes of interaction that 
characterize our globalized world. Our moral judgment system is thus said to be 
inadequate to cope with so-called ‘New Harms’. 
In chapter 5 we have examined whether this claim can be invoked to explain the 
motivational gap regarding climate change. The question we have tried to answer is 
whether our lack of motivation to tackle climate change really is insurmountable? 
The starting point was the fact that although climate change jeopardizes the 
fundamental human rights of current as well as future people, current actions and 
ambitions to tackle it are clearly inadequate, which indicates a lack of motivation. The 
predominant explanation for this motivational gap maintains that our conventional 
moral judgment system is not well equipped to identify a complex problem such as 
climate change as an important moral problem. However, we have argued that this 
explanation is incomplete, since it disregards people’s ability to psychologically 
reconstruct a problem in order to reduce its urgency or minimize perceptions of their 
own contribution to it. Moreover, we have argued that the complexity of problems such 
as climate change precisely provides the necessary latitude for people to deploy strategies 
of moral disengagement, enabling them to dissociate self-condemnation from harmful 
conduct.4 In this way, emitters are able to maintain their consumptive lifestyle without 
 
                                                     
4 Whether this is a conscious strategy has been a subject of discussion. It might be argued that this ‘deployment’ 
rather is a natural psychological process. Discussing this issue further unfortunately falls beyond the scope of 
this chapter. 
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having to accept moral responsibility for the harmful effects of their profligate 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
Since these strategies of moral disengagement contribute significantly to the 
motivational gap to successfully respond to climate change, we have proposed three 
avenues for tackling moral disengagement. First, we should attempt to increase the moral 
urgency of climate change by enhancing people’s moral judgment of their contribution 
to the problem.5 Second, we should encourage people to evaluate and reconsider their 
self-interested materialistic motives. Finally, we have argued that the propensity for 
moral disengagement itself should be tackled, by promoting a better general 
understanding of moral psychology and the function of moral disengagement.  
We have not denied that climate change poses a serious challenge to our moral 
judgment system, due to its inherent complexity. Rather, we have argued that moral 
disengagement is an important additional explanatory factor for the existing 
motivational gap. When the inadequacy of our moral judgment system is invoked to 
justify inaction regarding New Harms, we consequently need to be on our guard. 
The institutional level 
After focusing on the level of the individual moral agent, we have turned our attention to 
the institutional level. More specifically, we have focused on the institutions involved in 
the tackling of climate change, namely the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the states (and politicians) that constitute this institution (the 
Parties to the UNFCCC), and the citizens of these states. The questions we have tried to 
answer are how we should deal with the illegitimacy of the UNFCCC (chapter 6) and how 
possible conflicts between democracy and justice should be solved (chapter 7). 
Our starting point in chapter 6 again was the fact that the response to the challenge of 
climate change is characterized by inadequate action at all levels. More specifically, we 
have focused on one argument that is often invoked to explain this inaction, namely that 
addressing climate change is exclusively the job of others – primarily the government and 
supranational institutions. In this context, we have explained the delegated authority 
model and then examined the legitimacy of the UNFCCC using three substantive criteria 
(minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, and institutional integrity). In this 
way, we have tried to answer the question whether the failure to implement a robust 
policy to tackle climate change necessarily implies that the relevant institution loses its 
 
                                                     
5 See also section 8.2. 
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legitimacy. With regard to the UNFCCC, we have argued that the only way to save its 
legitimacy would be to prove that the current arrangement really is the best feasible 
option. 
More specifically, we have examined whether the failure to design a policy that 
respects basic human rights is due to unwillingness on the part of the political 
representatives or due to genuine unfeasibility. In contrast to the general perception, we 
have argued that the failed delegation of responsibilities should not in the first place be 
ascribed to the elected delegates. Since their electors fail to give them a strong mandate 
to strive for a robust climate policy, the availability of feasible options for the political 
representatives to defend a strong agreement is severely limited.  
The implications of this failed delegation of responsibility are twofold. First, since 
responsibility is in fact not delegated to the collective level in a consistent way, most 
citizens of developed, high emitting countries can no longer invoke this model of political 
legitimacy as an excuse for the general inaction regarding climate change. Hiding behind 
the delegated authority model should then be characterized as a mechanism of moral 
disengagement through which people deny their individual responsibility in an 
unjustifiable way. Consequently, we are no longer justified to shift the blame for the 
failure to effectively tackle climate change onto our representatives and the institution 
they constitute. We should urgently recognize that the delegated authority model is 
being misused to facilitate moral disengagement and to evade responsibility for the 
violation of basic human rights entailed by climate change. The second implication of the 
current illegitimacy of the UNFCCC is that we need to take responsibility (both 
individually and politically) for the failed delegation of responsibility. If we want to 
maintain that it is the task of the government and supranational institutions to address 
climate change, we at the very least have the obligation to vote for parties that explicitly 
advocate robust policies to tackle climate change. If we fail this minimalist task, we should 
accept our complicity in the resulting violations of basic human rights caused by climate 
change. 
In chapter 7 we have discussed other ways to deal with the illegitimacy of institutions 
and to solve possible conflicts between democracy and justice. We have argued that the 
way in which climate change is currently handled is an excellent illustration of this 
tension that may exist between democracy and justice, even under our minimalist 
conception of global justice. We have examined two problems of accountability that 
contribute significantly to this failure of democracy, namely that politicians do not only 
lack accountability for the future adverse effects of their policies, but also for the adverse 
effects their policies have on current people who do not belong to their own 
constituencies. Both factors undermine the effective tackling of climate change by 
democratic institutions significantly, at least in their current form. The successful 
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functioning of the UNFCCC is further jeopardized by its requirement of consensus 
decision making.   
We went on to discuss different solutions for this failure of democracy and proposed 
three possible strategies for making democracy just, namely role reminders, institutional 
reform, and the role of courts and litigation. Since role reminders could solve the problem 
within the current institutions, it is the most elegant solution and should be pursued first 
and foremost. If we, as citizens, would fulfil our political obligation and give our political 
representatives a robust mandate to tackle climate change, they might just succeed. 
However, if we fail to do so, politicians not only are permitted, but rather have the 
obligation, to overrule democratic demands by considerations of justice. The current 
political circumstances (e.g. the two problems of accountability we have discussed) make 
this course of action very unlikely. 
Institutional reforms thus might be necessary to break the current deadlock, both at 
the international and the national level. Regarding the UNFCCC, we have argued that its 
current consensus decision making should be replaced by majority voting. At the level of 
the individual states, reforms should be implemented to end the pervasive and harmful 
short-termism. However, in both contexts, history does not give much cause for 
optimism.  
Therefore, we might need to adopt a ‘last resort’ type strategy, namely suing 
governments that fail to fulfil their obligations regarding climate change. If the preferred 
solutions (role reminders and institutional reforms) fail to end the violation of basic 
human rights, this more drastic instrument might be justified, or even obligatory. When 
faced with this enduring injustice, hiding behind the democratic nature of the decision-
making process can never be justified. 
9.3 How to overcome the feasibility objections at the level 
of the individual moral agent? 
In Part III of this dissertation, we have examined how the feasibility objections at the level 
of the individual agent should be tackled. More specifically, we have investigated ways to 
overcome the lack of motivation to tackle climate change. 
Our starting point in chapter 8 was the lack of motivation people experience to tackle 
so-called ‘New Harms’ and the extent to which this is a consequence of our 
phenomenology of agency. We thus have tried to answer the question whether our 
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phenomenology of agency really is too ill-suited to deliver a moral judgment of climate 
change that fully captures its urgency. We believe this claim is excessive and have 
questioned whether these New Harms really are so new. Moreover, we have argued that 
climate change does in fact correspond to a paradigm moral problem in certain important 
respects. Climate change is a matter both of omissions and acts, remote effects and near 
effects, and group effects and individual effects, and it should also be characterized along 
these lines.   
More generally, we have argued that the way in which an argument is framed, can have 
a significant impact upon people’s motivation to fulfil their obligations. More specifically, 
whether an obligation is perceived as an obligation of justice or as an obligation of 
assistance, can really make a difference from a motivational perspective. If people fully 
grasp that they are in fact harming others and acting wrongly, even under a minimal 
conception of global justice, we might expect to heighten their guilt and their motivation 
to end this harmful situation. The first way in which the motivational gap at the 
individual level can be overcome thus is to enhance people’s moral judgment based on 
conventional moral ideas.  
We fully acknowledge that this first strategy will most likely not succeed in bridging 
the motivational gap completely. Moreover, the causal efficacy of institutions, the 
perceived demandingness of our obligations, and the allocation problem, all provide good 
reasons to collectivize and thereby institutionalize our duties. In this way, the delegation 
of responsibilities to institutions could solve the motivational problems we experience at 
the individual level (partly) due to our phenomenology of agency. However, all relevant 
actors need to fulfil their respective responsibilities, for the delegation to be successful.  
We have already discussed the mechanism of role reminders as a possible solution for 
conflicts between democracy and justice. In chapter 8, we have further elaborated on 
what this mechanism might mean for the responsibilities of politicians in overcoming the 
motivational problem at the level of the individual moral agent. We have again argued 
that politicians have the obligation to overrule democratic demands, if these result in the 
violation of basic human rights. We have also assessed the two objections that challenge 
this claim. First, our claim that duties of justice should sometimes overrule democratic 
demands might be challenged on theoretical (e.g. libertarian) grounds. A second, more 
pragmatic, objection is that forcing people to fulfil their obligations might result in 
electoral punishment for the respective politicians. Enforcing the fulfilment of 
obligations of justice might thus be both illegitimate and impractical. However, we have 
argued for a more limited obligation that can accommodate both concerns and offers a 
way out of the current gridlock; the moral obligation to nudge. We have argued that this 
obligation can accommodate the libertarian criticism, since nudging, by definition, rules 
out coercion. Moreover, we believe that the risk of getting punished electorally can be 
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reduced significantly by ensuring that people can opt out relatively easily. In this way, 
the moral obligation to nudge combines both realistic and utopian elements. Fulfilling 
this obligation is an important feasible step in attaining our minimal conception of global 
justice. 
9.4 Avenues for future research 
In this dissertation we have examined how the process of globalization has changed our 
responsibilities, with climate change as our focal point. We believe that we should 
examine whether or not we are harming people through our role in all the different 
aspects of globalization (e.g. migration, international trade, taxation, the global financial 
system, …). We fully acknowledge that our phenomenology of agency complicates our 
understanding of the (potentially harmful) interactions in which we participate. 
Moreover, the specificities of the different aspects and the relevant institutions will make 
this investigation even more challenging. As the world becomes more complicated, so do 
our responsibilities. However, if we want to convincingly maintain that we are not acting 
unjustly, even under a minimal conception of global justice, we need to take up this 
daunting challenge.  
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Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
Globalisering en globale rechtvaardigheid 
De eerste vraag die we in deze dissertatie hebben beantwoord is wat globale 
rechtvaardigheid precies betekent. We worden geconfronteerd met een verscheidenheid 
aan ethische standpunten en uiteenlopende opvattingen over globale rechtvaardigheid 
en kunnen deze niet eenvoudig verwerpen. Daarom is de eerste logische stap in ons 
onderzoek om te onderzoeken hoe we met dit gebrek aan overeenstemming omgaan en 
om onze eigen positie in dit debat af te bakenen. Daartoe hebben we eerst een overzicht 
gegeven van de belangrijkste argumenten in het debat tussen realisten, aanhangers van 
de gemeenschap-van-staten benadering (en nationalisten), en cosmopolitanisten. 
Vervolgens hebben we de meest vooraanstaande varianten van moreel cosmopolitanisme 
beoordeeld, zijnde utilitarisme, een contractarische variant, een noden-variant, de 
capabilities-benadering, een Kantiaanse variant, en een cosmopolitanisme gebaseerd op 
rechten.  
Bij het ontwikkelen van onze eigen positie hebben we geargumenteerd dat globale 
rechtvaardigheid ingevuld moet worden op een normatief-minimalistische manier, 
namelijk als respect voor een beperkte lijst van fundamentele mensenrechten. 
Veeleisender posities kunnen niet gerechtvaardigd worden, gegeven dat er een redelijke 
onenigheid bestaat en dat we elkaar gelijk respect verschuldigd zijn. Aangezien onze 
positie een gematigde (speciale verplichtingen zijn toegelaten) en zwakke (niet ijverend 
voor globale gelijkheid) vorm van cosmopolitanisme is, moet ze niet zoveel tegenstand 
verwerken als extreme en sterke vormen. Dit is een belangrijke kwaliteit met het oog op 
de haalbaarheid van globale rechtvaardigheid. Daarenboven beperken we onze positie tot 
negatieve rechten, waardoor we het allocatie-probleem kunnen vermijden. Aangezien we 
onze positie ook conceptualiseren als een rechten-benadering, krijgen de 
overeenkomstige aanspraken ook een speciale morele status toegeschreven. 
De volgende stap in ons onderzoek was nagaan hoe onze normatief-minimalistische 
visie op globale rechtvaardigheid onze verplichtingen binnen de huidige geglobaliseerde 
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wereld beïnvloedt. Anders gezegd, we hebben geprobeerd om de vraag te beantwoorden 
of we door onze rol in het proces van globalisering mensenrechten aan het schenden zijn. 
We hebben ons hierbij in het bijzonder gericht op twee aspecten van globalisering, 
namelijk de globale economische orde en klimaatverandering. We hebben 
geargumenteerd dat het ondersteunen van de huidige economische orde kan betekenen 
dat we onze negatieve plicht tot niet schaden overtreden. Echter, deze conclusie lijkt af 
te hangen van de specifieke maatstaf die we gebruiken. We pleiten ervoor om het 
‘vulnerability presumption principle’ een belangrijke rol te laten spelen in deze context. 
Als we er niet in slagen de klimaatverandering tegen te gaan, schenden we onze negatieve 
plichten zonder enige twijfel, aangezien dit actief schade berokkent aan anderen en hun 
situatie verslechtert. Bijgevolg hebben we een goede reden om onze relatie met diegenen 
die worden geschaad door klimaatverandering te waarderen en we dragen 
verantwoordelijkheid voor hen, zelfs als we niet (voldoende) gemotiveerd zijn om deze 
op te nemen. De schade die we berokkenen via klimaatverandering brengt op deze manier 
speciale positieve rechtvaardigheidsplichten om deze situatie te remediëren met zich 
mee. Op zijn minst hebben we de plicht om de getroffenen te compenseren voor hun 
schade en om de nodige hervormingen door te voeren. We moeten hierbij benadrukken 
dat het vervullen van deze plichten een kwestie van rechtvaardigheid is, geen 
liefdadigheid. 
Het eerste deel van deze dissertatie hebben we afgesloten door de mogelijk spanning 
tussen globalisering en mensenrechten meer concreet te onderzoeken aan de hand van 
een gevalstudie. We hebben onze aandacht gericht op het mondiaal bestuur en beleid dat 
ontworpen is om intellectuele eigendomsrechten (voornamelijk patenten) te reguleren 
en de gevolgen van dit regime voor de globale vervulling van het mensenrecht op 
gezondheid (voornamelijk toegang tot medicijnen). Het Health Impact Fund werd 
uitgebreid besproken als mogelijke oplossing voor de huidige crisis rond toegang tot 
essentiële medicijnen. 
Problemen rond haalbaarheid 
In het tweede deel van deze dissertatie hebben we haalbaarheidsproblemen onderzocht 
die suggereren dat globale rechtvaardigheid niet moet worden nagestreefd, omdat dit 
niet bereikt kan worden. We hebben onze aandacht gericht op klimaatverandering, 
aangezien dit een duidelijkere illustratie van schade is dan het ondersteunen van de 
globale economische orde. De haalbaarheidsproblemen rond het tegengaan van 
klimaatverandering hebben we zowel op het individuele als op het institutionele niveau 
onderzocht.  
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De meest gebruikte tegenwerping op het individuele niveau is dat globale 
rechtvaardigheid onhaalbaar zal blijven ten gevolge van de menselijke natuur. Hierbij 
stelt men dat onze gangbare opvatting van individuele verantwoordelijkheid slecht is 
uitgerust om te kunnen omgaan met de nieuwe en complexe manieren van interageren 
die onze huidige geglobaliseerde wereld karakteriseren. We hebben onderzocht of deze 
claim gebruikt kan worden om het gebrek aan motivatie met betrekking tot 
klimaatverandering te verklaren. De vraag die we hierbij hebben proberen beantwoorden 
is of het gebrek aan motivatie om klimaatverandering aan te pakken werkelijk 
onoverkomelijk is. 
We erkennen ten volle dat klimaatverandering een enorme uitdaging vormt voor ons 
moreel oordeelsysteem door de inherente complexiteit van het probleem. We hebben 
echter geargumenteerd dat deze verklaring onvolledig is, aangezien ze geen rekening 
houdt met de mogelijkheid om een probleem psychologisch zo te reconstrueren dat de 
ernst ervan verkleind wordt, net als de ervaring van onze eigen bijdrage aan het 
probleem. Bovendien lijkt het net de complexiteit van dergelijke problemen te zijn, die 
mensen de ruimte geeft om strategieën van ‘moral disengagement’ te gebruiken, 
waardoor ze zelfkritiek kunnen loskoppelen van hun schadelijk gedrag. 
Na de bespreking van het individuele niveau, hebben we onze aandacht gericht op het 
niveau van de instituties. Meer concreet hebben we ons gefocust op de instellingen die 
betrokken zijn bij de strijd tegen klimaatverandering, namelijk de United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), de staten (en politici) die deze 
instelling vormgeven (de ‘Parties to the UNFCCC’), en de burgers van deze staten. 
Eerst hebben we het argument beoordeeld dat het aanpakken van klimaatverandering 
uitsluitend de taak is van anderen, namelijk overheden en supranationale instellingen. In 
het bijzonder hebben we onderzocht of het uitblijven van een beleid dat de 
mensenrechten respecteert het gevolg is van onwil van de politieke afgevaardigden of 
echt een kwestie van onhaalbaarheid. In tegenstelling tot wat algemeen wordt 
aangenomen, hebben we geargumenteerd dat de gefaalde delegatie van 
verantwoordelijkheden niet in de eerste plaats mag worden toegeschreven aan onze 
politieke vertegenwoordigers. Aangezien het electoraat er niet in slaagt om hen een sterk 
mandaat te geven om een robuust beleid te voeren dat klimaatverandering kan 
tegengaan, wordt de beschikbaarheid van haalbare mogelijkheden voor de politici om een 
stevig akkoord te sluiten danig ingeperkt. Aangezien het delegeren van 
verantwoordelijkheid naar het collectieve niveau in feite niet consistent gebeurt, kunnen 
de meeste burgers van de ontwikkelde landen met een hoge uitstoot dit model van 
politieke legitimiteit niet langer als een excuus voor het gebrek aan actie gebruiken. Zich 
verschuilen achter het ‘delegated authority model’ moet dan ook gekarakteriseerd 
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worden als een mechanisme van ‘moral disengagement’, waardoor mensen hun 
individuele verantwoordelijkheid ontkennen op een ongerechtvaardigde manier.  
Het uitblijven van een sterk beleid dat klimaatverandering daadwerkelijk kan 
tegengaan, zet de legitimiteit van de relevante instellingen zwaar onder druk. Daarom 
hebben we onderzocht hoe we moeten omgaan met de vermeende illegitimiteit van 
instellingen en hoe we mogelijke conflicten tussen rechtvaardigheid en democratie 
moeten oplossen. We hebben geargumenteerd dat de manier waarop klimaatverandering 
momenteel wordt aangepakt een voorbeeld bij uitstek is van de mogelijke spanning 
tussen democratie en rechtvaardigheid, zelfs volgens onze minimalistische invulling van 
globale rechtvaardigheid. We hebben twee aansprakelijkheidsproblemen onderzocht die 
significant bijdragen aan dit falen van democratie, namelijk dat politici niet aansprakelijk 
worden gehouden voor de toekomstige negatieve gevolgen van hun beleid, noch voor de 
gevolgen van hun beleid voor mensen die niet tot hun kiesgebied behoren. Beide factoren 
ondermijnen een succesvolle aanpak van klimaatverandering door de democratische 
instellingen, althans in hun huidige vorm. Daarenboven wordt de succesvolle werking 
van de UNFCCC verder bemoeilijkt door de vereiste van consensus bij de besluitvorming. 
We hebben drie mogelijke oplossingen voor dit falen van de democratie voorgesteld, 
namelijk ‘role reminders’, institutionele hervormingen, en de rol van rechtbanken en 
rechtszaken. 
Hoe moeten we de haalbaarheidsproblemen op het niveau van de 
individuele morele agent overstijgen? 
In het laatste deel van deze dissertatie hebben we onderzocht hoe de individuele 
haalbaarheidsproblemen opgelost moeten worden. In het bijzonder zijn we ingegaan op 
manieren om het gebrek aan motivatie om klimaatverandering aan te pakken op te 
vangen. 
Ons startpunt hierbij was het gebrek aan motivatie dat mensen ervaren met betrekking 
tot zogenaamde ‘New Harms’ en de mate waarin dit een gevolg is van onze 
‘phenomenology of agency’. We hebben dus proberen beantwoorden of onze 
‘phenomenology of agency’ werkelijk te slecht is uitgerust om een moreel oordeel te 
vellen over klimaatverandering dat de ernst van het probleem volledig vat. We geloven 
dat deze claim excessief is en stellen in vraag of deze New Harms werkelijk zo nieuw zijn. 
Daarenboven hebben we geargumenteerd dat klimaatverandering in bepaalde aspecten 
wel degelijk overeenstemt met een ‘paradigm moral problem’. Klimaatverandering is een 
zaak van zowel omissies als handelingen, gevolgen ver en dichtbij, groepseffecten en 
individuele effecten. Het moet bijgevolg ook op deze manier gekarakteriseerd worden. 
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Meer algemeen hebben we geargumenteerd dat de manier waarop een argument 
gekaderd of geformuleerd wordt, een aanzienlijke impact kan hebben op de motivatie om 
verplichtingen te vervullen. Concreet maakt het een motivationeel verschil of een 
verplichting wordt ervaren als rechtvaardigheidsplicht of als een kwestie van 
liefdadigheid. Benadrukken dat het vervullen van onze plichten een zaak is van 
rechtvaardigheid, niet van liefdadigheid, zal hoogstwaarschijnlijk echter niet volstaan 
om het gebrek aan motivatie volledig op te vangen. Daarom hebben we verder onderzocht 
wat het mechanisme van ‘role reminders’ zou kunnen betekenen voor de 
verantwoordelijkheden van politici met betrekking tot het overstijgen van het 
motivatieprobleem op het niveau van de individuele morele agent. We hebben gepleit 
voor de morele plicht tot ‘nudging’ als een belangrijke en haalbare stap richting onze 
minimale invulling van globale rechtvaardigheid. 
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